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“Once	we	have	discarded	our	rooted	predilection	for	absolute	Causality,	we	shall	succeed	in	
overcoming	the	difficulties.”	
E.	Schrödinger:	What	is	a	Law	of	Nature?	Science	Theory	and	Man	
	
Abstract:	
We	critically	examine	the	role	and	status	probabilities,	as	they	enter	via	the	Quantum	Equilibrium	Hypothesis,	
play	 in	 the	 standard,	 deterministic	 interpretation	 of	 deBroglie’s	 and	 Bohm’s	 Pilot	 Wave	 Theory	 (dBBT),	 by	
considering	 interpretations	 of	 probabilities	 in	 terms	 of	 ignorance,	 typicality	 and	 Humean	 Best	 Systems,	
respectively.	We	argue	that	there	is	an	inherent	conflict	between	dBBT	and	probabilities,	thus	construed.	
The	conflict	originates	in	dBBT’s	deterministic	nature,	rooted	in	the	Guidance	Equation.	Inquiring	into	the	latter’s	
role	 within	 dBBT,	 we	 find	 it	 explanatorily	 redundant	 (in	 particular	 for	 dBBT’s	 solution	 of	 the	Measurement	
Problem,	 which	 only	 requires	 that	 the	 corpuscles	 possess	 definite	 positions),	 and	 subject	 to	 a	 number	 of	
difficulties.	Following	a	suggestion	from	Bell,	we	propose	to	abandon	the	Guidance	Equation,	whilst	retaining	
dBBT’s	point	particle-based	Primitive	Ontology,	with	positions	as	local	beables.	The	resultant	theory,	which	we	
identify	as	a	stochastic,	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory,	describes	a	random	walk	through	configuration	
space.	Its	probabilities,	we	propose,	are	best	understood	as	dispositions	of	possible	corpuscle	configurations	to	
manifest	themselves.	We	subsequently	evaluate	the	merits	of	sdBBT	vis-à-vis	dBBT,	such	as	the	justification	of	
the	Symmetrisation	Postulate	and	the	violation	of	the	Action-Reaction	Principle.	
Not	only	 is	 sdBBT	an	 attractive	Bohmian	 theory	 that,	whilst	 retaining	dBBT's	 virtues,	 overcomes	many	of	 its	
shortcomings;	it	also	sparks	off	a	number	of	exciting	follow-up	questions,	such	as	a	comparison	between	sdBBT	
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and	 other	 stochastic	 hidden-variable	 theories,	 e.g.	 Nelson	 Stochastics,	 or	 between	 sdBBT	 and	 the	 Everett	
interpretation.	
	
Keywords:	 Bohmian	 Mechanics;	 Probabilities;	 Typicality;	 Humeanism;	 Bell’s	 Formulation	 of	 the	 Everett	
Interpretation;	Primitive	Ontology	
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I.		Introduction	
Vis-à-vis	the	hassle	in	the	foundations	of	quantum	mechanics	(QM),	esp.	the	measurement	
problem,	the	interpretation	of	the	Heisenberg	relations	and	their	joint	culmination	in	the	EPR	
“paradox”	(1935),	the	question	arises	whether	QM	in	its	current	form	is	incomplete:	Might	
there	 exist	 an	 element	 of	 physical	 reality	 that	 has	 no	 counterpart	 in	 QM?1 	Einstein,	 for	
instance,	was	“[…]	firmly	convinced	that	the	essentially	statistical	character	of	contemporary	
quantum	 theory	 is	 solely	 to	 be	 ascribed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 [theory]	 operates	 with	 an	
incomplete	description	of	physical	systems.”2		
deBroglie-Bohm	Theory	 (dBBT)	 is	 an	attempt	 to	 complete	QM:	 It	 proffers	 an	account	of	 a	
deterministic	dynamics	that	describes	a	sub-quantum	particle	world,	from	which	QM	emerges	
–	as	Einstein	had	hoped	 for	–	 in	 a	manner	 “approximately	 analogous	 […]	 to	 the	 statistical	
mechanics	within	the	framework	of	classical	mechanics.”3	
This	reference	to	statistical	mechanics	(SM)	prompts	three	questions.		
1. What	does	the	asserted	analogy	between	dBBT	and	SM	consist	in?		
2. To	what	extent	is	it	justified?	
3. What	 precisely	 does	 the	 “statistical	 character”	 of	 QM	 consist	 in	 from	 the	 dBBT	
perspective?	What	is	the	role	and	status	of	probabilities	within	dBBT?		
Our	subsequent	pursuit	of	these	questions	will	put	its	finger	to	what	we’ll	argue	to	be	dBBT’s	
biggest	 shortcoming,	 namely	 the	 joint	 incompatibility	 of	 its	 deterministic	 dynamics,	 its	
probabilistic	Quantum	 Equilibrium	Hypothesis	 and	 its	 aspiration	 to	 a	 thoroughly	 objective	
“quantum	 theory	without	observer.”	As	 a	natural	 and	 conservative	 resolution,	 following	 a	
suggestion	 by	 Bell,	 we	 propose	 to	 simply	 drop	 the	 deterministic	 dynamics,	 yielding	 a	
fundamentally	stochastic	deBroglie-Bohmian	“rump	theory”.	The	following	paper	will	attempt	
to	take	up	the	cudgels	for	this	so-far	largely	neglected	theory	as	superior	to	dBBT.	
We’ll	proceed	as	follows:	In	section	II,	we	briefly	review	(II.1)	and	critically	examine	(II.2)	the	
standard	 interpretation	 of	 dBBT	 and	 the	 status	 probability	 has	 in	 it,	 considering	
interpretations	in	terms	of	ignorance	as	well	as	typicality	and	Humean	Best	Systems	(II.3).	The	
																																																						
1	Einstein	et	al.	(1935),	cited	in	Redhead	(1987),	p.71,	who	also	discusses	the	EPR	argument	in	detail.	
2	Einstein	(1949),	p.	666	
3	Ibid.	
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subsequent	analysis	of	the	role	the	Guidance	Equation	plays	within	dBBT	(III.1)	suggests	an	
alternative	 stochastic	 reading	 of	 dBBT	 that	 dispenses	 with	 it:	 stochastic	 deBroglie-Bohm	
Theory	(sdBBT).	The	resulting	theory	is	irreducibly	stochastic	with	the	probabilities	of	the	Born	
Rule	representing	a	disposition	for	a	random	walk	through	configuration	space	(III.2).	In	IV,	we	
critically	examine	 sdBBT,	 its	 status	as	a	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	 theory	 (IV.1),	 and	 its	
status	 as	 a	 fundamental	 (rather	 than	 a	 merely	 phenomenalist)	 theory	 (IV.2).	 In	 IV.3,	 we	
address	an	objection	Bell	has	articulated	against	sdBBT,	namely	its	“temporal	solipsism”,	i.e.	
the	temporal	discontinuity	of	the	world	according	to	sdBBT.	We	conclude	section	IV	with	the	
completion	of	our	comparison	of	dBBT’s	and	sdBBT’s	virtues,	respectively,	along	the	lines	of	
metaphysical	questions	regarding	the	status	of	the	wavefunction	in	both,	the	justification	of	
the	Symmetrisation	Postulate	and	claimed	conceptual	advantages	for	calculations	regarding	
quantum	tunnelling.	IV.5.4	discusses	the	issue	of	relativity	in	sdBBT	and	dBBT,	respectively.	In	
the	 last	 section	 (V),	we	 summarise	our	main	 findings	 and	 sketch	promising	 lines	of	 future	
enquiry.	II.	dBBT	and	its	discontents	II.1.	Standard	dBBT	
For	a	universe	with	N	corpuscles	of	mass	𝑚" 	each4,	dBBT	consists	of	three	axioms:	
(1) The	 standard,	 non-relativistic	N-particle	 Schrödinger	 Equation	 (SE):	𝑖ℏ %%& 𝜓& 𝒒, 𝑡 =𝐻𝜓&(𝒒, 𝑡) 	with	 the	 wavefunction	𝜓&:	ℝ23×ℝ → ℂ 	and	 the	 N-particle	 Hamiltonian	𝐻 = − ℏ89:;3"<= 𝛁?9 + 𝑉(𝒒, 𝑡)	with	𝛁? = BB𝐪𝐢,	𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁.	
(2) The	Guidance	Equation	(GE),	governing	the	i-th	corpuscle’s	trajectories	(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁):		𝑚" H𝑸;H& = ℏ𝔍𝔪 𝛁;LL :	Given	initial	positions	of	the	corpuscles,	the	GE	determines	their	
positions	 at	 any	 other	 time.	 Existence	 and	 uniqueness	 of	 the	 trajectories	 are	
guaranteed	under	prima	facie	reasonable	assumptions	(more	on	this	in	III.2).	
																																																						
4	Ascribing	the	masses	to	the	corpuscles	turns	out	to	be	subtle	–	an	issue	to	which	we’ll	return	in	III.2.	For	the	
time	being	suffice	it	here	to	cite	the	arguably	consensus	view	Esfeld	articulates	“[…][The	corpuscles]	do	not	have	
any	hysical	properties	over	and	above	their	being	localised	in	physical	space.	Hence,	[…]	these	objects	cannot	be	
considered	as	having	an	intrinsic	mass	or	an	intrinsic	charge	(or	an	intrinsic	spin).	They	do	not	have	any	intrinsic	
properties”,	Esfeld	(2016),	p.4.		
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(3) The	Quantum	Equilibrium	Hypothesis	(QEH):	For	an	ensemble	of	identical	systems	with	
the	same	wavefunction	𝜓,	the	corpuscles’	configurations	are	distributed	according	to	
the	Born	Rule	(BR),	𝜌 = 𝜓 9.		
The	continuity	equation	𝜕&𝜌L + div𝒋𝝍 = 0	obtained	from	the	SE,	with	the	probability	
density	𝜌L = 𝜓 9		and	 the	 probability	 flux	𝒋𝝍 = 𝒋UL U<=,…,3 = ℏ9":V 𝔍𝔪 𝜓∗𝛁𝐤ψ 	
implies:	If	at	any	instant	particles	are	 𝜓 9-distributed,	so	are	they	at	any	other	time:	If	
the	corpuscles	are	initially	distributed	according	to	the	BR,	they	satisfy	it	later,	too	(and	
vice	versa).	
For	the	time	being,	we’ll	take	the	wavefunction	to	represent	a	holistic,	real	property	of	the	
system	of	N	corpuscles,	constituting	the	basic	stuff	of	reality,	located	in	physical	3-dimensional	
space.	More	on	 this	 in	 III.2.	Regarding	 the	wavefunction,	 let’s	preliminarily	accept	 it	 as	an	
entity	that	in	some	way	“pilots”	the	corpuscles.	At	this	stage,	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	its	
ontological	 status	 –	 E.g.:	A	physical	 field	 like	 the	electromagnetic	 one?	A	 law-like	 abstract	
entity?	A	disposition?	–	needn’t	delay	us	yet.		II.2	Critical	analysis	of	dBBT’s	subjectivist	probabilities		
Let’s	first	turn	to	the	nature	of	dBBT’s	probabilities.	Such	an	inquiry	can	take	two	directions:		
1. Can	the	BR	somehow	be	derived/deduced,	rather	than	being	just	stipulated	by	fiat?	
E.g.	Valentini	et	al.,	taking	up	Bohm’s	idea	from	1953,	indeed	attempt	to	explain	how	
a	 system	 initially	 in	 quantum	 non-equilibrium	 relaxes	 into	 quantum	 equilibrium	 –	
analogously	 to	 Boltzmann’s	 H-Theorem.	 The	 results	 hinge	 on	 strong	 assumptions,	
however,	only	little	better	than	just	postulating	the	BR.5		
2. Following	mainstream	presentations	of	dBBT,	we	therefore	include	the	BR	(or	QEH)	as	
an	 independent	 axiom.	 The	 question	 then	 remains:	 What’s	 the	 status	 of	 the	
probabilities	the	QEH	introduces?	
According	to	Bell,	“[…]	the	only	use	of	probability	here	is,	as	in	classical	[SM],	to	take	account	
of	uncertainty	in	initial	conditions.”6	In	the	following	we	assume	the	orthodox	interpretation	
of	dBBT’s	probabilities	to	be	an	ignorance	interpretation.7		
																																																						
5	Cf.	Callender/Weingard	(1997),	Callender	(2006)	
6	Bell	(1980),	p.	156	
7	E.g.	also	Esfeld	(2016),	p.	5	
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But	 how	 convincing	 is	 the	 first	 part	 of	 Bell’s	 answer,	 viz.	 the	 asserted	 analogy	 with	
thermodynamic	equilibrium	(i.e.	the	probability	distribution	of	the	canonical	ensemble,	𝜌 =𝑒[\V]/𝑍,	with	Boltzmann’s	constant	𝑘,	the	classical	Hamiltonian/energy-function,	the	partition	
function	𝑍	and	temperature	𝑇	of	the	equilibrated	system)?8	At	best,	we	submit,	it’s	heuristic:	
• The	 system’s	dynamics	 imposes	 constraints	on	 the	probability	distributions	 in	both	
cases.	(More	on	this	in	II.3).		
• “[I]n	both	 cases	 it	 seems	natural	 to	 try	 to	 justify	 these	equilibrium	distributions	by	
means	of	mixing-type,	convergence-to-equilibrium	arguments	[…].	[It’s]	been	argued,	
however,	that	in	both	cases	the	ultimate	justification	for	these	probability	distributions	
must	be	in	terms	of	statistical	patterns	that	ensembles	of	actual	subsystems	within	a	
typical	individual	universe	exhibit.”9	The	success	of	such	attempts	is	controversial.10	
Here	the	similarities	end:	
• An	immediate	crucial	difference	in	terms	of	physical	significance	is	that,	whereas	our	
current	universe	is	far	from	thermodynamic	equilibrium/heat-death	(with	equilibrium	
states,	of	course,	observable	only	locally,	e.g.	in	one’s	morning	café	au	lait)	the	dBBT	
universe	has	always	been	in	global	Quantum	Equilibrium,	which	thus	isn’t	a	“quantum	
heat-death”,	devoid	of	all	structures.11	
• More	 importantly,	 whereas	 in	 the	 thermodynamic	 case,	 the	 classical-mechanical	
Hamiltonian	 (operating,	 with	 its	 double	 role	 as	 energy	 of	 the	 macrosystem	 and	
generator	of	the	dynamics	of	 its	micro-constituents,	on	both	levels)	 links	the	micro-
dynamics	 with	 the	 macro-system’s	 properties,	 dBBT’s	 BR-probability	 distribution	
contains	only	the	wavefunction:	Although	it,	too,	occurs	on	the	“macro-“,	i.e.	quantum	
level,	it	doesn’t	genuinely	link	two	levels,	as	dBBT	includes	the	SE,	as	QM’s	essence,	as	
an	axiom	and	hence	as	part	of	the	“micro-”,	i.e.	subquantum	level	description.	In	other	
words,	since	from	the	dBBT	perspective	the	SE,	arguably	constituting	the	essence	of	
the	macro-level	QM,	is	an	axiom	of	the	micro-level	dBBT,	both	levels	are	not	clearly	
																																																						
8	Cf.	Goldstein	(2013),	Sect.	9	
9	Ibid.	
10	For	the	SM	case,	cf.	Sklar	(2015),	sect.	3.	
11	Cf.	Dürr	et	al.	(2003),	Ch.	12,	13.	
The	global	nature	of	quantum	equilibrium	plays	a	crucial	role	for	the	dynamical	systems	analysis	within	dBBT,	cf.	
loc.	cit.	
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separated;	 QEH	 thus	 cannot	 properly	 bridge	 them.	 Rather	 than	 as	 a	 subquantum	
theory,	which	“completes”	QM,	this	suggests	to	regard	dBBT	as	an	alternative	theory	
in	its	own	right,	empirically	equivalent	to	QM.	Then,	however,	the	analogy,	which	turns	
on	the	idea	of	one	theory	emerging	from	the	other,	breaks	down	altogether.	
Let’s	move	on	to	Bell’s	second	assertion,	viz.	that	SM	probabilities	are	epistemic.12	This	is	a	
contentious	 point 13 	–	 and	 hence	 ill-suited	 to	 illuminate	 the	 interpretation	 of	 dBBT’s	
probabilities:	
• Popper,	for	instance,	argues	that	explanations	of	SM	in	which	epistemic	probabilities	
play	a	role	assert	“that	irreversibility	[as	expressed	in	the	2nd	Law	of	thermodynamics]	
is	a	result	of	our	ignorance	of	the	details	of	the	state	of	the	gas.”	This,	he	continues,	
“[…]	leads	to	the	absurd	result	that	the	molecules	escape	from	our	bottle	[air-filled	
and	 then	 uncorked	 in	 vacuum],	 because	 we	 do	 not	 know	 all	 about	 them	 […]”14 .	
Popper,	 in	short,	claims	that	epistemic	probabilities	amount	to	the	absurd	belief	 in	
telekinesis.		
• He	 also	 observes	 the	 incompatibility	 between	 Boltzmannian	 SM	 and	 epistemic	
probabilities:	 Firstly,	 “nescience	 always	 increases,	 provided	 we	 do	 not	 start	 with	
complete	 knowledge.	 But	 disorder,	 or	 entropy,	 decreases	 at	 times;	 according	 to	
Boltzmann,	it	fluctuates.	Secondly	nescience	does	not	increase	if	we	have	complete	or	
perfect	knowledge	to	start	with	[…].	Again	this	is	incompatible	with	Boltzmann’s	view;	
for	if	ever	a	system	should	attain	perfect	order	by	a	highly	improbable	fluctuation,	it	
would,	 in	 all	 probability,	 immediately	 become	 disordered	 again,	 according	 to	
Boltzmann.”15		
• Furthermore,	Popper	maintains,	 the	probability-subjectivist	 cannot	explain	 the	 fact	
and	 the	 irreversibility	 of	 diffusion	 of	 the	 gas	 molecules	 in	 the	 example:	 “[The	
																																																						
12	According	to	Uffink	(2011),	one	should	distinguish	between	two	forms	of	non-objective	probabilities,	where	
an	objective	quantity	or	quality	of	an	object	corresponds	to	an	inherent	property	of	the	physical	object	itself,	
independent	of	any	subject’s	knowledge	of	it:	Subjective	probabilities	reflect	the	strength	of	an	individual’s	belief,	
i.e.	 the	degree	of	 subjective	certainty;	by	contrast,	epistemic	probability	assignments,	capture	an	 individual’s	
certainty	 relative	 to	 the	 information	 available	 to	 them.	 In	 other	 words,	 epistemic	 probabilities	 express	 an	
objective	or	 at	 least	 inter-subjective	evaluation	of	 their	 knowledge.	 In	 the	 following,	we	will	 treat	 ignorance	
interpretations	of	probability	as	epistemic	interpretations.	
13	Cf.,	e.g.	Lavis	(2011)	for	recent	defences	of	objective	probabilities	in	SM.	
Contrariwise,	e.g.	Frigg	(2007)	or	Uffink	(2011)	make	the	case	for	epistemic	probabilities	in	SM.		
14	Popper	(1982),	pp.	109	(our	emphasis)	
15	Op.	cit.,	p.	115	(Popper’s	emphases)	
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subjectivist]	cannot	even	say	that	the	gas	has	in	fact	expanded.	All	he	can	say	is	that	
his	state	of	ignorance	has	increased	[…].”16		
As	 Frigg	 points	 out,	 however,	 a	misconception	 underlies	 these	 objections:17	Espousing	 an	
epistemic	view	on	probability	doesn’t	 imply	 that	our	beliefs	or	 lack	of	knowledge	cause	or	
bring	 about	 the	 physical	 facts.	 Epistemic	 probabilities	 only	 explain	 “why	 or	 when	 it	 is	
reasonable	to	expect	[gases	to	disperse,	ice	cubes	to	melt,	or	coffee	to	mix].”18		
One	 may	 counter	 that	 our	 scientific	 explanations	 should	 go	 beyond	 “reasonable	
expectations”19;	rather,	adhering	to	a	vision	of	physics	close	to	those	of	Einstein	or	Planck20,	
we	should	strive	for	explanations	and	interpretations	in	purely	physical	terms	only,	with	no	
reference	to	subjects	and	their	epistemic	states.	
And	 indeed,	 dBBT	 expressly	 aspires	 after	 a	 realist,	 objectivist	 “quantum	 theory	 without	
observer”	(Popper).21	In	particular,	dBBT	intends	to	be	able	to	describe	fundamental	reality	
even	in	the	absence	of	any	epistemic	subjects	who	could	have	any	“reasonable	expectations”,	
such	 as	 in	 the	 early	 phases	 of	 the	 universe.	 (Note	 that	 such	 deviations	 from	 Quantum	
Equilibrium	elicit	physical	effects,	which	leave	objective,	in	principle	detectable	traces	in	the	
cosmic	 microwave	 background. 22 )	 Thus,	 the	 question	 still	 looms:	 How	 do	 epistemic	
probabilities	 fit	 into	 its	otherwise	 realist,	objectivist/subject-free	 framework?	We’ll	 further	
pursue	that	line	of	thought	shortly.		
One	might	bypass	the	problem	if	dBBT’s	probabilities	turned	out	not	really	to	be	probabilities	
directly	 expressing	 chance-related	 quantities,	 but	 something	 like	 constraints	 on	 all	
conceivable	 statistical	 initial	 distributions	 of	 Bohmian	 corpuscles.	 Let’s	 ponder:	 How	 to	
understand	 the	 continuous	 BR-probability	 distribution	 𝜌&b(𝑸) ≔ 𝜓(𝑸) 9 	vis-à-vis	 the	
corpuscles’	 discrete	 distributions	 of	 the	 form	 𝜌d:e(𝑸):= =3 𝛿(𝑸 − 𝒒𝒊)3"<= ,	 with	𝒒𝒊	 the	
corpuscles’	 actual	 positions?	 Goldstein	 declares	 that	 the	 former	 (which	 he	 calls	 the	
																																																						
16	Op.cit.	p.	116	(Popper’s	emphases)	 	
17	Cf.	Frigg	(2010),	p.	30	
18	Uffink	(2011),	p.	45	
19	E.g.	Bunge	(1974)	for	a	thoroughgoingly	objectivist	philosophical	semantics		
20	Cf.	Scheibe	(2006),	Ch.	II,	III	and	IX	
21	Allori	et	al.	(2007),	sect.	8,	expressly	classify	dBBT,	alongside	GRW,	as	a	quantum	theory	without	observer.	
Dürr/Teufel	(2009),	pp.	177	illustrates	the	vehemence	with	which	dBBT-adherents	dismiss	subjectivism	in	the	
context	of	the	Measurement	Problem.	
22	Cf.	Valentini	(2010)	
	9	
	
“theoretical	 distribution”)	must	 approximate	 the	 latter	 (the	 “empirical	 distribution”):	 “The	
theoretical	 distribution	 is	 an	 idealisation	 providing	 a	 good	 approximation	 to	 the	 empirical	
distribution,	𝜚d:e ≈ 𝜚&b,	in	the	limit	of	large	ensembles	of	subsystems.”23		
But	what’s	supposed	to	be	the	physical	and	ontological	status	of	such	an	idealising	constraint?	
What	does	the	discrepancy	between	the	“theoretical	distribution”	and	the	actual	“empirical	
distribution”,	which	ineluctably	arises	for	any	Bohmian	universe	of	finite	corpuscle	number,	
signify?	Two	oddities	obstruct	an	interpretation	of	the	QEH	as	a	contingent	boundary/initial	
condition	 of	 our	 universe:	 Firstly,	 the	 constraint	 itself	 evolves	 dynamically	 –	 against	 the	
intuition	that	boundary/initial	conditions	should	be	fixed.	Secondly,	the	Schrödinger	Equation,	
which	 governs	 this	 dynamics,	 is	 a	 partial	 differential	 equation.	 Hence,	 it	 requires	 the	
specification	of	contingent	initial	data	for	the	wavefunction.	In	other	words:	QEH,	construed	
as	 a	 contingent	 constraint,	 in	 turn,	 is	 subject	 to	 another	 contingent	meta-constraint.	 This	
seems	 redundant.	 (We’ll	 revert	 to	 these	 two	peculiarities	 in	 IV.5.1)	Goldstein’s	 suggestion	
yields	no	satisfactory	resolution.		
Let’s	therefore	bite	the	bullet:	In	accordance	with	dBBT’s	realist	framework,	what	we’re	after	
is	a	way	to	accommodate	for	its	probabilities	in	an	objective	way.	What	options	are	on	the	
table?	II.3.	Two	culs-de-sac	to	objective	probabilities	for	dBBT	
In	his	review	of	objective	interpretations	of	probability24,	Maudlin	discusses	two	that	appear	
viable	for	our	deterministic	dBBT,	viz.	typicality	and	Humean	Best	Systems.	How	do	dBBT’s	
probabilities	fare	on	these?	II.3.1.	Typicality	
The	 analogy	 with	 SM,	 fickle	 as	 it	 may	 be,	 raises	 the	 question:	 Might	 Boltzmann’s	 own	
understanding	 of	 probabilities	 in	 his	 approach	 to	 SM	 bail	 us	 out?25	Here,	 the	 probability	
measure	figures	as	a	modal	measure	of	how	typical/common	certain	sets	of	phase-space	are.	
A	 statement	 involving	 an	 equilibrium	 macrostate	 with	 typicality	 measure	 (“t-measure”,	
henceforth)	 close	 to	 unity	 holds	 typically,	 i.e.	 for	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 micro-
																																																						
23	Goldstein	(2011),	p.	9	
24	Cf.	Maudlin	(2011a)	
25	Cf.	Goldstein	(2001);	Lazarovici/Reichert	(2015)	
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configurations	 –	 or	 equivalently,	 since	 the	 dynamics	 preserves	 the	measure,	 initial	micro-
configurations:	 Most	 microscopic	 initial	 conditions	 evolve	 into	 indistinguishable	 coarse-
grained	macrostates.	Out	of	all	nomologically	possible	systems,	most	behave	typically.	
Neither	randomness	nor	ignorance	becloud	the	sky	of	such	an	interpretation:	T-probabilities	
in	SM	are	compatible	with	the	determinism	inherent	in	its	underlying	micro-dynamics.		
Advocated	as	an	apposite	framework	for	probabilities	in	SM26,	it’s	tempting	to	ponder:	Can	
we	transfer	the	typicality	account	to	dBBT’s	probabilities?	Indeed,	standard	presentations	of	
dBBT27	couch	the	QEH	in	terms	of	typicality:	The	universal	wavefunction	(of	the	universe)	Ψ	
induces	 a	 t-measure	ℙlm ≔ Ψn 9 .	 A	 Law	 of	 Large	 Numbers	 then	 establishes	 that	 typical	
subsystems	 of	 a	 universe	 in	 Quantum	 Equilibrium,	 with	 corresponding	 “effective”	
wavefunction	𝜓	are	distributed	according	to	 𝜓 9,	i.e.	the	BR	as	probed	in	laboratory	contexts.		
More	precisely,	relaxing	the	assumption	of	the	wavefunction	being	factorisable,	a	subsystem	
is	said	to	have	an	effective	wavefunction	𝜓,	if	the	universal	wavefunction	Ψ:𝑋×𝑌 → ℂ,	with	
X	and	Y	denoting	the	configuration	space	of	the	subsystem	and	its	environment,	respectively,	
can	be	decomposed	as	∀ x, y ∈ 𝑋×𝑌:Ψ x, y = ψ x ϕ y + Ψv 𝑥, 𝑦 ,	
where	ϕ	and	Ψv	have	macroscopically	disjoint	y-support	and	𝑌 ⊆ supp ϕ .	Subsystems	with	
an	effective	wavefunction	and	negligible	 interaction	with	 its	environment	can	be	shown	to	
satisfy	the	SE	for	ψ.	
For	 subsystems	 with	 the	 same	 wavefunction	 ψ ,	 the	 ℙl -measure,	 conditional	 on	 all	
environmental	 configurations	 Y	 that	 yield	 to	 the	 same	 effective	 wavefunction	 ψ ,	 is	
determined	(independent	of	Y)	as:		ℙl 𝑸 = 𝑋, 𝑌 : 𝑋 ∈ 𝑑~𝑥 Ψ . , Y = ψ: 𝑌 = ψ 9𝑑~𝑥.	
																																																						
26	Cf.	 Volchan	 (2006);	Maudlin	 (2011a);	 Hemmo/Shenker	 (2015);	 Lazarovici/Reichert	 (2015);	 Oldofredi	 et	 al.	
(2016)	
27	E.g.	Dürr/Teufel	(2009),	Ch.	8.3.	We	follow	the	presentation	in	Oldofredi	et	al.	(2016),	Sect.	3		
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From	this,	a	Law	of	Large	Numbers	follows:	For	any	measurable	set	𝑨 ⊆ ℝ2~	and	an	ensemble	
of	N	 identically	 prepared	 subsystems	 with	 the	 effective	 wavefunction	𝜓 	and	 the	 position	
random	variables	𝑋",	it	holds	that		
∀𝜀 > 0:ℙlm 𝑸 ∈ ℝ2~ :	 1𝑁 𝜒;∈𝑨 𝑸 −3"<= 𝑑2~𝑄𝑨 𝜓(𝑸) 9 < 𝜀	 3→ 0.	
	
In	other	words:	The	distribution	of	corpuscles	in	sufficiently	large	ensembles	of	subsystems,	
each	prepared	with	the	same	effective	wavefunction	ψ,	typically	approximate	the	statistics	of	
the	BR,	i.e.	 ψ 9,	where	the	measure	of	typicality	is	given	by	the	QEH,	i.e.	ℙl = Ψ 9,	with	the	
universal	wavefunction	Ψ.	
In	light	of	these	results,	Oldofredi	et	al.	announce:	“Born’s	rule	is	thus	predicted	and	explained	
by	[dBBT]	as	a	statistical	regularity	of	typical	Bohmian	universes.”28	If	 the	QEH	is	accepted,	
subsystems	necessarily	obey	the	usual	quantum	mechanical	probabilities.	
But	why	buy	into	the	QEH,	why	accept	ℙl	as	its	t-measure?	In	SM,	stationarity	figures	in	the	
usual	motivation/justification	of	 the	 Lebesgue-measure	 (a	 justification,	 however,	 Frigg	 has	
argued	 to	 be	 fundamentally	 misguided29).	 In	 dBBT,	 the	 notion	 of	 equivariance30 	suitably	
generalises	 stationarity:	 Imposing	 it	 uniquely	 determines	 Ψn 9 	as	 the	 t-measure 31 	that	
depends	 only	 locally	 on	Ψn	 and	 its	 derivatives	 –	 a	 far	 more	 satisfactory	 picture!	 Their	
importance	 as	 mathematical	 theorems	 notwithstanding,	 these	 mathematical	 uniqueness	
results	don’t	answer	the	question	why	we	should	assume	QEH.	Dickson	succinctly	writes:	“It’s	
not	at	all	obvious	why	equivariance	 is	a	preferred	property	of	measures	over	 the	possible	
initial	distributions.	Equivariance	is	a	dynamical	property	of	a	measure,	whereas	the	question	
‘Which	 initial	 distribution	 is	 the	 correct	 one?’	 involves	 no	 dynamics,	 nor	 is	 it	 clear	 why	
																																																						
28	Oldofredi	et	al.	(2016),	pp.15	
29	Cf.	 Frigg	 (2011).	 One	main	 argument	 is	 that	 although	 the	 Lebesgue	measure	 is	 indeed	 the	 only	measure	
invariant	under	all	Hamiltonian	flows,	it’s	not	clear	that	this	property	is	at	all	relevant	for	justifying	the	choice	of	
the	Lebesgue	measure,	since	each	system	is	governed	by	exactly	one	Hamiltonian.	For	any	specific	Hamiltonian,	
there	could	also	be	invariant	measures	other	than	the	Lebesgue	measure.	
30	Let	Ψ	denote	the	wave	function	of	the	universe.	It	generates	the	dBBT	dynamics	in	the	form	of	the	flow	Φnl.	
A	Ψ -	 dependent	 measure	ℙl 	is	 called	 equivariant,	 if	 for	 a	 measurable	 set	 A	 the	 following	 equality	 holds:	ℙ&l 𝐴 ≔ ℙl ∘ Φnl [= 𝐴 = ℙlm(𝐴),	cf.	Dürr/Teufel	(2008),	Ch.	11.	
31	Cf.	Goldstein/Struyve	(2007)	
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dynamical	properties	of	a	measure	are	relevant”.32	Moreover,	we	submit,	typicality	accounts	
are	inept	to	settle	the	interpretation	of	dBBT’s	probabilities:		
• Albeit	 a	measure	over	possible	 –	hence,	by	 standard	accounts33,	non-real	 –	world-
configurations,	 the	 t-measure, 	ℙlm = Ψn 9 ,	 satisfies	 a	 dynamical	 law	 –	 usually	
characteristic	 of	 real	 properties.	 (We’ll	 revisit	 this	 argument	 in	 a	 different	 context	
more	in	detail	in	III.2.)	
The	dynamical	nature	of	the	wavefunction	has	an	important	implication:	Insofar	that	
typicality	 quantifies	 how	 common	 a	 trait	 is	 amidst	 the	 space	 of	 nomological	
possibilities,	 a	 typicality	 statement	 shouldn’t	 be	 contingent,	 that	 is,	 vary	 across	
different	 possible	 worlds.	 But	 since	 the	 wavefunction,	 qua	 SE,	 requires	 the	
specification	of	initial	conditions	that	characterise	a	particular	world,	ℙlm 	measure	is	
contingent,	as	well.	Therefore	it	cannot	be	a	measure	of	typicality.	
• More	oddities	 are	 in	 the	 offing:	 Even	 if,	 as	we	 reported,	 dBBT’s	 t-measure,	ℙlm =Ψn 9,	is	unique	and	to	some	extent	appears	plausible,	one	must	be	wary	of	concluding	
that	sets	of	measure	zero	w.r.t.	ℙlm 	(e.g.	the	set	of	initial	conditions	for	which	the	GE	
is	well-defined,	see	III.1)	are	small34:	Sets	of	measure	zero	in	general	needn’t	be	small	
at	 all	 in	 any	 mundane	 sense:	 Think,	 for	 example,	 of	 the	 infinitely	 many	 rational	
numbers	 in	 the	 interval	 between	 0	 and	 1,	 whose	 Lebesgue	 measure	 𝜆 	is	 zero:	𝜆 ℚ ∩ 0; 1 = 0.		
Moreover,	Frigg	stresses	that	“[…]	as	Sklar	[…]	has	pointed	out,	sets	of	measure	zero	
needn’t	even	be	negligible,	if	sets	are	compared	with	respect	to	properties	other	than	
their	measures.	For	instance,	we	can	judge	the	‘size’	of	a	set	by	its	cardinality	or	Baire	
category	rather	than	by	its	measure	which	may	lead	to	different	conclusions	about	a	
set’s	‘size’.	[…]	So	we	face	the	question	of	what	conveys	upon	measures	a	privileged	
status	when	it	comes	to	judging	typicality.”35	
• Quite	concretely,	one	may	ponder:	What	ensures	that	typical	solutions	are	actually	
observed?	Suppose,	we	rearrange	the	first	𝑀 ≫ 10=92	(the	latter	being	an	estimate	
of	the	number	of	bits	of	our	universe)	digits	of	the	(infinite)	series	of	digits	of	a	so-
																																																						
32	Dickson	(1998),	p.	123	(Dickson’s	emphasis)	
33	In	non-standard	views,	such	as	modal	realism,	cf.	Lewis	 (1986)	and	dispositional	metaphysics,	cf.	Mumford	
(2003),	the	situation	is	different.	We’ll	explore	the	prospect	of	the	latter	in	III.2.		
34	Cf.	Frigg	(2011),	p.90	
35	Loc.cit.	
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called	normal	number	𝑧 = 𝑑=, 𝑑9, … ,	 i.e.	one	 in	which	each	digit	 i	 occurs	equally	
often	(with	equal	t-measure	𝜇( 𝑖 ) = ==),	such	that	of	the	first	M	digits	every	other	
number	is	seven:	𝑧∗ ≔ 7, 𝑑=∗, 7, 𝑑9∗ … ,	where	the	𝑑"∗’s	are	obtained	from	deleting	all	
7’s	 from	 the	 first	 M	𝑑" ’s.	 Of	 course,	 the	 rearrangement	 z*	 doesn’t	 change	 the	
frequency	 with	 which	 7	 occurs;	 its	 t-measure	 is	 preserved	 under	 finitely	 many	
permutations,	∀𝑖: 𝜇∗ 𝑖 = 𝜇( 𝑖 ).	Yet,	by	looking	at	𝑧∗,	it	appears	that	every	other	
number	is	7,	i.e.	that	𝜇∗ 7 = =9.		
The	immediate	lesson	is:	Without	randomisation	that	suitably	mixes	the	results,	a	high	
t-measure	 over	 the	 ensemble	 of	 possible	 dBBT	 systems	 doesn’t	 explain	 why	 our	
observed	statistical	patterns	match	typical,	i.e.	BR-obeying	outcomes.	The	facts	of	the	
world	(assumed	to	be,	at	most,	countably	inifinite)	could	perfectly	well	have	the	QEH’s	
measure	of	typicality,	whilst	still	all	empirical	evidence	could	violate	the	BR	–	if,	e.g.	a	
malicious	demon	decided	to	suitably	re-arrange	the	facts	of	the	world	in	a	way	that	all	
those	(finitely	many)	facts	available	to	us	deceive	us.	Why	preclude	such	a	demon?	
How	to	ensure	that	typicality	is	linked	to	empirical	results?	
If	the	choice	of	the	t-measure	can’t	explain	the	empirical	adequacy	of	the	BR,	we	could	
equally	well	postulate	any	other	t-measure!	Hence,	without	a	randomisation,	the	BR	
loses	 its	 empirical	 content.	 But	 then,	what’s	 the	point	 of	 an	 allegedly	 fundamental	
theory	without	 empirical	 content?	 So,	we	wind	 up	where	we	 started:	Whence	 the	
randomness	in	the	otherwise	deterministic	dBBT	universe?	
• One	way	out	of	the	preceding	problem	is	to	simply	assume	that	our	dBBT	universe	or	
any	 other	 system	 we’re	 interested	 in	 is	 typical,	 i.e.	 started	 from	 typical	 initial	
conditions.	 But	 as	 Frigg	 poignantly	 remarks:	 “Whether	 the	 system	has	 a	 particular	
initial	condition	is	a	factual	question,	and	as	such	it	has	to	be	settled	by	an	appeal	to	
matters	of	fact	and	not	measures	of	sets;	[…]	we	need	an	argument	for	the	conclusion	
that	the	system	indeed	started	out	in	a	typical	initial	condition,	but	that	these	are	of	
measure	(close	to)	one	does	not	give	us	such	an	argument.	[…]	Whether	or	not	this	
initial	condition	is	also	typical	is	simply	irrelevant.”36	
One	 reply	would	be	 to	 argue	 that	 in	 the	 absence	of	 further	 information	about	 the	
details	of	a	system,	it’s	rational	to	expect	the	system	to	be	typical.		
																																																						
36	Op.cit.,	p.91	
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We	 already	 encountered	 such	 an	 epistemic	 manoeuvre,	 and	 dismissed	 it	 as	
endangering	the	Bohmian	objectivist	agenda.	M	
Perhaps	 more	 to	 the	 point,	 even	 any	 connection	 between	 typicality	 and	 “rational	
expectability”	 is	questionable.	Conceptually,	 a	 t-measure	 refers	 to	 the	 collection	of	
possible	 worlds/systems.	 In	 essence,	 such	 a	 collection	 of	 systems	 is	 a	
canonical/Gibbsian	ensemble,	as	known	from	Gibbsian	SM.37	Thus,	its	use	is	subject	to	
the	same	criticism	as	in	the	Gibbsian	case.38	
In	 particular,	 dBBT	 claims	 universal	 applicability,	 encompassing	 the	 universe	 as	 a	
whole.	The	latter	doesn’t	have	any	copies,	though.	And	given	that,	for	all	we	know,	
there’s	 only	 one	 universe,	 why	 should	 it	 be	 “rational	 to	 expect”	 it	 to	 be	 a	 typical	
member	 of	 all	 conceivable	 universes?	 It’s	 true	 that	 multiverse	 speculations	 have	
become	 fashionable	 in	 contemporary	 cosmology	 –	 however,	 not	 without	 being	
severely	scathed39;	furthermore,	demanding	that	a	consistent	interpretation	of	dBBT’s	
probabilities	be	perforce	committed	to	multiverse	scenarios	seems	an	unnecessarily	
compromising	deed	of	desperation.	
We	 conclude	 that	 it’s	 not	 even	 clear	 how	 typicality	 should	 even	 matter	 to	 a	 substantial	
interpretation	of	dBBT	–	let	alone	how	it	would	settle	the	status	of	its	probabilities.		II.3.2.	Humean	Best	Systems	
After	hitting	a	blind	alley	with	 typicality	accounts,	what	about	 the	other	 road	 to	objective	
chances	Maudlin	considers,	Humean	Best-System	theories	(HBSs)?40	
What	underlies	them	is	Lewis’	conception	of	laws	as	the	systematisation	of	statements	about	
the	“Humean	Mosaic”	(i.e.	the	actual/categorical	local,	only	spatiotemporally	connected	facts	
making	up	the	world’s	history)	that	strikes	the	best	balance	between	simplicity,	strength	(How	
many	 phenomena	 does	 it	 cover?)	 and	 fit	 (how	 exact	 are	 the	 predictions	 of	 the	
systematisation?).	 These	 statements	 can	 be	 either	 deterministic	 or	 probabilistic.	 So,	 HBSs	
																																																						
37	Cf.	Dürr/Teufel	(2008),	p.	64	
38	Cf.,	e.g.	Frigg	(2008),	Ch.	3.3	
39	E.g.	Ellis	(2014)	
40	Maudlin	(2011a),	sect.	3;	Cf.	also	Hájek/Hoefer	(2006);	Frigg/Hoefer	(2006)	
	15	
	
framework	allows	for	chances	even	in	a	fundamentally	deterministic	world41	–		a	conceptual	
advantage	inviting	an	application	to	a	deterministic	dBBT	with	its	probabilistic	GE.		
What	motivates	HBSs	is	to	avoid	postulating	necessary	connections	and	irreducible	modalities	
(about	both	of	which	Humeans	share	their	eponym’s	famous	scepticism),	as	well	as	a	close	
link	between	chances	and	action-guiding	credence42.	Especially	attractive	with	regard	to	dBBT	
is	that	HBSs	can	accommodate	for	the	QEH	as	a	statement	about	an	initial	state	of	the	universe	
(thanks	to	the	continuity	equation	for	the	probability	density/flux	from	the	SE),	similar	to	the	
Past	Hypothesis:	“[…]	[A]	stochastic	dynamics	cannot,	by	itself,	have	any	implications	about	
what	the	initial	state	of	the	universe	is,	since	that	state	is	not	produced	by	a	transition	from	
anything	 else.	 But,	 for	 the	 Humean,	 probabilistic	 claims	 are	 just	 a	 means	 of	 conveying	
information	about	empirical	distributions.”43	
Yet,	upon	closer	inspection	the	optimism	that	HBS	might	provide	a	satisfactory	framework	for	
dBBT	and	its	probabilities	starts	to	subside:	
• Besides	a	general	worry	that	HBSs	are	unable	to	even	provide	a	metaphysics	proper44,	
the	characterisation	of	laws	as	a	“best	match”	between	simplicity,	fitness	and	strength	
is	vague:	How	to	flesh	out	these	notions	–	and	their	relevant	“combination”	–	in	an	
objective,	exact	way?	One	may	feel	uneasy	about	this	flavour	of	subjectivism,	sticking	
to	this	quadruple	vagueness	–	and	it’s	a	purely	objective,	subject-free	interpretation	
of	dBBT	we’d	set	out	for.	
• A	 more	 severe	 problem	 springs	 from	 the	 non-separable	 nature	 of	 dBBT’s	
wavefunction.	 To	 formulate	 this	 popular	 argument,	 let’s	 inspect	 Maudlin’s	 more	
precise	 contemporary	 characterisation	 of	 Humeanism	 as	 the	 conjunction	 of	 three	
doctrines:	
	
																																																						
41	Cf.	Hoefer	(2011),	Frigg	(2014)	
42	Cf.	Brown	(2011)	
43	Maudlin	(2011a),	p.302	
44	Hájek	(2011),	sect.	3,	for	instance,	voices	this	suspicion	that	HBSs	“[…]	mistake	an	idealised	epistemology	of	
chance	for	its	metaphysics”.	And	someone	desiring	a	metaphysical	framework	for	dBBT	may	now	interject,	it’s	
an	objective	metaphysics,	an	attempt	to	understand	and	explain	its	concepts	and	how	a	world	would	look	like	if	
it	were	true,	that	a	fundamental	theory	such	as	dBBT	calls	for:	“Humean	laws	[…]	can	summarise,	but	not	[…]	
explain”	Maudlin	(2011a),	p.	303.	
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Separability:	“The	complete	physical	state	of	the	world	is	determined	by	(supervenes	
on)	the	intrinsic	physical	state	of	each	spacetime	point	(or	each	point-like	object)	and	
the	spatio-temporal	relations	between	points.”45	
	
Physical	Statism:	“All	facts	about	a	world,	including	modal	and	nomological	facts,	are	
determined	by	its	total	physical	state.”46	
	
A	 third	 condition	 specifies	 the	 type	 of	 facts	 admissible	 in	 Physical	 Statism:	 “The	
intrinsic	physical	state	of	the	world	can	be	specified	without	mentioning	the	laws	(or	
chances,	or	possibilities)	that	obtain	in	the	world.”47	The	Humean	thus	abstains	from	
invoking	irreducible	nomic,	modal,	dispositional	or	causal	facts	in	specifying	the	state	
of	the	world.	
Entangled	 states,	 e.g.	 the	 singulet	 state	 𝜓"~ = =9 ↑↓ − ↓↑ ,	 inherent	 in	 generic	
quantum	theories,	violate	separability48;	in	particular,	dBBT	does,	with	(according	to	Maudlin)	
the	state	of	the	universe	being	specified	by	the	pair	 𝑸,Ψ .	In	short,	insofar	as	Humeanism	is	
committed	to	Separability	and	an	interpretation	of	dBBT	regards	the	wavefunction	as	a	real,	
fundamental	entity,	Maudlin	contends	that	Humeanism	and	dBBT	are	incompatible.	
Retaining	Maudlin’s	definition	of	Humeanism,	his	argument	against	a	Humean	interpretation	
of	entanglement-involving	quantum	theories	can	be	circumvented	by	demoting	the	status	of	
the	wavefunction	to	a	non-real	(more	precisely:	non-fundamenta)	entity49.	On	Humeanism,	
only	the	Mosaic	and	its	elements	fundamentally	exist,	i.e.	actual,	local	matters	of	particular	
fact	in	spacetime;	all	other	entities	don’t:	Not	having	any	correlates	in	fundamental	reality,	
they’re	useful	fictions	in	our	theories	to	economically	summarise	or	systematise	the	patterns	
in	the	Mosaic,	to	algorithmically	compress	the	data	of	the	Mosaic.	The	status	of	those	non-
fundamental	entities	as	useful	fictions	is	called	“Humean	supervenience”.	
																																																						
45	Maudlin	(2007),	p.	51	
46	Loc.cit.	
47	Op.cit.,	p.	52	
48	Loc.cit.,	Ch.	2.1	
49	Cf.	Miller	(2014);	Esfeld	(2014),	Callender	(2015)		
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By	deciding	to	categorise	a	certain	term	as	only	supervenient,	the	Humean	needn’t	ban	any	
terms	from	physical	theories	as	metaphysically	illegitimate:	Physicists	are	allowed	to	continue	
their	business	as	usual	–	as	long	as	they	don’t	forget	these	terms	are	merely	fictional.		
Consequently,	 by	 declaring	 the	 wavefunction	 supervenient,	 its	 non-separability	 (more	
precisely,	its	non-factorisability)	becomes	innocuous	–	merely	a	mathematical	peculiarity	of	a	
useful	 fiction,	 not	 a	 feature	 of	 reality;	 the	 Humean	 tenet	 of	 Separability	 thus	 remains	
unharmed.	
In	terms	of	ontological	categories,	the	demotion	of	the	wavefunction	to	a	supervenient	fiction	
amounts	treating	it	as	law-like	or	“nomological”,	comparable	to	the	status	of	the	Lagrangian	
in	 classical	 field	 theories.	 Hence,	 this	 ontological	 re-classification	 of	 the	 wavefunction	 (in	
principle,	independent	from	any	commitment	to	Humeanism)	is	known	as	the	“Nomological	
View”.	
Is	 the	Humean	Bohmian	now	off	 the	hook	with	 resorting	 to	 the	Nomological	View?	Three	
objections,	we	submit,	mar	her	hopes:	
• Whilst	Humeanism	delimits	which	entities	count	as	fundamental	and	correspond	to	
something	 real	 (viz.	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 Mosaic),	 and	 which	 don’t	 (viz.	 laws,	
irreducible	dispositions,	etc.),	it	procures	no	criteria	for	ascertaining	whether	a	certain	
theoretical	 term	 should	 be	 classified	 as	 representing	 an	 element	 of	 the	Mosaic	 or	
merely	 “nomological”.	 In	 particular,	 declaring	 the	 wavefunction	 as	 “nomological”	
mandates	 further	 arguments;	 just	 decreeing	 it	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	Humeanism	 is	
question	begging.	
• Should	a	term,	by	fiat	declared	“law-like”,	not	jibe	with	characteristics	all	other	bona	
fide	 laws	share,	we	are	all	 the	more	entitled	to	demand	good	reasons	for	that	fiat.	
This,	 we	 shall	 see	 in	 III.2,	 is	 the	 case	 for	 the	 wavefunction.	 Downplaying	 the	
importance	or	accuracy	of	intuitions	about	laws,	as	for	instance	Goldstein	and	Zanghì	
parry50,	is	a	red	herring:	The	issue	is	not	how	or	whether	to	revise	our	intuitions	about	
																																																						
50	Goldstein/Zanghì	(2013)	
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laws,	but	 that	 the	proponent	of	 the	Nomological	View	must	proffer	arguments	 for	
declaring	the	wavefunction	nomological.51		
• But	let’s	for	the	time	being	grant	that	the	wavefunction’s	status	can	convincingly	be	
established	to	be	law-like.	Within	dBBT,	this	would	spawn	an	odd	hierarchy	of	law-like	
entities:	 If	 the	 wavefunction	 is	 law-like,	 the	 SE,	 as	 the	 law	 that	 determines	 the	
wavefunction,	would	 consequently	 be	 “meta-law”-like;	 in	 turn,	 the	GE,	 as	 the	 law	
governing	via	the	wavefunction	the	dynamics	of	the	corpuscle	positions,	would	ought	
to	be	seen	as	“hypo-law”-like.	Both	meta-laws	and	hypo-laws	come	in	two	flavours:	
dynamical	 (viz.	 the	 SE	 and	 the	 GE,	 resp.)	 and	 “static”	 (viz.	 the	 boundary/initial	
conditions	the	solution	of	the	SE	requires,	and	the	QEH,	resp.).	Such	an	explosion	of	
legislature	seems	unnecessary.	
One	may	try	to	fend	off	the	preceding	objections	by	construing	“nomological”	less	narrowly:	
In	this	vein,	Bhogal	and	Perry52	suggest	that	in	using	the	term	“law-likeness”	one	shouldn’t	be	
deceived	by	any	received	connotations	of	laws;	rather,	nomologicality	refers	to	any,	merely	
supervenient	theoretical	term,	regardless	of	its	ontological	category	as	a	law,	property,	etc.	In	
other	 words:	 For	 such	 a	 liberalised	 Humeanism,	 law-likeness	 and	 non-fundamentality	 are	
synonymous.	(Consequently,	even	mass	or	charge	in	e.g.	Esfeld’s	similar	proposal	for	a	liberal	
“Quantum	Humeanism”53,	on	which	 the	Mosaic	 consists	only	of	points	 in	 spacetime	being	
either	occupied	or	empty,	would	count	as	“law-like”.)		
However,	 whether	 this	 liberalisation	 ameliorates	 the	 Humean	 Bohmian’s	 predicament	 is	
questionable:	The	Humean	still	owes	us	good	arguments	 that	 the	wavefunction	 should	be	
regarded	as	a	supervenient	entity.	The	critic	of	a	Humean	approach	to	dBBT	may	be	happy	to	
concede	that	the	wavefunction	could	be	nomological,	and	that	consequently	such	a	Humean	
approach	to	dBBT	is	at	least	conceptually	possible	–	but	ultimately	a	critic	would	demand	more	
than	a	proof	of	principle.	Neither	does	a	liberal	Humeanism	prima	facie	curtail	the	unnecessary	
proliferation	of	nomological	entities	of	sub-	and	superordinate	rank.	
																																																						
51	Callender	(2015)	 illustrates	this	need	for	an	explicit	 justification	very	clearly	by	pointing	to	Hamilton-Jacobi	
Theory	to	demonstrate	that	the	default	argument	for	the	Nomological	View,	viz.	the	fact	that	the	wavefunction	
is	defined	on	configuration	space,	isn’t	cogent:	Being	defined	on	configuration	space,	isn’t	a	sufficient	condition	
for	“nomologicality”.	
52	Cf.	Bhogal/Perry	(2015)	
53	Cf.	Esfeld	(2014);	Esfeld	et	al.	(2015)	
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But	let’s	charitably	grant	that	the	liberal	Humean	averts	the	mentioned	problems.	Still,	she	
faces	yet	another	counter-argument,	which	turns	on	the	Bohmian	Humean’s	core	claim	that	
dBBT	is	indeed	the	best	systematisation	of	the	Mosaic.	Dewar	has	recently	criticised	this	claim	
in	detail	and	its	potential	defences54,	arguing	that	the	Humean	Bohmian	shirks	their	burden	
of	proof	of	his	core	claim,	with	dBBT	prevailing	also	over	other	approaches	to	QM,	including	
ordinary	QM	 itself.	Here,	 let’s	 elaborate	 two	 lines	of	 thought	 aiming	at	 very	dBBT-specific	
issues.		
• The	first	one	targets	the	notions	of	simplicity	appealed	to	when	singling	out	the	GE	as	
the	allegedly	simplest	one	amongst	all	empirically	equivalent	alternative	GEs.	(We’ll	
return	to	this	underdetermination	of	the	GE	in	detail	in	III.1).55	Ceteris	paribus,	should	
the	Humean	Bohmian	fail	to	demonstrate	that	the	GE	presented	in	section	II,	is	the	
simplest	such	choice,	his	own	Humean	standards	would	compel	him	to	abandon	dBBT	
in	its	orthodox	form.	Humeanism	must	show	the	simplicity	of	the	GE,	lest	it	result	in	a	
reductio	ad	absurdum.	Assaults	on	dBBT’s	simplicity	can	come	from	three	different	
directions:	
Dürr	et	al.’s	attempts	to	justify	the	GE	by	deriving	it	from	Galilei	invariance	presuppose	
that	the	latter	is	a	necessary	a	priori	constraint	to	impose	on	any	viable	dynamics.56	
Whence,	though,	this	distinguished	status,	especially	given	that	BM’s	inertial	structure	
is	“Aristotelian”	(Valentini),	rather	than	Galilean,	such	as	in	Newtonian	mechanics?	An	
adherent	 of	 Brown’s	 Dynamical	 Approach	 to	 symmetry 57 ,	 for	 instance,	 would	
furthermore	 flat-out	 dismiss	 that	 justification	 as	 putting	 the	 cart	 before	 the	 horse,	
insisting	that	the	spacetime	symmetries	be	derived	from	the	dynamics/the	GE,	not	the	
other	way	 around.	Quite	 generally	 again,	 one	may	 simply	 doubt	 the	 plausibility	 of	
requiring	the	spacetime	symmetries	of	a	less	fundamental	theory,	namely	CM,	to	hold	
also	for	the	hopefully	more	fundamental	dBBT.	
																																																						
54	Dewar	(2016)		
55	We	gloss	over	here	the	general	vagueness	in	the	notion	of	simplicity,	as	is	illustrated	by	Goldstein’s	“identity-
based	Bohmian	Mechanics”,	discussed	by	Esfeld	et	al.	(2015),	sect.	3:	The	Guidance	Equation	of	this	identity-
based	Bohmian	Mechanics	is	considerably	more	complicated	than	the	one	in	standard	dBBT,	“but	doesn’t	
necessarily	amount	to	more	complicated	physics”,	op.cit.,	p.	17.	Esfeld	et	al.	thus	seem	to	insinuate	that	in	
order	to	assess	how	simple	a	theory	is,	one	needs	to	differentiate	between	mathematical	and	some	“physical”	
simplicity,	where	the	latter	seems	to	override	the	former.	
56	Dürr	et	al.	(2002),	Sect.	3	
57	Brown	(2007)	
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A	third	strategy	to	undermine	the	simplicity	of	the	standard	GE	originates	in	the	non-
relativistic	limit	of	the	GE,	obtained	from	the	Dirac-Bohm	Theory	(see	III.1	and	IV.5).	It	
differs	 from	 the	 ordinary	 GE,	 despite	 empirical	 equivalence.	 Since	 the	 Dirac-Bohm	
Theory	 has	 a	 considerably	 larger	 strength,	 it	 seems	 plausible	 to	 consider	 its	 non-
relativistic	limit	as	“better”	in	the	sense	of	HBSs.	Consequently,	dBBT	with	the	standard	
GE	doesn’t	count	as	the	Best	System;	hence,	the	Humean	should	reject	standard	BM.	
• The	underdermination	of	the	GE	menaces	the	Humean	Bohmian	even	more	severely:	
As	we’ll	 argue	 in	 the	 subsequent	 section,	 the	GE	 is	 empirically	 inaccessible,	 vastly	
underdetermined	 and	 serves	 no	 explanatory	 function	 –	 a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 the	
Humean	 to	 simply	 abandon	 the	 GE,	 and	 thereby	 dBBT	 altogether,	 in	 favour	 of	 a	
statistical	 theory	 of	 random	 corpuscle	 jumps	 –	 an	 option	we’ll	 explore	 in	 detail	 in	
section	III.		
Dewar	poignantly	adumbrates	the	same	idea:	“The	problem	is	that	our	evidence	for	
quantum	mechanics	 is	 (famously)	statistical	 in	nature.	 It	 is	not	 that	we	have	direct	
access	 to	 some	 small	 number	 of	 the	 Bohmian	 trajectories,	 and	 have	 successfully	
stitched	those	together	by	overlaying	a	wavefunction	governed	by	quantum	dynamics.	
What	 we	 have	 instead	 are	 individual	 but	 imprecise	 measurements	 of	 positions	 at	
particular	times.	[…]	So	what	we	have	really	woven	together	into	a	quantum	tapestry	
are	 those	probability	densities,	 rather	 than	 the	 trajectories	 themselves;	and	on	 the	
Bohmian’s	 own	 account,	 those	 probability	 densities	 represent	 all	 that	 can	 ever	 be	
known	for	sure	about	the	trajectories.”58	
In	short,	a	Humean,	upon	re-examining	the	GE,	will	have	good	reasons	not	to	consider	
dBBT	 the	 simplest	 systematisation;	 a	 Humean	 couching	 of	 dBBT	 thus	 seems	 self-
defeating.		
	
After	 this	 brief	 tours	 d’horizon	 into	Humeanism,	we	 find	 the	 latter,	 too,	 a	 dead	 end	 for	 a	
satisfactory	framework	for	dBBT	in	general,	and	its	probabilities	in	particular.	II.3.3.	Digression:	Objectivism	and	Heisenberg	relations	
Germane	to	dBBT’s	problems	with	probabilities	and	the	conflict	with	its	objectivist	framework	
cropping	up,	is	the	standard	account	of	the	Heisenberg	indeterminacy	relations	in	dBBT:	For	
																																																						
58	Dewar	(2016),	p.13	(Dewar’s	emphases)	
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roughly	known	corpuscle	positions	their	wavefunctions	are	sharply	peaked.	“[…]	The	 initial	
randomness	 of	 the	 particle	 position	 translates	 into	 the	 randomness	 of	 the	 particle’s	
asymptotic	velocity,	 […]	given	by	the	modulus	squared	of	 the	Fourier	 transform	of	 the	 [...]	
wave	packet.	That	distribution	is	all	the	more	spread	out	as	the	initial	wave	packet	is	sharply	
localised.	This	is	Heisenberg’s	uncertainty	relation.	[…]	Quantum	Equilibrium	entails	absolute	
uncertainty	about	the	Bohmian	positions.”59		
Two	observations	regarding	this	passage	are	in	order:	
• An	epistemic	category,	uncertainty,	invades	here	the	otherwise	objective/subject-free	
account.	Other	standard	reference	on	Quantum	Equilibrium	are	even	more	explicit	in	
this	regard,	identifying	the	latter	as	the	“origin	of	absolute	uncertainty”,	conveying	the	
“most	 detailed	 knowledge	 possible	 concerning	 the	 present	 configuration	 of	 a	
subsystem	(of	which	the	‘observer’	or	‘knower’	is	not	part	[…].”60	
This	 starkly	 contrasts	 with	 the	 objectivism	 officially	 professed	 by	 many	 of	 dBBT’s	
proponents.	 E.g.	 Bell	 red-flags	 “[…]	 some	 words	 which,	 however	 legitimate	 and	
necessary	in	application,	have	no	place	in	a	formulation	[of	QM]	with	any	pretension	
to	physical	precision:	system,	apparatus,	environment,	microscopic,	macroscopic,	[…]	
observable,	information,	measurement.”61	
• Secondly,	 note	 in	 Dürr/Teufel’s	 cited	 account	 their	 remark	 that	 corpuscles’	 initial	
positions	are	randomly	distributed.		
Is	 it	actually	meaningful	 to	apportion	randomness	to	 initial	conditions?	Prima	facie,	
only	stochastic	processes,	e.g.	Poisson	processes	such	as	radioactive	decay,	can	display	
randomness;	by	contrast,	initial	conditions	are	brute	fact	data.	Moreover,	even	if	one	
grants	 the	 meaningfulness	 of	 randomness	 in	 initial	 conditions,	 we’re	 back	 in	 our	
previous	 pickle:	 How	 can	 there	 be	 randomness	 in	 dBBT’s	deterministic	 world?	 The	
																																																						
59	Loc.cit.,	p.	223	
60	Dürr	et	al.	(2003)	,	p.	57	(the	authors’	emphases);	cf.	also	Dürr	et	al	(1995),	p.	27.	
Dürr	 et	 al.	 (2003),	 Ch.	 11,	 12,	 try	 to	 somewhat	 mitigate	 the	 charge	 of	 smuggling	 in	 epistemic/subjectivist	
elements:	“Whatever	we	may	reasonably	mean	by	knowledge,	 information,	or	certainty	–	and	what	precisely	
these	do	mean	is	not	at	all	an	easy	question	–	it	simply	must	be	the	case	that	experimenters,	their	measuring	
devices,	[…]	must	be	a	part	of	or	grounded	in	the	environment	of	these	systems.	The	possession	by	experimenters	
of	 such	 information	 must	 thus	 be	 reflected	 in	 correlations	 between	 the	 system	 properties	 to	 which	 this	
information	refers	and	the	features	of	the	environment	which	express	or	represent	this	information.	We	have	
shown,	however,	that	given	its	wave	function	there	can	be	no	correlation	between	(the	configuration	of)	a	system	
and	(that	of)	its	environment,	even	if	the	full	microscopic	environment	[…]	is	taken	into	account”	(loc.cit.,	p.	57).		
61	Bell	(1990),	p.	34	
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same	authors	paradoxically	negate	 that:	 “It	 looks	 as	 if	 objective	 chance	 is	 at	work,	
while	in	truth	it	is	not.	There	is	no	chance.”62	How	to	resolve	this	contradiction?	
Pledging	allegiance	to	its	objectivist	outlook,	might	perhaps	we	re-cast	dBBT	–	or	at	least,	its	
essential	 ingredients	 –	 as	 a	 stochastic/indeterministic	 theory	 and	 thereby	 resolve	 the	
conundrums?	
	III.	Stochastic	deBroglie-Bohm	Theory	(sdBBT)	III.1.	Role	of	the	Guidance	Equation	
Evidently,	the	GE	curtails	a	stochastic	re-conceptualisation	of	dBBT.	The	elephant	in	the	room	
now	is:	Might	it	be	dispensable?	We’ll	argue	in	this	and	the	following	two	sections,	it’s	indeed	
not	only	explanatorily	redundant,	but	also	spawns	a	few	sources	of	discomfort.	
Let’s	scrutinise	first	some	of	dBBT’s	often	perceived	blemishes	that	involve	the	GE:	
• An	immediate	inquiry	concerns	the	latter’s	formal	definability.		
In	general,	a	wavefunction	possesses	zeros.	Consequently,	for	some	initial	conditions,	
the	 GE	 (𝑸" ∝ 𝔍𝔪 𝛁;LL )	 will	 steer	 corpuscles	 into	 that	 set	 of	 zeros,	 where	 the	 GE	
becomes	singular.	Thus,	it	isn’t	well-defined	for	all	of	configuration	space.		
Although	the	set	of	initial	conditions	that	lead	to	singularities	is	of	measure	zero63,	this	
poses	 no	 satisfactory	 resolution	 of	 the	 problem	 –	 a	 rehearsal	 the	 measure-zero	
problem	in	SM64.	 In	particular,	as	we	saw	in	 II.3.1,	sets	of	measure	zero	needn’t	be	
negligible	or	even	small.	
In	consequence,	the	GE	pares	down	dBBT’s	domain	of	applicability.		
• Another	 formal	 discontent	 is	 levelled	 at	 GE’s	 non-uniqueness:	 Are	 different	 GEs	
possible?	Indeed,	the	orthodox	GE	given	above,	𝑸 = 𝒋	with	the	quantum	probability	
flux	 𝒋 = ℏ9":V 𝔍𝔪 𝜓∗𝛁ψ U 	and	 the	 probability	 density	𝜌 = 𝜓 ,	 is	 but	 one	 of	 an	
infinitude	 of	 viable	 alternative	 dynamics 65 :	 Any	 other	 choice	 𝒋′ = 𝒋 + 𝓳 ,	 with	 a	
																																																						
62Dürr/Teufel	(2009)	p.64.		 	
63	Cf.	Berndl	et	al.	(1995)	
64	Cf.	Frigg	(2008),	Ch.	3.4,	esp.	pp.	125	
65	Cf.	also	Deotto/Ghirardi	(2002)	
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divergence-free	vector	field	𝓳,	div	𝓳 = 0,	 for	the	quantum	probability	 is	equally	fine	
and	compatible	with	the	QM	prediction.	Yet,	 the	resulting	trajectories	will	differ.	 In	
other	words,	the	choice	of	no	less	suitable	GEs/dynamics	for	deterministic	trajectories	
is	vastly	underdetermined.	Which	is	the	right	one?	
The	orthodox	GE	has	 been	 argued	 to	 be	 the	 simplest	 such	 choice	 compatible	with	
Galilean	and	time-reversal	invariance.66		
But	 this	 is	 problematic:	 Firstly,	 because	 appeals	 to	 simplicity	 are	 glaringly	 hand-
waiving:	Why	should	nature	care	about	our	preconceptions	of	simplicity?	Secondly,	as	
we	saw	in	II.3.2,	the	motivation	for	demanding	Galilei	invariance	is	doubtful:	It’s	true,	
though,	that	the	Schrödinger	Equation	turns	out	to	be	Galilei	invariant	(provided	the	
wavefunction	transforms	in	a	particular,	non-scalar	way),	but	why	expect	that	from	the	
GE,	as	well?	This	seems	particularly	in	need	of	further	arguments,	since	the	motivation	
of	Galilei	invariance	lies	in	the	Galilean	spacetime	structure	of	CM	and	dBBT	seeks	to	
supersede	 CM:	 So,	 why	 should	 we	 assume	 dBBT’s	 GE	 to	 inherit	 CM’s	 spacetime	
structure?	 Thirdly,	 relativistic	 generalisations	 of	 dBBT	 in	 fact	 speak	 against	 this	
putatively	simplest	choice	of	the	GE:	Plugging	the	quantum	probability	4-current	of	the	
Dirac	equation	(see	section	IV.5.4),	i.e.	𝑗¡ = 𝑐𝜓£𝛾¡𝜓	(with	the	Dirac	matrices	𝛾¡,	and	
the	Dirac-spinor	𝜓),	 into	𝑸" = 𝒄𝒋𝒊¦§ 	(i=1,2,3),	one	obtains	a	relativistic	GE	for	fermions.	
Its	non-relativistic	limit67,	however,	is	not	our	orthodox	GE	(using	spinors	which	satisfy	
the	Pauli	Equation68),	but	contains	a	spin-dependent	additional	divergence-free	term.		
What	lesson	to	draw	from	this	underdetermination	of	the	GE?	It	seems	to	betray	that	
the	 concrete	 trajectories	 per	 se	 play	 no	 role	 in	 the	 theory,	 as	 long	 as	 they	 are	
compatible	with	the	Schrödinger	dynamics.	dBBT’s	determinism	produces	no	tangible	
insights	into	a	more	fundamental	subquantum	world	–	a	dead	end	Einstein	seems	to	
have	intuited,	when	dismissing	dBBT	in	a	letter	to	Born	form	1952	as	“too	cheap”,	likely	
for	 the	 reason	 that	“we	would	not	have	discovered	statistical	mechanics	by	adding	
																																																						
66	Cf.	Dürr/Teufel	(2009),	Ch.	8.1	
67Cf.	Holland/Philippidis	(2003).	The	difference	vis-à-vis	the	original,	non-relativistic	GE	amounts	to	exactly	such	
an	added	divergence-free	vector-field.	
68	Cf.	Dürr/Teufel	(2009),	Ch.	8.4;	Holland	(1993),	Ch.	9	
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small	corrections	to	thermodynamics,	or	by	adding	hidden	variables	that	were	in	some	
way	‘guided’	by	the	free	energy,	or	some	other	thermodynamic	quantity.”69	
We	can	substantiate	the	suspicion	that	the	GE	is	explanatorily	idle	even	further:	
• As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 dBBT	 is	 empirically	 indistinguishable	 from	 QM.	 How	 is	 this	
achieved?	 The	 equivalence	 in	 no	 way	 depends	 on	 the	 GE. 70 	Let’s	 recall	 the	 two	
ingredients	for	ensuring	empirical	equivalence	with	ordinary	QM:	
o The	BR	delivers	the	right	probability	for	finding	a	dBBT-corpuscle	at	a	certain	
position.	 For	 position	measurements,	 this	 coincides	 with	 the	 predictions	 of	
standard	QM.	
o dBBT’s	ontology	procures	the	rest:	In	dBBT,	there	are	no	dynamical	properties	
other	 than	 position;	 what	 we	 usually	 interpret	 as	 such	 properties,	 e.g.	
momentum	or	spin,	are	only	manifestations	of	the	wavefunction	and	how	it	
guides	 the	particles	positions.	When	 it	comes	to	observable	effects,	 though,	
the	statistics	obeys	the	BR.	
In	 consequence,	 the	empirical	 content	of	 dBBT	 is	 independent	of	 the	deterministic	
trajectories	of	the	dBBT	corpuscles;	the	GE	eschews	empirical	accessibility.	
Remark:	 It’s	 instructive	 to	 note	 how	 dBBT	 circumvents	 the	 two	 principal	 no-go	
theorems	for	hidden	variables	theories71:	Since	all	the	theoretical	work	is	done	by	the	
wavefunction,	which	enters	both	the	GE	and	the	BR,	and	the	latter	 is	“non-local”	 in	
that	 it	 involves	 the	non-separable/non-factorisable	wavefunction,	 Bell’s	 Theorem	 is	
automatically	 satisfied.	 As	 for	 contextuality,	 as	 enforced	 by	 the	 Kochen-Specker-
Theorem,	it’s	explicitly	implemented	in	the	Bohmian	ontology,	which	construes	only	
position	as	the	only	“non-contextual”	variables.	
• Let’s	look	then	beyond	empirical	equivalence	with	QM	–	at	the	Measurement	Problem	
and	 how	 to	 interpret	 the	 macroscopic	 superpositions	 the	 minimally	 interpreted	
																																																						
69	Squires	(1996),	quoted	in	Passon	(2005),	fn.	11	
70	The	“familiar	statistical	description	of	sub-systems	in	terms	of	effective	wave-functions	[…]	is	really	all	that	
matters	for	most	practical	purposes”,	as	Esfeld	et	al.	(2015)	remark.	
71	Wallace	(2008),	sect.	2.6.2,	cashes	out	four	empirical	constraints	on	any	hidden	variables	theories.	The	GE	only	
features	in	the	fourth	constraint,	which	requires	that	hidden	variables	via	their	dynamical	equation	be	affected	
only	by	“their”	branch	of	the	state	vector.	Crossing	out	the	GE	altogether,	this	constraint	is	trivially	satisfied.	
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quantum	formalism	seems	to	predict.	Motivating	to	a	considerable	extent	the	hidden	
variables	agenda,	 the	Measurement	Problem	more	precisely	 consists	 in	 the	mutual	
inconsistency	 of	 the	 three	 assumptions	 that	 the	 wavefunction	 is	 complete,	 that	 it	
evolves	 in	 accord	 with	 the	 Schrödinger	 dynamics	 and	 that	 measurements	 yield	
determinate	outcomes,	respectively.72		
dBBT	 has	 been	 argued	 to	 its	 most	 convincing	 solution	 –	 by	 denying	 that	 the	
wavefunction	 alone	 completely	 specifies	 the	 physical	 state: 73 	Only	 the	 pair	
wavefunction	and	corpuscles’	position,	(Ψ,𝑸),	(rather	than	the	wavefunction	alone,	
as	 e.g.	 in	 the	Many	Worlds	 Interpretation74)	 represents	 the	 complete	 state	 of	 the	
system:	Since	the	positions	of	the	corpuscles	are	definite	at	any	instance,	so	is	the	state	
of	each	system	–	including	the	various	pointer	positions	of	measurement	devices.	In	
other	words:	Although	the	wavefunction	of	a	measurement	device,	too,	in	general	is	
in	a	superposition,	the	value-definite/-determinate	configuration	of	the	corpuscles	of	
which	the	device	is	composed,	picks	out	a	definite	measurement	outcome.	
At	no	point	does	determinism,	i.e.	the	GE,	enter	the	stage:	All	the	work	is	done	by	the	
presupposed	 ontology	 with	 its	 position-definiteness	 and	 wavefunction-mediated	
contextuality	w.r.t.	all	other	dynamical	variables.	The	GE	thus	is	irrelevant	to	dBBT’s	
solution	of	the	Measurement	Problem.	
This	is	not	to	downplay	a	related,	but	distinct	question	Maudlin	calls	the	“Problem	of	
Effect”:	“The	result	of	a	measurement	[…]	has	predictive	power	for	the	future:	after	
the	 first	measurement	 is	 completed,	we	are	 in	 a	position	 to	 know	more	about	 the	
outcome	of	 the	 second	 than	we	 could	before	 the	 first	measurement	was	made.”75	
Indeed,	the	GE	accounts	for	the	Problem	of	Effect76,	allowing	for	information	of	the	
measurement	to	propagate	into	the	future.	As	we	shall	argue	in	detail	in	section	IV.3,	
abandoning	the	GE,	and	stomaching	the	absence	of	a	solution	to	the	Problem	of	Effect	
is	of	no	empirical	or	pragmatic	consequence:	We	are	 licenced	to	dispense	with	 the	
requirement	 that	 “(t)he	 result	 of	 the	 first	 measurement	 (be)	 not	 codified	 in	 the	
subsequent	wavefunction	[…]”.77	
																																																						
72Cf.,	for	instance,	Maudlin	(1995)		
73Cf.	Dürr/Teufel	(2009),	Ch.	9	or	Esfeld	(2014)	
74	Cf.,	for	instance,	Wallace	(2008),	Ch.	2.4	
75	Maudlin	(1995),	p.	13	
76	Cf.	Albert	(1992),	pp.	147	
77	Maudlin	(1995),	p.	14	
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• It	has	been	argued	that	 the	GE	 in	some	sense	explains	dBBT’s	peculiar	ontology,	 in	
which	 corpuscles	 have	 positions	 as	 their	 only	 non-contextual	 dynamical	 variables:	
“Bohmian	Mechanics	 should	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 first-order	 theory,	 in	which	 it	 is	 the	
velocity	[…]	that	is	fundamental	in	that	it	is	this	quantity	that	is	specified	by	the	theory,	
directly	and	simply	[…].	[…]	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	second-order	concepts	[viz.	
acceleration,	 force,	work	and	energy]	play	no	 role	 in	Bohmian	mechanics;	 they	are	
emergent	notions.”78		
However,	an	ontology	cannot	be	simply	extracted	from	the	formalism.	It	follows	from	
axioms	that	must	be	postulated	separately79;	a	bare	formalism	never	provides	its	own	
interpretation	 or	 ontology.	 Consequently,	 the	 formalism	 cannot	 explain	 (in	 any	
deductive	sense)	the	ontology:	Rather,	 the	two	 in	some	cases	match	better	than	 in	
others,	with	some	ontological	stipulations	appearing	more	plausible	than	others.		
How	well	motivated,	one	may	immediately	wonder,	is	dBBT’s	ontology	with	its	beable	
status	of	positions	and	contextuality	of	all	other	variables?	We	concur	here	with	Bell,	
who	praises	 its	naturalness	and	cogency80	without	any	 reference	 to	 the	GE:	 “[…]	 in	
physics	the	only	observations	we	must	consider	are	position	observations,	if	only	the	
positions	of	instrument	pointers.	It	is	a	great	merit	of	the	deBroglie-Bohm	picture	to	
force	 us	 to	 consider	 this	 fact.	 If	 you	 make	 axioms,	 rather	 than	 definitions	 and	
theorems,	about	the	‘measurement’	of	anything	else,	then	you	commit	redundancy	
and	risk	inconsistency.”81		
• Does	the	GE	at	least	help	us	explain	and	grasp	quantum	phenomena?	One	may	well	
challenge	 that,	 arguing	 that	 the	 GE	 merely	 garnishes	 the	 QEH	 with	 a	 “fictitious	
determinism”82	which	doesn’t	enhance	our	understanding:	
																																																						
78	Dürr	et	al.	(1995),	pp.	7	(Dürr	et	al.’s	emphasis).		
Originally,	 the	argument	 is	 intended	as	a	criticism	of	the	2nd-order	“quantum	potential”	 formulation	of	dBBT,	
espoused	e.g.	by	Holland	(1993).	
79	Cf.	Bunge	(1967);	Esfeld,	passim	
80	Daumer	et	al.	(1997)	elaborate	Bell’s	idea	that	the	non-contextuality	of	variables	other	than	position	is	rooted	
in	a	naïve	realism	about	operators.	
81	Bell	(1982),	p.	166	
82	Englert	(2001)	in	his	review	of	the	German	version	of	Dürr/Teufel	(2009)	(D.	Dürr:	“Bohmsche	Mechanik	als	
Grundlage	der	Quantenmechanik”,	Springer,	2001)		
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o The	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 dBBT’s	 ontological	 framework,	 with	 its	 dualist	
wavefunction-point	 particle	 ontology,	 contextuality,	 etc.,	 drastically	 depart	
from	any	classical	picture,	to	begin	with.83		
o Also	 from	 a	 less	 philosophical	 angle,	 the	 “surrealistic”	 trajectories	 are	
misleading:	“The	Bohm	trajectory	is	[…]	macroscopically	at	variance	with	the	
actual,	 that	 is:	 observed	 track”84 ;	 semi-classical	 dBBT	 trajectories	 in	 semi-
classical	situations	differ	strongly	from	classical	trajectories.85		
Einstein’s	objection	to	dBBT	from	1953	takes	up	this	point	(already	articulated	by	Pauli	
much	 earlier	 in	 regards	 to	 deBroglie’s	 original	 pilot-wave	 theory	 from	 1927)	 and	
couples	it	to	a	methodological	principle.86	He	considers	a	one-dimensional	particle	in	
a	 perfectly	 elastic	 box	 of	 length	 L,	 centred	 around	 zero.	 Inside	 the	 box,	 the	
corresponding	energy	eigenfunctions	are	superpositions	of	plane	waves	travelling	to	
the	right	and	left,	respectively:		
𝜑~ 𝑥, 𝑡 = 2 ∤ 𝑛:	 12L cos 𝑛𝜋𝑥𝐿 𝑒["ℏ²²´²8µ¶²&2|𝑛:	 12L sin 𝑛𝜋𝑥𝐿 𝑒["ℏ²²´²8µ¶²& .	
The	GE	then	yields	a	vanishing	velocity	at	all	times	–	a	result	that	“contradicts	the	well-
founded	 requirement	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	macro-system	 the	motion	 should	 agree	
approximately	with	the	motion	following	from	classical	mechanics.”87		
Similarly,	in	the	case	of	the	ground	state	of	the	hydrogen	atom,	due	to	its	real-valued	
wavefunction	the	shell	electron,	according	to	dBBT,	is	at	rest88	–	again,	at	variance	with	
the	demand	 that	 in	 the	macro-limit	one	 should	approximately	 recover	 the	classical	
motion.	
For	the	moment,	we	postpone	the	discussion	of	two	further	types	of	blemishes	to	the	next	
subsection.	May	the	aforementioned	shortcomings	suffice	now	as	a	motivation	to	jettison	the	
redundant	 GE,	 leaving	 us	 with	 the	 dBBT	 ontology	 (position	 determinateness	 and	
																																																						
83	Cf.	Esfeld	et	al.	(2014)	
84	Englert	et	al.	(1992),	quoted	in	Passon	(2005),	p.	8,	who	critically	discusses	this	argument.	Note,	though,	that	
this	discrepancy	between	the	“surrealistic”	dBBT	trajectories	and	the	“observed	tracks”	doesn’t	amount	to	any	
empirical	deviation	of	dBBT	from	the	well-confirmed	quantum	mechanical	predictions,	cf.	ibid.	
85	Cf.	Matzikin/Nurock	(2003)	
86	Cf.	Myrvold	(2003),	esp.	sect.	3.1.	See	also	Holland	(1993),	Ch.	6.5.	Both	authors	criticize	these	objections.	
87	Einstein	(1953),	quoted	in	Myrvold	(2003),	p.	10	
88	Cf.	Holland	(1993),	Ch.	4.5.	
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contextuality)	 and	 the	 QEH/BR,	 whose	 conjunction	 alone	 warrants	 that	 all	 predictions	 of	
ordinary	 QM	 are	 reproduced.	 We	 dub	 the	 resultant	 theory	 “stochastic	 deBroglie-Bohm	
Theory”(sdBBT)	–	a	name	to	whose	deliberate	choice	we’ll	turn	in	III.3.89		
In	the	following,	let’s	take	sdBBT	seriously	–	as	a	fundamentally	stochastic	micro-theory:	
• Corpuscles	no	longer	are	assigned	continuous,	deterministic	trajectories,	picked	out	by	
specifying	initial	conditions.	
• They	only	have	a	localisation	probability,	equal	to	the	BR-probability,	quantifying	–	in	
a	manner	to	be	made	precise	in	the	subsequent	subsection	–	the	corpuscles’	random	
walk	 through	 configuration	 space:	 The	 corpuscles	 spontaneously	 jump	 between	
possible	positions.	
• Their	 random	 localisations	 notwithstanding,	 at	 every	 instance	 they	 have	 definite	
positions.	All	other	dynamical	properties,	 like	 in	the	standard	dBBT	ontology,	which	
sdBBT	inherits	from	dBBT,	are	only	derivative/contextualised.	III.	2.	Probabilities	in	sdBBT	
Let’s	examine	in	more	detail	now	sdBBT’s	probability	space	 ℝ2¹,𝒜, ℙ ,	with	configuration	
space	ℝ2¹ 	as	 the	 so-called	 sample	 space,	 the	𝜎-algebra90	of	 “events”	𝒜	generated	by	ℝ2¹	
(i.e.	 the	 Borel	 set)	 and	 the	 Born-probability	 measure	𝑑ℙ = 𝜓 9𝑑23𝑸. 91 	We	 propose	 the	
following	(non-Popperian92)	propensity	interpretation93:	
• The	 sample	 space	 is	 the	 set	of	possible	 configurations	 an	N-corpuscle	universe	 can	
occupy.	
• As	the	most	“literal”	ontology	for	the	probabilistic	sdBBT	is	a	“world	of	propensities”	
(Popper),	we	propose	the	following:	Rather	than	being	uniquely	determined	in	their	
spatiotemporal	evolution	by	initial	conditions,	the	corpuscles	possess	only	a	tendency	
																																																						
89	Bell	(1987),	Ch.5	considers	the	same	idea	as	a	characterization	of	the	Everett	interpretation.	We	take	up	the	
question	of	whether	this	identification	is	justified	or	not	in	III.3.	
90	Certain	mathematical	difficulties	prohibit	the	definability	of	the	probability	measure	on	all	partial	sets	of	the	
sample	space.	With	a	𝜎-algebra	of	events	one	constructs	a	smaller,	but	simultaneously	still	sufficiently	rich	set	
on	which	to	define	the	probability	measure.	
91	For	all	formal/mathematical	issues,	cf.,	e.g.,	Georgii	(2009),	esp.	Ch.	1.	
92 	Propensity	 views	 can	 vary	 considerably	 w.r.t.	 their	 referents	 (propensities	 of	 what?),	 their	 content	
(propensities	for	what?)	and	their	ontological	status	(e.g.	dispositions?),	cf.	Torretti	(1990),	Ch.4.		
In	particular	in	the	first	two	respects	our	propensity	view	differs	from	Popper’s,	which	takes	propensities	to	be	
dispositions	of	the	whole	experimental	setup	to	produce	long-term	frequencies.	
93	We	draw	partially	on	Bunge	(2011),	Ch.	4.	
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(disposition	 or	 propensity)	 to	 spontaneously,	 randomly	 materialise	 or	 jump	 into	
existence	in	a	certain	configuration	at	a	certain	instance	in	time:	The	manifestation	of	
the	 disposition	 is	 the	 localised	 corpuscle	 configuration,	 which	 we	 register	 as	
frequencies.	(We	don’t	assume	–	and	in	fact	expressly	reject,	see	IV.3	and	IV.5.2	–	the	
identity	of	the	corpuscles	between	different	localisations:	Corpuscles	don’t	persist	in	
time,	lacking	diachronic	identity.)	Thus,	a	change	in	a	corpuscle’s	position	no	longer	
requires	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 triggering	 mechanism	 –	 as	 a	 literal	 reading	 of	 sdBBT’s	
formalism	seems	to	call	for.		
Note	 that	 the	 corpuscles’	 spontaneous	 localisation	 isn’t	 a	 “collapse	 of	 the	
wavefunction”:	 The	 disposition	 continues	 to	 evolve	 unitarily	 also	 after	 its	
manifestation.	
The	 probability	 measure	 quantifies	 the	 strength	 of	 such	 a	 propensity 94 ,	 with	 a	
configuration	 of	 zero	 probability	 possessing	 minimal	 propensity	 to	 happen.	 That	
doesn’t	mean,	though,	that	the	configuration	is	impossible.	(Recall	that	generally,	for	
every	continuous	probability	distribution	each	single,	possible	outcome	has	probability	
zero.)	Conversely,	a	configuration	with	probability	1	isn’t	necessary/inevitable95;	it	only	
has	 the	 greatest	 tendency	 to	 become	 actualised.	 (Dispositionalism	 suggests	 a	
modification	of	the	notion	of	(nomological)	impossibility:	An	event	may	be	said	to	be	
impossible,	 iff	 it	 cannot	 be	 assigned	 a	 probability	 value.	 Adopting	 this	 notion	 of	
nomological	possibility	allows	us	to	pre-empt	a	metaphysical	objection	against	sdBBT’s	
ontology:	namely	that	it	postulates	an	incessant	creatio	ex	nihilo,	with	the	corpuscles	
popping	into/out	of	existence	from/back	into	absolute	nothingness,	respectively.	Such	
spontaneous	 materialisations	 and	 de-materialisations	 apparently	 contradict	 the	
received	metaphysical	 principle	 of	 substance	 conservation,	 i.e.	 that	 substances	 can	
neither	spontaneously	emerge	nor	perish.96	Dispositionalism	avoids	the	conflict	with	
that	principle,	though,	since	firstly	the	N	corpuscles’	disposition	to	localise	themselves	
stretches	 throughout	all	of	 space:	The	disposition	 is	everywhere	 (not,	of	course,	 its	
manifestation).	Secondly,	the	number	of	corpuscles	is	also	conserved:	At	any	instant,	
there	are	always	N	actual	corpuscles.	Hence,	the	corpuscles	are	not	popping	into	/out	
																																																						
94	The	status	of	the	wavefunction	may	be	seen	as	the	gauge	field	(analogous	to	the	electromagnetic	4-potential	
in	electromagnetism)	with	the	corresponding	physical	field	(analogous	to	the	Faraday	tensor).	
95	Cf.	Bunge	(2011),	sect.	6.3.	
96		
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of	existence	out	of/into	absolute	nothingness	or	empty	space.	One	may,	of	course,	
criticise	the	idea	that	a	disposition	elicits	spontaneous,	random	manifestations	–	but	
that’s	a	general	scepticism	of	a	dispositional	metaphysics,	not	specific	to	sdBBT.)	
Advocating	above	a	single-case	propensity	interpretation,	it	now	behoves	us	to	address	the	
canonical	objections	against	single-case	propensities	–	an	opportunity	also	to	elucidate	some	
of	sdBBT’s	salient	features.	
• The	 Reference	 Class	 Problem 97 	arises	 for	 propensity	 interpretations	 when,	 as	 in	
Popper’s	propensity	theory	from	1957,	probabilities	are	assigned	to	an	experimental	
setup	of	physical	conditions	that	generate	the	observed	outcomes:	The	propensity	of	
an	event	is	thus	always	relative	to	the	generating	conditions.	These,	however,	can	be	
incorporated	 in	various,	different	 classes.	Consequently,	one	cannot	unambiguously	
assign	an	event	its	propensity.	
While	 the	 Reference	 Class	 Problem	 notoriously	 plagues	 frequentism	 and	 long-run	
propensities,	 sdBBT	 –	 like	 most	 variants	 of	 QM 98 	–	 escapes	 it 99 :	 The	 system’s	
wavefunction	 completely	 determines	 the	 dBB-propensities;	 no	 further	 facts	 of	 the	
system	as	“generating	conditions”	are	necessary.	Such	propensities	are	understood	as	
quantities	inherent	in	the	corpuscles.		
• Hájek	criticises	this	manoeuvre	to	circumvent	the	Reference	Class	Problem	as	exacting	
the	 price	 of	 a	 vacuous	 notion	 of	 propensity:100	Indeed,	 propensity	 approaches	 are	
often	 dismissed	 as	 pseudo-explanatory	 of	 the	 type	 a	 quack	 physician	 dishes	 up	 in	
Molière’s	 Le	 Malade	 Imaginaire,	 when	 “explaining”	 the	 sleep-inducing	 powers	 of	
opium	through	a	virtus	dormitiva.		
This	complaint,	however,	rests	on	a	misunderstanding:	Quantification,	explanation	and	
interpretation	are	distinct	conceptual	operations.		
o Propensity	accounts	don’t	pretend	to	be	explanations	(i.e.	answers	to:	“How	
can	 we	 derive	 the	 BR-probabilities	 from	 a	 certain	 metaphysical	 or	 physical	
																																																						
97	Cf.	Hájek	(2006)	
98	Cf.,	e.g.	Galavotti	(2001)	
99	Cf.	Frigg/Hoefer	(2010),	sect.	3	and	5.	The	argument	carries	over	verbatim.	
100	Cf.	Hájek	(2006),	pp.	25	
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theoretical	 framework”	–	 in	 the	manner	of,	 say,	Robb’s	 (failed)	 attempts	 to	
derive	the	metric	structure	from	causal	relations101).	
o Rather,	propensities	intend	to	interpret	and	ontologically	ground	probabilities:	
“What	could	the	concept	of	probability	refer	to	in	a	world	described	by	sdBBT?”	
In	sdBBT,	propensities	are	inherent,	dispositional,	real	quantities	–	figuring	as	
truthmakers	of	probabilistic	statements.	
o In	 turn,	 probabilities	 formalise	 and	 quantify	 the	 vaguer,	 pre-theoretical,	
qualitative	and	ontological	notion	of	a	propensity:	“How	to	render	the	concept	
of	 a	 propensity	 sufficiently	 mathematically	 precise?”	 To	 this	 end,	
Kolmogorow’s	 axioms	 are	 imposed	 as	 formal	 desiderata,	 whose	motivation	
(esp.	that	of	𝜎-addivity)	shall	not	concern	us	here.	Once	imposed,	probabilistic	
statements,	 thus	 rendered	 quantitative,	 can	 subsequently	 be	 subjected	 to	
empirical	tests.102	
• Arguably	 “devastating	 for	 views	 that	 take	 propensities	 to	 involve	 weakened	 or	
intermittent	causation”103	is	Humphreys’	Paradox.	It	boils	down	to	the	incompatibility	
between	inverse	conditional	probabilities,	understood	as	propensities,	and	the	time-
asymmetry	of	causality.		
Consider	a	partition	 𝐵": 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 	of	the	sample	space	of	physical	states	of	some	system,	
Ω = 𝐵""∈¿ ,	 with	∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑘:	𝐵" ∩ 𝐵U = ∅ ,	 and	 let	A ∈ Ω 	be	 an	 event.	 Then,	 Bayes’	
Theorem	purports:	∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼:	ℙ 𝐵" 𝐴 = ℙ(Ã Ä;)ℙ(Ä;)ℙ(Ã ÄÅ)ℙ(ÄÅ)Å∈Æ .	What	does	this	signify	in	terms	
of	propensities?		
It	seems	natural	to	interpret	the	conditional	probability	ℙ(𝐴 𝐵")	as	the	propensity	of	
the	 system	to	undergo	 the	 transition	𝐵" ↝	A.	This	 suggests	 to	understand	𝐵" 	as	 the	
cause	 of	 the	 effect	 𝐴 ,	 and	 hence	 conditional	 probabilities	 as	 representing	 a	
probabilistic	form	of	causation.		
The	 conditional	 probability	 for	 the	 inverse	 transition,	ℙ 𝐵" 𝐴 ,	 definable	 via	Bayes’	
Theorem,	would	thus	quantify	the	tendency	for	the	effect	A	to	bring	about	the	cause	𝐵".		
																																																						
101	Cf.	Sklar	(1992),	pp.	83	
102	Cf.	Georgii	(2011),	Ch.10	&11;	Gillies	(2000),	Ch.	6,7;	Beisbart	(2011),	esp.	4.2;	Suárez	(2014)		
103	Eagle	(2004),	p.	402	
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In	consequence,	not	only	would	smoking	cause	lung	cancer,	but	also	conversely	would	
lung	cancer	cause	smoking.	This	seems	absurd:	Only	causes	produce	their	effects,	not	
vice	 versa;	 causal	 chains	 of	 events	 cannot	 be	 inversed.	 Probabilities	 therefore,	 the	
argument	concludes,	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	propensities.	
A	closer	inspection	of	the	paradox	is	apposite.	Three	groups	of	posits	enter	it:	
(i) We	 adopt	 standard	 probability	 calculus,	 with	 probability	 measures	 obeying	
Kolmogorow’s	axioms.	
(ii) The	 second	 group	 of	 posits	 comprises	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	
propensities	(denoted	by	𝔓,	time-indexed	w.r.t.	𝑡= < 𝑡9 < 𝑡2)	in	a	causal	process	𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐵(𝑡9) ↝ 𝐶 𝑡2 	(i.e.	chain	of	events,	𝐴,	𝐵	and	𝐶):	
a. The	 propensity	 of	 the	 process	 𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐵 𝑡9 	is	 nontrivial:	1 > 𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴(𝑡=) > 0	
b. The	propensity	of	the	causal	chain	isn’t	minimal	:		𝔓&Ê 𝐶 𝑡2 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ 𝐵 𝑡9 > 0.	
c. In	 the	 absence	of	𝐵,	 the	 process	𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐶 𝑡2 	has	minimal	 propensity:	𝔓&Ê 𝐶 𝑡2 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ ¬𝐵 𝑡9 = 0.	
d. Future	 events	 are	 causally	 neutral/irrelevant	 for	 past	 events:	𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ 𝐶 𝑡2 = 𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ ¬𝐶 𝑡2= 𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴 𝑡= 	
(iii) The	 last	 posit	 bridges	 (i)	 and	 (ii),	with	 an	 identity	 thesis,	 according	 to	which	 all	
propensities	𝔓&	can	be	uniquely	associated	with	probabilities,	with	the	strength	𝜎	
of	the	propensity	being	identified	with	the	probability:		𝔓& → ℙ&, ∀𝑥: 	𝔓& 𝑥 ↦ 𝜎 𝔓& 𝑥 ≡ ℙ& 𝑥 	
Humphreys’	Paradox	now	consists	in	the	inconsistency	that	arises	from	the	conjunction	of	
(i),	 (ii)	 and	 (iii).	 Which	 premise	 therefore	 to	 relinquish	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	 the	
contradiction?	
In	contradistinction	to	Humphreys	himself,	we	wish	to	remain	as	conservative	as	possible,	
and	retain	the	standard	probability	calculus.	
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Accepting	the	causal	intuitions	of	propensities	captured	in	(ii),	Suárez	has	pled	for	rejecting	
the	identity	thesis104	–	in	particular,	its	first	part:	Not	all	probabilities	are	amenable	to	a	
propensity	 interpretation;	 some	 conditional	 probabilities	 in	 particular	 don’t	 refer	 to	
factually	possible	transitions	in	the	world.	This	isn’t	unfamiliar	from	other	theories	whose	
formalism	also	 treats	physically	 impossible	 situations,	 forbidden	by	extra-mathematical	
selection	 rules.	 E.g.	 in	 standard	 QM,	 N-particle	 wavefunctions	 transform	 either	
symmetrically	 or	 anti-symmetrically	 under	 permutations;	 formally,	 nothing	 prevents	
mixed-symmetric	transformation	behaviour.	Nature,	though,	doesn’t	seem	to	realise	this	
option.	
In	their	defence	of	propensity	interpretations	in	GRW	collapse-theories,	Hoefer	and	Frigg	
have	 indeed	 abolished	 the	 identity	 thesis	 by	 asserting	 "that	 GRW	 propensities	 are	 all	
forward-looking	 in	 time” 105 	–	 a	 “response	 that	 any	 advocate	 of	 objective	 quantum	
probabilities	will	wish	to	make.”106	
In	addition	to	abandoning	the	 identity	thesis	 (iii),	sdBBT	compels	us	to	abandon	 (iic):	 It	
captures	 the	 intuition	 that	 in	 a	 causal	 chain	𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐵(𝑡9) ↝ 𝐶 𝑡2 	the	 intermediary	
event	B	is	indispensable;	i.e.	in	B’s	absence,	the	chain	has	minimal	propensity	to	occur.	In	
sdBBT,	however,	the	corpuscles’	configurations	spontaneously	and	randomly	jump	from	
one	 instant	 to	 another,	 independently	 of	 previous	 configurations;	 sequences	 of	
configurations	are	no	longer	causally	connected.	In	other	words,	there	exists	no	triplet	of	
events	that	satisfies	(iic);	in	sdBBT	(iic)	is	violated.	Humphreys’	Paradox	thus	lapses.	
Spurred	 by	 those	 doubts	 regarding	 the	 conceptual	 tenability	 of	 propensity	 interpretations	
simpliciter,	as	well	as	perhaps	by	discomfort	about	the	lack	of	direct,	empirical	falsifiability	of	
propensities107,	one	might	generally	baulk	at	our	invocation	of	a	metaphysics	of	dispositions.	
What	swayed	us?	We’ll	consider	first	reasons	to	regard	the	wavefunction	real	(”wavefunction	
																																																						
104	He	furthermore	makes	a	case	against	conversely	identifying	all	propensities	with	probabilities.	
105	Frigg/Hoefer	(2007),	p.385	
106	Loc.cit.	
107 	As	 well	 as	 the	 “inferential	 link”	 between	 frequencies	 as	 estimates	 for	 probabilities	 and	 the	 “decision-
theoretical	link”	concerning	the	role	probabilities	play	in	decisions	and	action-relevant	choices,	cf.	e.g.,	Brown	
(2011),	esp.	sect.	3.	
Such	issues	are	intimately	tied	up	with	the	debate	between	Humeanism	and	Governing	Law	Approaches,	which	
lies	outside	our	current	scope.	We	refer	to	e.g.	Maudlin	(2007),	esp.	Ch.	2	for	further	details.	
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realism”);	 we’ll	 then	 argue	 that	 viewing	 the	 wavefunction	 more	 specifically	 as	 a	 real,	
dispositional	quantity	overcomes	the	key	problems	of	wavefunction	realism.		
Above,	we	declared	the	corpuscles’	propensity	a	real/physical	property,	represented	by	the	
wavefunction.	 This	 wavefunction	 realism	 naturally	 accounts	 for	 the	 wavefunction’s	
contingency,	structural	complexity	and	time-evolution108:		
• The	wavefunction	has	dynamical	degrees	of	freedom	of	its	own,	governed	by	the	SE	
and	dependent	on	 initial/boundary	 conditions.	Varying	across	different	worlds	 that	
differ	 in	 those	 conditions,	 the	 wavefunction	 consequently	 represents	 a	 contingent	
quantity	–	as	opposed	to	absolute	objects,	which	don’t	vary	across	possible	worlds,	
e.g.	 the	 Minkowski	 spacetime	 metric	 in	 Special	 Relativity.	 Contingency	 is	 seen	 as	
characteristic	of	real	entities	–	as	opposed	to	merely	conventional	ones.		
As	Brown	and	Wallace	suggestively	point	out,	“(h)istorically,	it	was	exactly	when	the	
gravitational	 and	 electric	 fields	 began	 to	 be	 attributed	 independent	 dynamics	 and	
degrees	of	freedom	that	they	were	reified:	the	Coulomb	or	Newtonian	'fields'	may	be	
convenient	mathematical	fictions,	but	the	Maxwell	field	or	the	dynamical	spacetime	
metric	are	almost	universally	accepted	as	part	of	the	ontology	of	modern	physics.”109	
• Its	 contingency	 also	 implies	 that	we	 can	 to	 some	extent	 control	 the	wavefunction,	
insofar	as	we	can	prepare	a	physical	system	via	initial	and	boundary	conditions.	This	
controllability	 speaks	 strongly	 against	 a	 nomological	 interpretation	 of	 the	
wavefunction110,	which	 conceive	of	 the	 latter	 as	 a	 law.	As	Goldstein/Zanghì	 admit:	
“And	laws	are	not	supposed	to	be	things	that	we	can	control	–	we’re	not	God.”111	
																																																						
108	Cf.	Brown/Wallace	(2004),	pp.	12	
109	Loc.cit.	
110	E.g.	Esfeld	et	al.	(2014)	
111	Goldstein/Zanghì	(2013),	p.99.	Their	counterargument	is	“[…]	that	there	is	only	one	wave	function	we	should	
be	worrying	about,	the	fundamental	one,	the	wave	function	Ψ	of	the	universe”	(loc.cit.),	and	that	the	latter	is	
not	 controllable.	 Taking	 up	 their	 invocation	 of	 God,	 one	 needs	 to	 distinguish	 between	 two	 forms	 of	 Divine	
intervention:	On	the	one	hand,	God’s	thaumaturgical	ability	to	suspend	the	extant	laws	of	nature,	and	on	the	
other	hand	his	weakly	and	strongly	demiurgical	ability	to	create	worlds:	The	former	refers	to	the	ability	to	create	
distinct	 nomologically	 possible	 worlds,	 differing	 only	 w.r.t.	 contingent	 elements,	 such	 as	 initial/boundary	
conditions,	 while	 the	 non-contingent	 (“nomological”)	 elements	 remain	 the	 same;	 strong	 demiurgy	 refers	 to	
God’s	ability	to	create	worlds	in	which	different	laws	of	nature	hold.		
The	kind	of	uncontrollability	on	which	 the	 intuitive	notion	of	a	 law	 turns	 is	weak	demiurgy.	 In	 consequence,	
assuming	that	He	shares	our	ontological	intuitions,	God,	too,	arguably	would	reject	the	nomological	view.	
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• Like	other	real	quantities,	such	as	the	metric	in	General	Relativity,	subject	to	a	set	of	
16	 coupled	 hyperbolic-elliptic	 nonlinear	 PDEs,	 sdBBT’s	 wavefunction-dependent	
propensity	is	structurally	very	rich.		
In	both	sdBBT	and	dBBT,	this	structural	complexity	mirrors	its	ontological	importance	
in	 that	 the	 wavefunction	 is	 the	 only	 property	 (other	 than	 positions)	 that	 can	 be	
assigned	to	corpuscles.	
• sdBBT’s	propensity	evolves	in	time	according	to	the	SE.	It	seems	unnatural	to	regard	
something	that	thus	changes	over	time	as	not	real;	in	fact,	mutability	has	even	been	
proposed	as	the	essential	difference	between	purely	conceptual/”Platonic”	abstracta	
and	physical	concreta.112	
Despite	indeed	suggesting	that	the	wavefunction	represents	a	real	entity	(rather	than,	say,	a	
law-like	abstractum,	as	in	the	nomological	interpretation)	–	Brown	and	Wallace’s	“reification”	
argument	remains	still	silent	on	the	ontological	category	under	which	to	subsume	the	“reified”	
entity:	Is	it	a	substance	or	property?	
For	an	answer	within	a	traditional	ontological	framework,	let’s	analyse	the	extent	to	which	the	
wavefunction	 carries	 itself	 properties	 or	 not;	 the	 former	 would	 suggest	 its	 status	 as	 a	
substance.		
Given	the	dependence	of	the	wavefunction	–	as	a	solution	to	the	SE	–	on	parameters	such	as	
mass	or	 charge,	Holland	has	 proposed	 that	 the	wavefunction	 itself	 should	be	 regarded	 as	
massive,	charged	etc.113	Discussing	neutron	interferometric	thought	experiments,	Brown	et	
al.	 elaborate	 this	 proposal	 to	 attribute	 the	 state-independent,	 non-dynamical	 properties	
mass,	 charge,	 magnetic	 moment,	 etc.	 to	 both	 the	 wavefunction	 and	 the	 Bohmian	
corpuscles.114		
One	of	the	core	features	of	the	traditional	notion	of	substance115	is	“ultimate	subjecthood”	
(i.e.	being	predicable	without	itself	being	predicated	of	something	else).	It	suggests	that	the	
wavefunction	should	be	regarded	as	a	substance,	yielding,	prima	facie,	two	substances,	Ψ	and	
the	 corpuscles.	 One	 may	 find	 this	 substance-dualism	 already	 unpalatable	 enough.	
																																																						
112	Cf.	Bunge	(1981)	
113	Cf.	Holland	(1993),	pp.	78	
114	Cf.	Brown	et	al.	(1995);	Brown	et	al.	(1996),	sect.	3	and	4	
115	Cf.,	e.g.,	Kuhlmann	(2010),	Ch.	II.7	
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Ontologically	yet	more	disconcerting	is	that	in	dBBT	the	corpuscles,	albeit	ultimate	subjects	of	
position	 ascription,	 ignore	 another	 traditional	 category	 feature	 of	 substances,	 viz.	
independence:	Via	QEH	and	 the	GE,	 respectively,	 the	 corpuscles’	 initial	 configurations	and	
behaviour	are	determined	by	the	wavefunction.	(A	converse	dependence	of	the	wavefunction	
on	 the	 corpuscles	doesn’t	 obtain	–	 an	 issue	we’ll	 discuss	 in	 III.3.).	 In	 consequence,	 dBBT’s	
ontology	is	a	substance-dualism	consisting	of	one	bona	fide	substance,	viz.	the	wavefunction,	
and	one	entity,	viz.	the	corpuscles,	whose	ontological	category	is	ambivalent;	the	fact	that	the	
wavefunction	 and	 the	 corpuscles	 arguably	 share	 the	 state-independent	 properties	 mass,	
charge,	etc.	further	exacerbates	this	ontological	uneasiness.	
We	submit,	sdBBT’s	commitment	to	a	metaphysics	of	dispositions	(“dispositionalism”)	offers	
a	neater	ontological	picture:	While	concurring	with	the	aforesaid	proposal	to	ascribe	the	non-
dynamical	 properties	 also	 to	 the	 wavefunction,	 sdBBT	 needn’t	 classify	 the	 latter	 as	 a	
substance:	 The	wavefunction	 represents	 corpuscles’	 disposition	 of	 spontaneously	 popping	
into	 existence,	 both	 localising	 themselves	 at	 certain	 sites	 with	 certain	 masses,	 charges,	
magnetic	momenta,	etc.	Thus,	sdBBT’s	corpuscles	are	the	only	substances.	They	are	ascribed	
properties,	 which	 fall	 into	 two	 inter-related	 types	 –	 the	 disposition	 of	 spontaneous	
materialisation,	 represented	by	 the	wavefunction,	 and	 the	 corresponding	manifestation	of	
that	disposition	of	the	corpuscles	to	randomly	localise	themselves	at	certain	positions,	with	
certain	 state-independent	 properties.	 That	 the	 wavefunction	 is	 defined	 on	 configuration	
space,	 and	 that	 the	 corpuscles	 and	 the	 wavefunction	 can	 both	 be	 attributed	 the	 state-
independent	 properties,	 now	 simply	 reflects	 the	 ontological	 dependence	 between	
dispositions	and	their	manifestations.		
To	 some,	 our	 subscription	 to	 such	 a	 “revisionary	metaphysics”	 (Strawson)	 that	 posits	 also	
dispositions,	rather	than	exclusively	categorical	properties,	may	seem	appalling,	e.g.	on	the	
grounds	of	dispositions	defying	direct	empirical	access	–	an	objection,	however,	that	applies	
generically	to	theoretical	terms	and	runs	into	the	pitfalls	already	the	Logical	Positivists	had	to	
face	with	their	observational/theoretical	dichotomy.116	
Dispositionalism	 has	 merits	 both	 specifically	 in	 the	 germane	 context	 of	 GRW	 theories117	
(arguments	that	carry	over	verbatim	to	sdBBT),	as	well	as	generally	in	its	own	right.	Amongst	
																																																						
116	Cf.,	for	instance,	Suppe	(1974),	esp.	pp.	85	
117	Cf.	Dorato/Esfeld	(2010);	for	a	slightly	different	view,	cf.	Frigg/Hoefer	(2006),	esp.	sect.	5	
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them,	the	literature,	to	which	we	refer	for	details118,	extolls	the	following:	“[…]	a	clear	sense	
in	which	 quantum	 systems	 in	 entangled	 states	 possess	 properties	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
definite	 values;	 […]	 a	 clear	 transition	 from	 quantum	 to	 classical	 properties;	 […]	 a	 clear	
transition	 from	 quantum	 to	 classical	 structures;	 and	 […]	 [the	 grounding	 of]	 the	 arrow	 of	
time.”119	
The	 crucial	 advantage	 of	 dispositionalism	 in	 our	 context	 at	 hand,	 we	 submit,	 is	 that	 the	
dispositional	 character	 of	 the	 wavefunction	 can	 straightforwardly	 account	 for	 the	 3N-
dimensionality	of	the	configuration	space,	on	which	the	wavefunction	is	defined.120		
By	means	of	contrast,	consider	two	alternate	proposals:	
• “Configuration	 Space	 Realism”	 regards	 the	 wavefunction	 as	 a	 real	 object	 in	
configuration	space.	It	faces	“the	Problem	of	Perception”:	If	the	fundamental	quantum	
world	 lives	 in	3N-	dimensional	configuration	space,	how	 is	 this	compatible	with	the	
world	ostensibly	unfolding	itself	in	3D	physical	space?	How	to	adjudicate	between	the	
rivalling	claims	of	reality	being	3N-dimensional	vs.	3-dimensional?		
• “Multifield	 Realism”	 tries	 to	 avoid	 the	 Problem	 of	 Perception	 by	 regarding	 both	
configuration	 space	 and	 3-space	 as	 equally	 real;	 the	 wavefunction,	 acting	 like	 an	
invisible	 hand	 on	 the	 particles	 and	 fields	 by	 guiding	 their	 dynamics,	 encodes	 a	
multitude	 of	 fields	 in	 ordinary	 3D-space.	Multifield	 Realism	 faces	 “the	 Problem	 of	
Communication”,	 though:	 How	 does	 the	 Multifield	 Wavefunction	 impart	 on	 the	
objects	in	3-space	the	relevant	physical	information?	What’s	the	mechanism	by	which	
it	affects	them?	
How	does	sdBBT	ward	off	these	problems	and	position	itself?		
The	above	description	of	the	Problem	of	Perception	implicitly	presumed	that	wavefunction	
realism	entails	that	the	wavefunction	is	“fundamental”	in	the	sense	of	a	substantial,	physical	
field,	i.e.	a	spatially	extended	body,	which	hence	indeed	one	would	expect	to	be	defined	on	3-
space.	 Recall,	 however,	 our	 previous	 remark	 that	 wavefunction	 realism	 only	 asserts	 the	
reality,	 not	 necessarily	 the	 ontological	 fundamentality/substantiality	 of	 the	 wavefunction.	
																																																						
118	Cf.,	for	instance,	Choi/Fara	(2012)	or	Esfeld	(2008)	
119	Dorato/Esfeld	(2010),	p.	41	
120	Cf.	Suárez	(2015).
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SdBBT	 thus	 remains	 wavefunction	 realist,	 whilst	 conceiving	 of	 the	 wavefunction	 as	 a	
(dispositional)	 property.	 Consequently,	 the	 intuition	 that	 the	 wavefunction,	 no	 longer	
understood	 as	 a	 substantial/physical	 field,	 must	 be	 defined	 on	 physical	 space	 loses	 its	
plausibility;	 the	wavefunction	represents	a	property	of	 the	N-corpuscle	universe.	Since	 the	
ontologically	 subordinate	 wavefunction	 and	 the	 ontologically	 primary	 corpuscles	 don’t	
compete	for	fundamentality,	the	spaces	they	each	inhabit	–	configuration	space	vs.	3-space,	
respectively	–	can	peacefully	coexist.		
Put	differently,	our	actual	perceptions	are	based	on	the	actual	positions	the	corpuscles	occupy	
in	3-space;	these	positions	in	turn	are	the	manifestations	of	the	disposition,	represented	by	
the	wavefunction.	Consequently,	the	compartmentalisation	of	reality	into	dispositions	(where	
the	wavefunction	belongs)	and	their	manifestations	(where	all	actual	configurations	belong,	
including	those	we	detect	and	observe)	resolves	the	Problem	of	Perception.	
The	Problem	of	 Communication	 is	 overcome	 in	 tandem:	 The	wavefunction	 and	 the	 actual	
configurations	fall	into	different	ontological	compartments.	Consequently,	the	wavefunction	
can’t	act	on	the	configurations	in	any	causal	form.	
Dispositionalism	avoids	the	conflict	with	that	principle,	though,	since	firstly	the	N	corpuscles’	
disposition	 to	 localise	 themselves	 stretches	 throughout	 all	 of	 space:	 The	 disposition	 is	
everywhere	 (not,	 of	 course,	 its	manifestation).	 Secondly,	 the	number	of	 corpuscles	 is	 also	
conserved:	At	any	instants,	there	are	always	N	actual	corpuscles.	Hence,	the	corpuscles	are	
not	popping	into	/out	of	existence	out	of/into	absolute	nothingness	or	empty	space.	
Let’s	close	this	subsection	with	a	remark	on	the	global	nature	of	the	disposition	at	hand.	The	
wavefunction	Ψ&	 ,	 representing	 the	 propensity	 of	 the	 N-corpuscle	 universe	 to	 pop	 into	
existence	with	a	certain	configuration	𝑸:= 𝑸=,… ,𝑸3 ∈ ℝ23,	 is	a	holistic	(non-separable,	
but	not	non-local)	property	of	the	whole	system.	It	doesn’t	supervene	on	the	properties	of	
each	 individual	 corpuscles.121	Rather,	 the	 propensity	ℙlÏ 𝑸¦ ∈ 𝒬 	of	 the	 i-th	 corpuscle	 to	
localise	 itself	 in	 the	 region	𝒬 ⊂ ℝ2 	in	 physical	 3D	 space,	 derives	 from	 the	 global,	 usually	
entangled	wavefunction	via:		
																																																						
121	Cf.	also	Esfeld	et	al.	(2014)	
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ℙlÏ 𝑸" ∈ 𝒬 = 𝑑2𝑸¦ Ψ& 𝑸 93¦<=¦Ò"𝒬 .	
Deferring	for	the	moment	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	non-separability	of	the	wavefunction	to	
section	IV.5.4,	let’s	see	how	our	proposed	interpretation	of	sdBBT’s	wavefunction	as	a	holistic	
disposition	overcomes	the	alleged	inability	to	account	for	interactions	that	Esfeld	and	Gisin	
have	 recently	 diagnosed	 for	 primitive	 ontologies,	 with	 discrete	 beables	 whose	 temporal	
sequences	are	no	longer	continuous122	(“flash	ontologies”):	
According	 to	Maudlin,	one	 form	of	 the	problem,	as	 it	 arises	 in	GRW-flash,	 is	 that	 “(f)or	 to	
accept	this	theory	is	to	accept	that	microscopic	reality	is	nothing	at	all	like	what	we	took	it	to	
be	–	not	even	the	parts	that	we	naively	accepted	as	‘revealed’	to	us	by	microscopes.	The	ball-
and-stick	models	of	DNA	–	which	do	an	admirable	job	of	accounting	for	cellular	behaviour	–	
would	 be	 wildly	misleading:	 a	 strand	 of	 DNA	would	 show	 up	 in	 space-time	 as	 a	 sparsely	
scattered	set	of	flashes,	which	would	hardly	suggest,	over	reasonable	time	periods,	a	double	
helix.	Accepting	the	flash	ontology	entails	rejecting	the	space-time	picture	of	cellular	structure	
that	has	guided	the	great	advances	in	medicine	and	biochemistry.	The	theory	does,	of	course,	
account	for	the	practical	success	of	that	picture.”123	In	other	words,	Maudlin	appeals	to	the	
realist	 principle	 that	 the	 accounts	 the	 various	 disciplines	 envision	 of	 their	 scrutinised	
fragments	of	reality	be	mutually	consistent,	rather	than	contradict	each	other;	the	GRW-flash	
theory,	Maudlin’s	objection	asserts,	 flouts	 this	principle:	According	 to	GRW-flash	 theory,	a	
DNA	strand	materialises	approximately	only	once	per	day,	whereas	the	DNA	model	biologists	
successfully	utilise	in	their	research	assumes	that	the	DNA	strand	persists.	
Despite	 its	 likewise	 “flashy”	 ontology,	 sdBBT	 obeys	Maudlin’s	 principle:	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	
entire	N-corpuscle	 universe	 performing	 a	 random	 jump	 through	 configuration	 space,	 the	
macroscopic	 objects	 of	 our	 stochastic	 Bohmian	 world	 are	 indeed	 composed	 of	 actual	
corpuscles.		To	be	sure,	sdBBT	radically	revises	our	picture	of	the	world,	namely	implying	that	
we	most	probably	only	exist	for	one	instant	in	the	whole	history	of	the	universe	(more	on	this	
“temporal	 solipsism”	 in	 section	 IV.3);	 surprisingly,	 though,	 as	 we	 shall	 see,	 this	 doesn’t	
																																																						
122	Esfeld/Gisin	(2014),	sect.	5,	whom	we	follow	here.	
123	Maudlin	(2011b),	p.	257	
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contradict	the	picture	of	the	world	we	get	from	other	sciences,	as	long	as	this	is	understood	
as	the	best	guess	of	how	the	world	looks,	given	our	current	evidence.	
Arguably	 a	 more	 serious	 version	 of	 the	 problem	 concerns	 measurements:	 What	 is	 a	
measurement	 device	 supposed	 to	 interact	 with,	 if	 the	 measured	 quantum	 object,	 say	 a	
trapped	electron,	only	materialises	once	in	a	blue	moon?	Esfeld	and	Gisin	write:	“Let	us	take	
for	granted	that	the	flash	ontology	can	account	for	macroscopic	objects	such	as	measuring	
apparatuses	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘galaxies	 of	 flashes’.	 But	 on	 the	 flash	 ontology,	 there	 is	 nothing	
between	the	source	of	the	experiment	and	the	measurement	apparatus.	In	other	words,	there	
is	nothing	with	which	the	apparatus	could	interact:	there	is	no	particle	that	enters	it,	no	mass	
density	and	no	field	that	gets	in	touch	with	it,	either.“124	They	conclude	that	the	flash	ontology	
is	too	sparse	to		account	for	interactions.	How	to	get	out	of	this	pickle?	The	previous	argument	
is	of	no	avail	 in	 this	 regard:	Although	at	each	 instant	of	 time	our	ambient	macrocosmos	 is	
made	up	of	actual	corpuscles,	positing	an	interaction	between	these	corpuscles	would	amount	
to	an	instantaneous	action-at-a-distance,	which	not	only	falls	short	of	a	plausible	mechanism,	
but	also	rubs	against	the	relativity	of	simultaneity	at	the	heart	of	Special	Relativity.125				
Our	dispositionalist	interpretation	of	sdBBT	resolves	the	problem:	The	dispositional	nature	of	
the	 wavefunction	 warrants	 that	 both	 the	measurement	 system	 and	 the	 quantum	 system	
indeed	always	exist,	albeit	not	necessarily	actualiter.	 To	establish	 the	connection	between	
measurement	system	and	observed	system,	now	the	wavefunction’s	holistic	nature	comes	
into	play:	Both	 systems	are	 fundamentally	 inseparable,	with	only	 the	wavefunction	of	 the	
compound	system	being	the	complete	quantum	state,	representing	the	holistic	disposition	of	
the	pair	(configuration	of	the	measurement	apparatus,	configuration	of	the	measured	system)	
popping	into	existence,	with	its	statistical	correlations	as	brute	facts	of	the	manifestation	of	
the	holistic	disposition.	IV:	Critical	Analysis	of	sdBBT	
After	expounding	in	the	previous	section	some	conceptual	and	metaphysical	idiosyncrasies	of	
sdBBT	and	addressing	some	enquiries	regarding	its	consistency,	let’s	now	turn	to	two	sorts	of	
further	qualms:		
																																																						
124	Esfeld/Gisin	(2014),	p.	12	
125	E.g.	Maudlin	(2011)		
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• A	first	one	concerns	the	taxonomisation	of	sdBBT	as	a	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory:	Does	
the	 family	 resemblance	 between	 dBBT	 and	 sdBBT	 sanctify	 or	 do	 the	 differences	
contest	it?		
• Such	a	comparison	evokes	a	second	question:	 Is	 sdBBT	merely	a	phenomenological	
theory,	and	hence	not	on	a	par	with	theories,	such	as	dBBT,	that	 lay	claim	to	being	
fundamental?	And	furthermore,	if	we	grant	that	sdBBT	is	a	fundamental	theory,	what	
are	its	decisive	advantages	over	dBBT	that	might	justify	taking	sdBBT	indeed	seriously?	IV.1:	sdBBT	as	a	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory	
A	reader	who	has	charitably	followed	our	discussion	of	sdBBT	so	far	might	yet	hesitate:	To	
what	extent	may	sdBBT	still	be	classified	as	a	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory?	Is	sdBBT	sailing	under	
false	colours?	
Note	first	that	sdBBT	differs	from	ordinary	QM	in	its	ontological	premises,	all	of	which	sdBBT	
shares	with	dBBT	(except	for	determinism):	In	QM,	no	pair	of	conjugated	dynamical	variables	
is	ontologically	(or	otherwise)	preferred	over	another;	in	particular,	position	and	momentum	
are	on	a	par126.	(In	the	case	of	Everett’s	Many	World	Interpretation	of	QM,	this	symmetry,	i.e.	
the	absence	of	any	intrinsically	distinguished	dynamical	variables,	has	occasionally	led	to	the	
charge	 of	 the	 so-called	 Problem	of	 Preferred	 Basis.)	 By	 contrast,	 sdBBT,	 albeit	 empirically	
equivalent	 to	 standard	 QM,	 breaks	 this	 symmetry	 of	 all	 pairs	 of	 conjugated	 variables	 by	
distinguishing	position	as	the	sole	“beable”	(Bell),	 i.e.	the	dynamical	variable	that	 is	always	
value-definite/-determinate;	furthermore,	position	is	the	only	non-contextual	variable,	i.e.	in	
both	 dBBT	 and	 sdBBT	 corpuscles	 have	 no	 dynamical	 properties	 other	 than	 position.	 In	
consequence,	 Bell’s	 identification 127 	of	 sdBBT	 as	 a	 version	 of	 Everett’s	 Many	 Worlds	
Interpretation	of	QM	is	mistaken.	
This	distinction	of	position	as	a	beable	can	be	seen	to	be	motivated	physically	by	the	fact	that	
decoherence	–	 the	entanglement	of	 systems	with	 their	 ambient	environment	–	acts	as	an	
effective	 superselection	 rule,	with	position	as	a	preferred	variable,	 relatively	 stable/robust	
																																																						
126 	Pauli	 and	 Heisenberg	 reiterated	 this	 difference	 in	 their	 criticism	 of	 dBBT	 as	 introducing	 an	 “artificial	
asymmetry”,	cf.	Myrvold	(2003),	sect.	3,	who	also	critically	evaluates	it.		
127	Contra	Bell	(1987),	Ch.	5,	for	whom	“keeping	the	instantaneous	configurations,	but	discarding	the	trajectory	
is	the	essential	[…]	of	the	theory	of	Everett”,	loc.cit.,	p.	133.		
By	contrast,	Daumer	et	al.,	cf.	the	chart	on	p.	393	implicitly	distinguish	between	the	Everett	interpretation	and	
sdBBT	(despite	labeling	the	latter	“Bell’s	reformulation	of	Everett’s	theory”,	cf.	op.	cit.,	fn	13).	
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under	 interference,	 and	 in	particular,	 entanglement	effects,	 and	 commuting	with	all	 other	
observables.	 Conversely,	 such	a	distinction	by	 stipulation	has	 explanatory	 surplus	 value:	 It	
supplies	 a	 clear	 primitive	 ontology	whose	merits,	 such	 as	 an	 advantage	 in	 the	 debate	 on	
scientific	realism,	have	been	extolled	elsewhere.128		
In	 sdBBT,	we	 just	dismantled	 from	 the	orthodox	dBBT	 the	“superfluous	 ‘ideological	 super-
structure’”129	that	undermined	the	consistency	of	an	objectivist	interpretation	of	all	its	three	
axioms	and	was	the	culprit,	subject	of	a	number	of	further	complaints.	Sharing	the	ontological	
framework	of	dBBT,	which	we	deem	the	hallmark	of	the	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory	paradigm,	
sdBBT	 is	 thus	 fully-fledged	 “deBroglie-Bohmian”,	 of	 which	 it	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 minimal	
version.130	(N.B.:	Other	theories	might	as	well	count	as	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	theories,	
Nelson	Stochastics	being	a	potential	candidate,	see	sect.	VI.)	More	formally,	we	stipulate	that	
a	 theory	be	 called	deBroglie-Bohmian,	 iff	 it’s	 a	 so-called	 “primitive-ontology	 theory”131	(as	
opposed	to	a	so-called	“wavefunction	ontology”	theory,	such	as	the	Everett	interpretation)	
with	the	following	features132:	
(1) Its	objects	are	particles	or	corpuscles	–	as	opposed	to	e.g.	primitive	ontology	theories	
with	 strings,	 flashes	 or	 matter	 fields	 as	 fundamental	 stuff.	 (N.B.:	 Wavefunction	
ontology	theories	postulate	the	wavefunction	as	the	only	fundamental	constituent	of	
reality,	with	no	need	for	stuff	over	and	above	it.133)	
																																																						
128	Cf.	Allori	et	al.	(2008);	Allori	(2013,	2016)	
129	Heisenberg	(1953),	quoted	in	Myrvold	(2003),	p.	12		
130	Fine	(1996)	comes	to	the	same	conclusion	and	encourages	a	realist	understanding	of	sdBBT	(avant	la	letter):	
“At	the	heart	of	Bohmian	mechanics	ist	the	wavefunction	and	determinate	particle	positions,	and	perhaps	we	
need	be	realists	about	nothing	else”,	p.	249.	
131	Cf.	Allori	et	al.	(2008);	Allori	(2015)	
132	Cf.	also	Dürr	et	al.’s	criteria	for	a	theory	to	count	as	deBroglie-Bohmian:	“A	Bohmian	theory	should	be	based	
upon	 a	 clear	 ontology,	 the	 primitive	 ontology,	 corresponding	 roughly	 to	 Bell’s	 local	 beables.	 […]	 For	 the	
nonrelativistic	theory	[…]	the	primitive	ontology	is	given	by	particles	described	by	their	positions,	but	we	see	no	
compelling	reason	to	insist	upon	this	ontology	for	a	relativistic	extension	of	Bohmian	Mechanics.	[…]	There	should	
be	a	quantum	state,	a	wave	function,	that	evolves	according	to	the	unitary	quantum	evolution	and	whose	role	is	
to	somehow	generate	 the	motion	 for	 the	variables	describing	 the	primitive	ontology.	The	predictions	should	
agree	(at	least	approximately)	with	those	of	orthodox	quantum	theory	–	at	least	to	the	extent	that	the	latter	are	
unambiguous.”	Dürr	et	al.	(1995),	sect.	5	
133	It	deserves	to	be	pointed	out	that	despite	some	important	similarities,	viz.	the	assumptions	that	the	world	is	
made	up	of	discrete	events	in	spacetime	and	that	these	are	stripped	of	their	spatiotemporal	continuity,	the	
ontology	of	the	GRW	flash	theory	differs	(contra	e.g.	Esfeld	et	al.	(2015),	p.5)	from	sdBBT's	in	that	the	latter	is	a	
particle-based	primitive	ontology,	whereas	the	former	falls	under	wavefunction	ontology	approaches;	by	
contradistinction,	with	its	interpretation	of	the	wavefunction	as	a	mass	density	field	of	matter	in	physical	
space,	the	GRW	matter	theory	is	a	field-based	primitive	ontology,	cf.,	for	instance,	Esfeld	et	al.	(2015).	In	short,	
sdBBT's	stuff	consists	of	particles,	GRWf's	in	events	of	the	wavefunction.	
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(2) The	positions	 of	 these	 corpuscles	 have	beable	 status	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 e.g.	 fermion	
number	in	Bell’s	merely	Bohm-like	lattice	Quantum	Field	Theory.134	
(3) To	 secure	 compatibility	 with	 the	 Kochen-Specker-Theorem,	 all	 dynamical	 variables	
other	than	position	are	contextual.		
(4) It’s	fully	empirically	equivalent	with	QM	–	as	opposed	to	objective	collapse	theories,	
which	tamper	with	the	Schrödinger	dynamics.	
Within	 this	 family	 of	 theories,	 sdBBT	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 ontologically	 most	 parsimonious	
member.		IV.2:	sdBBT	and	realism	
One	 might	 object:	 Wasn’t	 one	 of	 the	 key	 points	 of	 the	 hidden-variables	 agenda	 to	 re-
inaugurate	realism	by	dispensing	with	QM’s	probabilities?	E.g.,	according	to	von	Neumann,	
the	refusal	to	accept	indeterminism	inherent	in	QM	underlies	the	search	for	hidden	variable	
theories.135	So,	doesn’t	sdBBT,	as	an	irreducibly	stochastic	theory,	defeat	its	purpose?		
The	question	rests	on	a	misunderstanding	that	conflates	determinism	and	realism.	Dürr	and	
Teufel	rectify	this	view:	“It	is	often	said	that	the	aim	of	(dBBT)	is	to	restore	determinism	in	the	
quantum	 world.	 That	 is	 false.	 […]	 What	 is	 ‘out	 there’	 could	 just	 as	 well	 be	 governed	 by	
stochastic	laws	[…].	A	realistic	quantum	theory	is	a	quantum	theory	which	spells	out	what	it	is	
about.	(dBBT)	is	a	realistic	quantum	theory.	It	happens	to	be	deterministic	[…].	The	merit	of	
(dBBT)	is	not	determinism,	but	the	refutation	of	all	claims	that	quantum	mechanics	cannot	be	
reconciled	with	a	 realistic	description	of	 reality.”136	In	 short:	 In	 giving	up	dBBT’s	 “fictitious	
determinism”,	we	needn’t	succumb	to	anti-realism.	
Note,	 however,	 as	 Fine	 points	 out,	 that	 dBBT	 compels	 us	 to	 disentangle	 the	 two	 claims	
underlying	classical	 realism137:	 firstly,	 the	metaphysical	one,	 that	 there	exists	an	observer-
independent	 world;	 and	 secondly,	 the	 epistemological	 one,	 that	 our	 measurements	 and	
																																																						
134	Cf.	Dürr	et	al.	(2004)	
135	Von	Neumann	(1932),	Ch.	III.2	
136	Dürr/Teufel	(2009),	pp.	10	(our	emphasis).		
In	the	same	spirit,	Goldstein	et	al.	declare	that	the	goal	of	dBBT	“[…]	is	to	replace	the	measurement	postulate	of	
standard	quantum	mechanics	with	postulates	 that	 refer	 to	electrons	and	nuclei	 instead	of	observers,	axioms	
from	which	the	measurement	rules	can	be	derived”,	Goldstein	et	al.	(2009),	p.	11.	
137	Cf.	Fine	(1996),	Sect.	6	
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observations	disclose	features	of	the	world	as	they	had	existed	before	and	independent	of	the	
measurement	act.		
While	dBBT	and	sdBBT	doubtlessly	both	embrace	 the	metaphysical	 component	of	 classical	
realism	 (“objectivism“),	 a	 measurement	 act	 in	 dBBT	 –	 itself	 a	 physical	 process	 –	 can	
occasionally	disturb	the	state	of	the	measured	system,	so	that	its	pre-measurement	state	and	
the	state	revealed	through	the	measurement	differ:	Measurements	can	be	invasive,	and	not	
merely	 passive	 records	 of	 the	 state	 of	 affairs.	 Already	 Bohm,	 in	 his	 treatment	 of	 the	 1-
dimensional	 particle	 in	 a	 box	 (see	 Sect.	 III.3)	 acknowledged	 this	 turning	 away	 from	 the	
epistemological	component	of	classical	realism:	“According	to	the	Bohmian	prescription	for	
velocity,	 the	 unmeasured	 particle	 is	 actually	 standing	 still!	 Measurement	 disturbs	 the	
situation,	freeing	the	wave	function,	which	guides	the	particle	into	motion.“138		
A	generic	feature	of	theories	in	which	the	wavefunction	plays	a	prominent	role	for	the	state	
of	a	system,	the	interaction	with	a	measurement	device	also	in	sdBBT	can	considerably	affect	
the	wavefunction	 of	 the	measured	 system:	Measurements	 thus	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 seen	 as	
passively	reading	out	pre-existing	values.	This	is	vividly	demonstrated	by	the	Quantum	Zeno	
Effect,	where	 the	physical	 interaction	with	a	measurement	device	 inhibits	 the	decay	of	an	
unstable	 particle.	 But	 already	 thoroughly	 classical	 systems,	 once	 they	 reach	 a	 certain	
complexity,	 can	 flout	 the	 epistemological	 claim	 of	 classical	 realism,	 as	 the	 butterfly	 effect	
popularly	illustrates:	Any	tiny	perturbation	of	any	observation	qua	physical	interaction	with	
the	observational	 instruments	may	be	amplified,	 so	 that	what	 the	presence	measurement	
reveals	about	the	system’s	state	can	considerably	differ	from	the	state	in	which	the	system	
would	have	been	in	isolation,	i.e.	without	the	measurement.	(It’s	in	fact	such	an	–	in	essence	
classically	 optical	 –	 perturbation	 of	 the	 system	 through	 the	measurement	 apparatus	 that	
Heisenberg	invoked	in	his	microscope	thought	experiment	as	an	argument	or	explanation	for	
his	uncertainty	relations.)		
In	light	of	the	fact,	however,	that	not	even	classical	physics	always	epistemologically	conforms	
to	classical	realism,	it	seems	that	epistemologically	the	latter	demands	too	much.	It	therefore	
seems	well	motivated	to	rest	content	with	the	merely	metaphysical	realism,	which	both	sdBBT	
and	dBBT	exhibit.	
																																																						
138	Loc.cit.,	pp.	245	
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IV.3:	“Temporal	Solipsism”	(Bell)	IV.3.1	sdBBT’s	many	worlds	
More	disquieting	is	sdBBT’s	departure	from	another	traditional	metaphysical	intuition,	namely	
the	 temporal	 continuity	 of	 configurations:	 Since	 the	 corpuscles	 perform	 random	 jumps	
through	configuration	space,	 the	connection	between	their	past	and	 future	states	 through	
continuous	trajectories	is	severed.	By	contradistinction,	in	dBBT,	micro-	(and,	a	fortiori,	macro-
)	configurations	are	continuously	linked	in	time.	
More	precisely,	Bell	apprehends	that	sdBBT	posits	many	worlds,	which	“[…]	exist,	not	at	the	
same	 time,	 but	 one	 after	 another.”139	Indeed,	 an	 sdBBT	 universe	 typically	 keeps	 jumping	
between	even	macroscopically	distinct	configurations.	Any	minute,	thus,	a	universe	could	pop	
into	 existence	 in	 which	 dinosaurs	 aren’t	 extinct	 yet.	 Strictly	 speaking,	 each	 such	 “world”	
endures	 only	 for	 infinitesimal	 instants	 of	 time	 –	 a	 peculiarity	 Bell	 lampoons	 as	 “temporal	
solipsism”.140	Yet,	striking	our	common	sense	intuitions	as	absurd,	as	sdBBT	doubtlessly	does	
in	 this	 regard,	 bears	 little	 argumentative	weight	 –	 especially	 not	 if	 the	 theory	 is	 expressly	
conceded	 empirical	 adequacy141,	 i.e.	 being	 experimentally	 indistinguishable	 from	 QM;	 as	
Lewis	is	reported	to	have	said:	“I	do	not	know	how	to	refute	an	incredulous	stare.”	
Indeed,	Bell	hints	at	a	more	systematic	reason142,	worrying	that	“[…]	 if	 (sdBBT)	were	taken	
seriously,	it	would	hardly	be	possible	to	take	anything	else	seriously.”143	This	can	be	explicated	
in	two	ways:	
• One	 source	 of	 Bell’s	 worry	 may	 be	 that	 sdBBT	 astronomically	 exacerbates	 our	
uncertainty	of	any	past	or	future	we’re	capable	to	reconstruct	or	anticipate.	Since	the	
state	 of	 the	world	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 an	 irreducibly	 stochastic	 jump,	 it’s	 extremely	
probable	that	already	in	the	next	second	the	universe	will	visit	a	region	of	configuration	
space	 corresponding	 to	 a	 world	 in	 which	 not	 even	 the	 Milky	 Way	 has	 formed.	
Conversely,	it	seems	overwhelmingly	improbable	that	the	world	in	which	our	fiancées	
have	just	accepted	our	marriage	proposal	still	exists	tomorrow!	How	can	we	trust	that	
																																																						
139	Allori	(2015),	p.17	
140	Cf.	Bell	(1987),	pp	135	
141	E.g.	Allori	 (2015),	p.17;	Allori	 (2016),	esp.	 sect.	5.1,	6.1;	For	general	 criteria	 for	 the	empirical	adequacy	of	
primitive	ontological	approaches	to	QM,	cf.	Allori	et	al.,	(2007),	sect.7.3	
142	Cf.	loc.cit.,	sect.	8.1.	
143	Bell	(1987),	p.136	
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our	memories	and	future	anticipations	retro-/predict	the	real,	actual	 future?	SdBBT	
simply	thwarts	this	trust,	transforming	it	even	into	utter	unlikeliness.	
• Bell	now	links	this	maddening	uncertainty,	rooted	in	the	objective	randomness	of	the	
world,	to	the	reliability	of	our	current	knowledge	of	the	world:	In	particular,	how	can	
we	trust	that	our	memories	anticipate	the	real	future?	In	other	words,	he	assumes	a	
tight	 connection	 between	 the	 uncertainty	 about	 our	 world’s	 existence	 and	 the	
relevance	of	 information:	How	can	our	current	knowledge	be	relevant	 for	decisions	
whose	consequences	lie	in	a	future	that	might	–	with	overwhelming	probability	–	not	
happen?	 If	 we	 assume	 that	 memories	 and	 knowledge	 supervene	 on	 current	
microphysical	 states,	 then	 the	 loss	 of	 temporal	 continuity	 entails	 the	 possibility	 of	
worlds	spontaneously	popped	into	existence	and	containing	archaeological	evidence,	
neuronal	configurations,	etc.	that	tell	of	a	past	which	has	never	occurred:	We	might	
suddenly	wind	up	in	a	world	in	which	we	actually	remember	yesterday’s	unpleasant	
encounter	with	a	stegosaurus	in	our	bathroom!	Temporal	solipsism	thus,	Bell	suggests,	
evinces	a	form	of	solipsism	even	more	radical	in	that	regard	than	the	traditional	one:	
Not	only	is	everything	outside	our	own	minds	unreliable,	but	also	everything	outside	
the	present	content	of	our	minds,	i.e.	momentary	perceptions.	
• As	 a	 third	 reason	 to	 reject	 sdBBT,	 Bell	 accuses	 its	 temporal	 solipsism	 of	 being	
irrefutable.	We	construe	this	as	a	methodological	ramification	of	the	conjunction	of	
the	previously	claimed	unreliability	of	our	memories	and	the	doubts	regarding	their	
relevancy	 for	 future-directed	 actions:	 If	 contemporaneous	 configurations	 are	 no	
longer	 reliably	 linked	 to	 past	 configurations,	 with	 memories,	 archaeological	 and	
historical	records	being	“entirely	unreliable”144,	the	same	must	apply	to	measurements	
–	or	 even	perceptions:	 They,	 too,	 forfeit	 their	 reliability	 and	 relevancy.	 SdBBT	 thus	
becomes	untestable,	and	hence	arguably	unscientific.	
	
How	lethal	is	Bell’s	criticism?	Our	strategy	will	be	to	block	it	by	denying	that	sdBBT’s	stochastic	
jumping	between	worlds	in	any	way	impinges	on	the	relevancy	of	the	information	available	to	
us.	
																																																						
144	Allori	(2015),	p.	20	
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To	elaborate	that	thought,	we	first	have	to	clarify	the	Achilles’	heel	of	Bell’s	above	criticism,	
namely	its	lax	notion	of	a	“world”.	
A	 sideway	 glance	 at	 Everett’s	 Many	Worlds	 Interpretation	 will	 prove	 rewarding:	 How	 do	
Everettians	define	worlds?	145	According	 to	Wallace,	 a	 “world”	 isn’t	 a	 fundamental,	 but	 an	
emergent	concept,	defined	only	pragmatically	as	the	components	of	the	wave	function	of	the	
universe	in	some	decomposition	into	dynamically	approximately	independent	wavepackets,	
narrowly	 localised	 in	momentum	and	position	 space,	 and	hence	approximately	 stable	 and	
robust.	 These	 components	 (“branches”)	 and	 their	 trajectories	 are	 picked	 out	 by	
decoherence146,	which	also	enables	their	re-identification	over	time.	Such	worlds	approximate	
well	“for	all	practical	purposes”	(FAPP)	classical,	Newtonian	trajectories.	As	Wallace	succinctly	
puts	 it:	“And	if	there	are	multiple	wave-packets,	the	system	is	dynamically	 isomorphic	to	a	
collection	of	independent	classical	systems.”147	
In	 the	 following,	 “worlds”	will	 always	 refer	 to	 corpuscle	 configurations	 in	 such	 emergent,	
pragmatically	defined	“branches”.	
Neither	 decoherence	 nor	 the	 functionalism	 employed	 in	 the	 above	 pragmatic	 concept	 of	
world	are	committed	to	any	specific	interpretation	of	QM.	Thus,	with	impunity	we	may	also	
avail	 ourselves	of	 them	 to	 clarify	 sdBBT’s	many	worlds	 character,	which	Bell	 had	 correctly	
diagnosed:	 Whereas	 in	 Everett	 all	 such	 worlds	 exist	 simultaneously,	 in	 sdBBT,	 each	 is	
spontaneously	 realised	 only	 one	 at	 a	 time,	 randomly	 “selected”	 by	 the	 configuration	 into	
which	the	“supercorpuscle”	 jumps.	The	Everettian	picture	thus	resembles	an	 ill-attuned	TV	
that	displays	several	channels	simultaneously148;	the	corresponding	sdBBT	picture	is	that	of	a	
TV	randomly	switching	between	different	channels.	
Note	 that	 on	 this	 understanding	 of	 a	 world,	 sdBBT’s	 temporal	 solipsism	 involves	 “jumps	
between	 worlds”,	 not	 merely	 jumps	 between	 (macro-)configurations	 simpliciter:	 Being	
associated	with	decoherence-induced	wavepackets,	which	one	can	track	through	time,	worlds	
display	some	form	of	diachronic	stability	(we’ll	elaborate	on	this	in	a	moment);	consequently,	
jumps	between	worlds	 amount	 to	 the	 random	actualisation	of	parts	 of	multiple	 “parallel”	
																																																						
145	Cf.	Vaidman	(2014)	and	Wallace	(2001,	2011),	whom	we	follow.	
146	Bacciagaluppi	(2012)	
147	Wallace	(2011),	p.	11	
148	We	take	this	simile	from	Allori	(2013),	sect.	4.4	
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world	histories.	The	 focus	on	 jumps	between	configurations	simpliciter	prescinds	 from	any	
trans-temporal,	historical	aspects.	
By	definition,	“our	memories”	refer	to	macro-configurations	that	belong	to	a	world	indexically	
pointed	out	by	the	speaker.	Everettians	would	paraphrase	this	as	the	indexical	selection	of	the	
branch	of	the	wavefunction	that	the	observer	inhabits.	In	the	following,	we’ll	also	borrow	from	
the	 Everett	 literature	 the	 notion	 of	 personal	 identity,	 distinguishing	 between	 multiple	
(actualised	or	non-actualised)	copies	of	the	present	authors	in	various	worlds,	and	“us”,	i.e.	
particular	(and	actualised)	copies,	associated	with	a	particular	past.149	
Memories	(barring	psychologically	flawed	ones),	archaeological	evidence,	etc.	are	parts	of	the	
history	 of	 that	 world.	 Since	 any	 such	 world	 behaves	 FAPP-classically,	 and	 in	 particular	 is	
causally	 FAPP-closed,	 the	 histories	 we	 reconstruct	 from	 our	 available,	 present	 knowledge	
about	the	world	will	be	causally	closed:	All	the	data	within	one	world,	 i.e.	our	perceptions,	
memories	 and	 future	anticipations,	 are	 consistent	 and	even	 coherent,	with	no	a-causal	 or	
otherwise	 absurd	 irregularities.	 In	 short,	 any	 snapshot	of	 the	history	of	 a	world	 (including	
perceptions,	memories,	etc.)	will	appear	completely	normal	–	FAPP-indistinguishable	from	a	
suitable	 snapshot	 of	 a	 classical	 world.	 	 Consequently,	 assuming	 that	 QM	 is	 empirically	
adequate,	for	all	practical	purposes	no	empirical	evidence	(including	measurement	records)	
consistent	with	QM	can	ever	contradict	sdBBT,	which,	after	all,	simply	consists	in	positing	a	
stochastic	 occurrence	 of	 such	 snapshots	 of	 world	 histories,	 allowed	 by	 the	 universal	
wavefunction.	 In	 short,	 sdBBT	 is	 capable	 of	 accounting	 for	 all	 empirical	 phenomena	 QM	
predicts.		
Whether	 a	world	 is	 actualised	 at	 other	 points	 in	 time	 or	 not,	 is	 a	 separate	 question;	 if	 a	
nanosecond	later	a	world	is	actualised	with	completely	different	historical	records,	then	simply	
a	 different	 world	 has	 jumped	 into	 existence,	 notwithstanding	 our	 linguistic	 habit	 to	 then	
indexically	refer	to	that	world,	too,	as	“ours”.	In	short,	the	reply	to	Bell’s	question:	“How	can	
a	temporal	solipsist	take	seriously	what	he	or	she	remembers	and	perceives?”	is	simply	that	–	
with	 the	 usual	 epistemological	 and	 methodological	 caution	 –	 on	 that	 basis	 we	
reconstruct/anticipate	our	world.	
																																																						
149	Saunders/Wallace	(2008),	esp.	Section	2.1	
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What,	then,	about	the	relevance	of	our	current	memories	and	perceptions	for	future-directed	
actions?	 Doesn’t	 sdBBT’s	 temporal	 solipsism	 undermine	 any	 such	 relevancy	 of	 current	
information	for	future-directed	actions?	Why	contract	a	life	insurance	in	this	world,	when	the	
latter’s	persistence	already	until	next	Saturday	is	doubtful?	Rephrasing	our	reconstruction	of	
Bell’s	criticism,	such	an	argument	assumes	that	the	following	two	questions	are	related:		
1. Does	our	world	actually	persist	“without	interruptions”?	Or	does	the	world	we	(believe	
to)	inhabit	fade	in/out	of	actuality	or	existence	only	for	finite	periods	or	moments,	with	
times	 of	 non-actuality/non-existence	 in-between?	 We’ll	 call	 this	 the	 “Problem	 of	
Persistence”.	
2. Is	data	within	one	world	–	namely	 the	one	we	happen	to	 inhabit	at	some	arbitrary	
instant	–	relevant	to	actions?	Should	we	pursue	our	duties,	dreams	and	hopes	that	
pertain	 to	 a	 still-to-come	 future	 of	 our	 world?	 We’ll	 call	 this	 the	 “Problem	 of	
Relevancy”.	
We	deny	that	the	Problem	of	Persistence	has	any	logical	bearing	on	the	Problem	of	Relevancy:	
The	temporal	discontinuity	of	our	actual	world	doesn’t	impinge	on	the	relevancy	of	taking	an	
action	(or	adopting	a	certain	belief)	now,	on	the	basis	of	current	knowledge.	
• Even	if	the	event	I	remember	or	as	a	result	of	which	I’m	taking	action	(or	adopt	a	belief)	
wasn’t/isn’t	 actualised,	 it	 still	 belongs	 to	 my	 world.	 (Recall	 the	 above	 stance	 on	
personal	 identity	we	 imported	 from	the	Everett	 literature.)	 If	 at	any	 later	point	my	
world	again	pops	into	existence,	I	will	face	the	consequences	of	forbearing	a	necessary	
action	–	or	conversely,	harvest	the	fruits	of	having	done	it.	 In	that	respect,	 I	should	
act/believe:	If	I	exist	again,	then	I	benefit	from	doing	A.	If	I	don’t	do	A,	and	I	don’t	exist	
again,	I	won’t	have	the	chance	to	regret	having	done	A,	either.	
• More	 formally,	 let’s	 tentatively	 take	 an	 action	A	 relative	 to	 a	 certain	 goal	G	 to	 be	
relevant,	 represented	 by	 the	 holding	 of	 the	 relation	𝑟(. , . ) 	if	 and	 only	 if	 A	 is	 an	
appropriate	means	to	reach	G,	i.e.	ceteris	paribus	brings	about	the	intended	goal:	𝐺 →𝐴:	𝑟(𝐺, 𝐴) ⟺	𝐺 → 𝐴.		
This	definition	of	r	remains	silent	on	the	actuality	𝛼(𝒲)	of	the	world	𝒲	to	which	G	
belongs,	i.e.	that	𝛼(𝒲)	holds,	such	that	𝐺 ∈ 𝒲.		
Such	 reference	 is	 straightforwardly	 implemented	 by	 stipulating	 that	 an	 action	 A	
relative	 to	 goal	 G	 be	 considered	 relevant,	 i.e.	 that	 𝑟 𝐴, 𝐺 	holds,	 iff	 G	 isn’t	 an	
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appropriate	means	for	A,	i.e.	¬ 𝐺 → 𝐴 ,	only	if	the	G-containing	world	𝒲	isn’t	actual,	
either	¬𝛼(𝒲).	That	is:	𝑟 𝐺, 𝐴 ⟺ ¬ 𝐺 → 𝐴 → ¬𝛼(𝒲).	By	contraposition,	thus:	𝑟 𝐺, 𝐴 ⟺ 𝛼 𝒲 →	 𝐺 → 𝐴 .	
This	bi-conditional	remains	true,	even	if	the	world	𝒲	isn’t	actual,	¬𝛼(𝒲).	
In	conclusion,	 the	relevancy	of	an	action	relative	to	a	goal	 is	 independent	 from	the	
actuality	of	a	world	in	which	the	goal	exists.	
By	 decoupling	 the	 reliability	 of	 our	memories	 or	 future	 anticipations	 from	 the	 ontological	
Problem	of	Persistence,	Bell’s	worry	of	 sdBBT	undermining	 the	 relevancy	of	our	 actions	 is	
blocked.	
Consequently,	also	his	claim	of	sdBBT’s	irrefutability	becomes	moot	–	as	far	as	the	reliability	
of	measurements	 is	the	 issue:	They	are	 just	as	reliable	and	relevant	as	any	other	historical	
records.	
As	 far	 as	 the	 issue	 is	 irrefutability,	 it’s	 either	 trivially	 true	 –	 or	 beside	 the	 point:	Given	 its	
empirical	equivalence	with	ordinary	QM,	any	violation	of	a	quantum-mechanical	prediction	
would	 refute	 sdBBT,	 too.	 Insofar,	 however,	 that	 Bell	 criticises	 that	 a	 defence	 of	 temporal	
solipsism	can’t	resort	to	empirical	arguments,	the	objection	is	beside	the	point:	Firstly,	should	
empirical	indistinguishability	be	the	issue,	it	suffices	to	recall	that	under-determination	by	the	
empirical	 data	 is	 a	 generic	 scientific	 phenomenon150,	 for	 which	 one	 cannot	 reproach	 any	
specific	theory.	Secondly,	should	the	issue	be	the	need	for	trans-empirical	arguments,	then	to	
assess	 empirically	 indistinguishable	 theories,	 one	 needs	 trans-empirical	 criteria,	 such	 as	
internal	consistency,	relationship	to	other	theories	or	explanatory	value.151	
Temporal	 solipsism	certainly	goes	against	our	metaphysical	grain,	prompting	 the	question:	
Why	take	sdBBT	seriously?	Why	assume	that	sdBBT	offers	an	account	closer	to	reality	than	
others?	E.g.	Collins	requires	that	“in	order	to	have	sufficient	reason	to	believe	that	a	theory	is	
(approximately)	 true,	 the	 theory	 must	 at	 least	 offer	 some	 truth-indicating	 theoretical	
advantage	–	that	is,	make	some	explanatory	progress	–	over	its	phenomenalist	counterpart	
																																																						
150	Cf.,	for	instance,	Stanford	(2013)	
151	Cf.	Esfeld	(2014)	
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[i.e.	sdBBT].”152	We’ll	postpone	a	critical	discussion	of	whether	Collins’	classification	of	sdBBT	
as	“phenomenalist”	is	justified	or	not,	to	section	IV.4.	
Relevant	for	this	section	is	that	his	epistemological	critique	of	dBBT	concludes	that	vis-à-vis	
sdBBT,	“we	do	not	have	sufficient	reason	to	believe	Bohm’s	theory”153.	This	concords	with	the	
results	of	our	analysis	so	far,	which	this	section	reaffirmed	by	rebutting	Bell’s	methodological	
criticism	of	sdBBT,	and	vindicating	sdBBT’s	empirical	adequacy	and	conceptual	consistency:	
The	picture	of	the	world,	i.e.	the	idea	of	us	being	trapped	in	an	infinitesimal	“time	capsule”	
(Julian	Barbour),	may	be	uncanny;	but,	we	argued,	it	can	satisfactorily	account	for	all	available	
empirical	data	and	their	role	as	reliable	evidence.	IV.3.2	Bohm	Brains	vs.	Boltzmann	Brains	
It’s	 instructive	 to	 compare	 sdBBT’s	multiverse	 nature,	 rooted	 in	 its	 temporal	 solipsism,	 to	
Boltzmann	Brains	scenarios	in	SM,	the	possibility	of	worlds	randomly	jumping	into	existence,	
filled	with	memories	and	records	of	a	non-existent	past.		
Boltzmann	 Brain	 scenarios	 arise	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Boltzmann’s	 H-theoretical	 attempts	 to	
explain	the	entropy	increase,	captured	in	the	2nd	Law	of	Thermodynamics.	Not	hinging	on	a	
preferred	 direction	 of	 time,	 his	 argument	 also	 holds	 for	 time-reversal.	 (Loschmidt’s	
Umkehreinwand).	 Consequently,	 low	 entropy	 states	 most	 likely	 are	 random	 fluctuations	
amidst	thermal	equilibrium,	islands	in	an	ambient	high-entropy	ocean.	
This	consequence	also	should	apply	to	our	brains,	which	then	are	likewise	to	be	seen	as	low	
entropy	fluctuations:	“We	pop	into	existence	as	thermal	fluctuations	with	our	brains	full	of	
memories	of	a	nonexistent	past.	[…]	In	the	Boltzmann	brain	scenario,	you	most	likely	came	
into	being	by	a	fluctuation	in	this	instant.	So,	your	recollection	of	reading	the	sentence	before	
this	one	is	just	as	fabricated	as	every	other	memory.”154		
How	to	respond	to	this	bizarre	speculation?155	
																																																						
152	Collins	(1996),	p.	266	
153	Loc.cit.	
154	Norton	(2015),	p.	3	
155	We	shall	gloss	over	the	controversial	question	whether	such	an	interpretation	of	the	H-theorem	in	terms	of	
a	theory	of	random	fluctuations	is	justified	or	not,	two	important	issues	in	this	context	being	the	identification	
of	the	uniform	measure	with	a	probability	measure	and	the	status	of	ergodicity.		
Lazarovici/Reichert	(2014)	argue	for	an	interpretation	in	terms	of	typicality,	instead.	
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Norton	has	pointed	out	that	in	addition	to	Boltzmann’s	argument		that	a	non-equilibrium	state	
arose	with	some,	albeit	small	probability	from	a	fluctuation	away	from	equilibrium	requires	
an	extra	step,	namely	the	existence	of	a	particular	low	entropy	state,	i.e.	a	brain	(including	its	
memories)	just	like	ours.	He	contemplates	two	main	conceivable	arguments	for	this	extra	step:	
The	first	one	appeals	to	Poincaré	recurrence,	which	states	that	eventually	the	evolution	of	a	
thermal	system	will	return	to	an	arbitrarily	small	neighbourhood	of	its	starting	point.	However,	
“(t)he	recurrence	argument	cannot	give	us	isolated	brains	that	exist	momentarily,	since	we	
would	have	to	assume	their	possibility	in	a	[sic]	the	first	place.”156	Hence,	Norton	discards	this	
argument	 as	 circular.	 Furthermore,	 he	 remarks	 that	 the	 Poincaré	 recurrence	 theorem	
presupposes	 antecedent	 conditions,	 such	 as	 finite	 phase	 space	 volume	 and	 finitely	 many	
degrees	of	freedom,	likely	not	to	be	met	for	our	universe.		
The	 second	 argument	 appeals	 to	 the	 time-reversal	 invariance	 of	 the	 underlying	 micro-
dynamics:	Since	an	 isolated	brain	of	a	sentient	observer	can	degrade	thermally	 into	a	 final	
equilibrium	heat	death,	by	time-reversal,	a	state	of	thermal	equilibrium	can	also	evolve	–	no	
matter	how	improbably	–	into	an	isolated	brain	of	a	sentient	being.	Norton	also	repudiates	
this	 argument,	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 time-reversal	 invariance	 of	 CM’s	micro-dynamics	 no	
longer	needs	to	carry	through	from	a	more	fundamental	quantum	perspective,	with	the	weak	
interaction	 (mediating	 radioactivity	 and	 hence	 arguably	 also	 biologically	 non-negligible)	
violating	 time-reversal	 invariance	 and	 “[…]	 the	 standard	 account	 of	 quantum	 mechanics	
(involving	a	time-irreversible	collapse	of	a	quantum	wave	on	measurement.	If	that	collapse	is	
a	real	process,	then	the	microphysics	is	very	far	from	time	reversal	invariant.”157	
How	do	Norton’s	objections	against	Boltzmann	Brain	scenarios	fare	in	the	sdBBT	case?	We	
submit,	they	don’t	carry	over.		
Poincaré	recurrence	isn’t	satisfied	for	generic	quantum	theories	(the	quantum	counterparts	
assume	 discrete	 energy	 spectra,	 a	 far	 too	 restrictive	 assumption	 for	 the	 general	 case158),	
hence,	 it	can’t	be	 invoked.	Neither	does	the	time-reversibility	argument	work	 in	the	sdBBT	
case:	Although	Norton’s	second	objection	to	it,	in	terms	of	a	time-irreversible	collapse	of	the	
																																																						
156	Norton	(2015),	p.	5	
157	op.cit.,	p.	8	
158	Cf.	Wallace	(2013)	
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wavefunction,	is	blocked	in	sdBBT,	as	a	non-collapse	theory,	the	time-irreversibility	of	weak	
interactions	persists.	
The	pivotal	reason,	however,	for	the	futility	of	the	argument	invoking	Poincaré	recurrence	was	
the	“initiation	problem”	(Norton):	“While	the	time	reversed	constitution	of	brains	is	possible,	
without	a	Poincaré	recurrence	theorem,	what	assurance	is	that	this	particular	fluctuation	will	
be	initiated,	even	if	only	in	probability?”159	In	contrast	to	the	Boltzmann	Brains	case,	sdBBT	
overcomes	 the	 Initiation	 Problem	 by	 its	 fundamental	 stochasticity:	 A	 “Bohm	 Brain”,	
indiscernible	 from	 ours,	 complete	 with	 spurious	 memories,	 could	 indeed	 just	 happen	 to	
randomly	materialise.		
Besides	the	above	problems	related	to	the	generation	of	a	Boltzmann	Brain,	which	sdBBT	thus	
seems	to	be	able	to	escape,	Norton	elaborates	a	second,	arguably	more	detrimental	argument	
against	 Boltzmann	 Brains:	 “Our	 memories	 are	 of	 a	 relatively	 orderly	 past,	 full	 of	 regular	
occurrences	conforming	to	discoverable	laws.	Nothing	forces	a	Boltzmann	brain	to	have	such	
regular	memories.	[…]	(I)t	is	vastly	improbable	that	a	Boltzmann	brain	might	have	memories	
of	a	regular	past	just	like	ours.”160	In	other	words,	to	the	mind	of	a	Boltzmann	Brain,	the	world,	
complete	 with	 memories	 and	 archeological	 evidence,	 ought	 to	 resemble	 rather	 Borges’	
Ciudad	de	los	Inmortales	than,	say,	the	rock	city	of	Petra.	Consequently,	the	uniformity	of	the	
world	we	experience	–	i.e.	a	world	that	seems	to	admit	of	perfectly	coherent	consistent	stories	
–	empirically	contradicts	what	Boltzmann	Brain	scenarios	would	have	us	expect,	namely	“batty	
brains”	 (Norton),	 typically	 hallucinating	 chaotic	 worlds.	 In	 short,	 Boltzmann	 Brains	 are	
empirically	inadequate:	The	theory	would	predict	batty	memories	and	perceptions.	
Of	 course,	 one	 could	 just	 stipulate	 that	 a	 “mind-bogglingly	 rare”	 (Myrvold)	 fluctuation	
generated	our	brains,	such	that	our	world	simply	happens	to	appear	regular	to	us.	But	on	what	
grounds	should	we	believe	in	such	a	miraculous	coincidence	–	other	than	in	order	to	restore	
empirical	adequacy	of	our	initial	hypothesis	in	an	ad-hoc	way?	It’s	exactly	this	(and	only	this)	
move	that	would	render	the	whole	Boltzmann	Brain	scenario	self-refuting,	since	it	relies	on	
																																																						
159	Norton	(2015),	p.7		
160	op.	cit.,	pp.	8	
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science,	whilst	simultaneously	reducing	all	empirical	evidence,	on	which	our	trust	in	science	
rests,	to	illusions,	thereby	undermining	the	very	reliability	of	science.161		
sdBBT’s	Bohmian	Brains	avoid	this	self-refuting	dodge,	as	we	saw:	The	worlds	that	randomly	
pop	 into	 existence	 are	 by	 construction	 regular,	 with	 for	 all	 practical	 purposes	 uniform	
histories;	unlike	in	the	case	of	Boltzmannian	Brains,	sdBBT	predicts	that	batty	brains	are	very	
unlikely	–	in	line	with	sdBBT’s	empirical	adequacy.	IV.4:	sdBBT	as	a	phenomenalist	theory?	
Let’s	briefly,	however,	pause	to	gainsay	Collins’	filing	of	sdBBT	as	a	phenomenological	theory,	
i.e.	“an	account	that	merely	takes	the	phenomenological	laws	of	quantum	mechanics	as	its	
unexplained	given.”162	This	characterisation	is	objectionable:	
• Firstly,	as	we	 reiterated	above,	 sdBBT	differs	 in	 important	ways	 from	ordinary	QM,	
conceptually	going	far	beyond	any	account	of	QM	simpliciter.		
• Secondly:	What	is	actually	meant	by	“phenomenological	laws”,	such	as	Hubble’s	Law,	
describing	the	expansion	of	the	universe	with	a	(highly	 idealised!)	 linear	correlation	
between	 the	 distance	 and	 observed	 recession	 velocities	 of	 far-away	 galaxies?	 On	
common	 notions,	 phenomenological	 models	 link	 observable	 properties,	 without	
providing	any	mechanism	in	terms	of	explanations	from	fundamental	first	principles.163	
(In	 the	 case	 of	 Hubble’s	 Law,	 of	 course,	 after	 Hubble’s	 formulation	 of	 his	
phenomenological	 law,	Lemaître	succeeded	 in	deriving	 it	as	an	approximation	 from	
General	 Relativity,	 promoting	 thereby	 its	 status	 from	 phenomenological	 law	 to	
(approximate)	theorem.)	
SdBBT	sits	squarely	with	such	a	notion	of	“phenomenological”:	SdBBT	doesn’t	restrict	
itself	 to	 more	 or	 less	 directly	 observable	 properties:	 This	 is	 evident	 for	 the	
wavefunction,	but	also	applies	to	the	corpuscle	positions	–	and	the	contextual	nature	
of	all	other	dynamical	variables.		
																																																						
161	E.g.	Myrvold	(2014)	for	such	a	criticism	of	Boltzmann	Brains	(echoing	Bell’s	that	we	saw	in	the	preceding	
subsection).	
162	Op.cit.,	p.	265	
163	E.g.	Bunge	(1997)	
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• Moreover,	with	its	clearly	delineated,	objective	ontology	of	the	basic	constituents	of	
reality,	sdBBT	qualifies	as	a	candidate	for	a	fundamental	account	of	reality	no	less	apt	
than	dBBT	or	other	primitive	ontology	approaches.164	
In	other	words:	sdBBT,	as	a	primitive	ontology	in	general,	and	as	a	theory	with	copious	
advantages	over	dBBT,	offers	much	to	justify	the	claim	that	it	actually	provides	first	
principles,	and	thereby	skirts	also	the	second	part	of	the	above	characterisation	of	a	
phenomenological	theory.	IV.5:	sdBBT	vs.	dBBT	
The	case	for	sdBBT’s	advantages	over	dBBT	can	 indeed	be	further	strengthened	 in	at	 least	
three	regards:	
1. Firstly,	with	now	all	the	conceptual	paraphernalia	in	our	hands,	we	can	see	how	sdBBT	
overcomes	three	often	perceived	ontological	shortcomings	of	dBBT,	one	related	to	the	
status	of	empty	wavefunctions,	and	the	other	two	related	to	the	odd	double	role	of	
dBBT’s	wavefunction.		
2. Secondly,	we	need	 to	 address	 an	 intriguing	objection	 that	 dBBT’s	GE	 after	 all	does	
possess	explanatory	surplus	value	–	viz.	by	allowing	a	 justification	of	 the	Symmetry	
Postulate	 for	 composite	 N-corpuscle	 systems.	 An	 objection	 pulling	 in	 the	 same	
direction	 is	 that	 dBBT	offers	 some	 conceptual	 advantages	 for	 the	 treatment	 of	 i.a.	
tunnelling	times.	
sdBBT,	we’ll	argue,	will	prove	no	less	successful	w.r.t.	these	features.		
3. Thirdly,	we’ll	argue	that	sdBBT’s	prospects	of	a	satisfactory,	relativistic	treatment	look	
promising,	with	dBBT’s	essential	impediments	being	removed	in	sdBBT.	IV.5.1:	Metaphysical	quarrels	with	wavefunctions	in	dBBT	
Having	deepened	our	understanding	of	sdBBT’s	conceptual	and	metaphysical	structure,	we’re	
now	in	a	position	to	resume	our	previous	discussion	of	what	many	have	perceived	as	dBBT’s	
ontological	shortcomings.	We’ll	see	how	sdBBT	overcomes	them.		
• In	 dBBT,	 by	 specifying	 initial	 corpuscle	 positions	 one	 selects	 one	 of	 the	 possible	
trajectories	 as	 the	actual	one.	 The	positions	 thus	distinguish	 those	branches	of	 the	
wavefunction	that	encode	the	actual	state	of	the	system.	Yet,	all	other	branches	of	the	
																																																						
164	Cf.	Allori	(2013ab,	2015ab,	2016)	
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wavefunction,	 into	 which	 no	 trajectories	 lead,	 are	 equally	 real:	 Myriads	 of	 empty	
wavefunction	branches,	which	in	general	no	longer	affect	the	system,	thus	populate	
space	 –	 an	 unsavoury	 feature.165	It’s	 unclear	 what	 their	 status	 is	 supposed	 to	 be;	
furthermore,	if	they	are	irrelevant	for	the	dynamics	of	the	corpuscles,	then	one	would	
rather	dispense	with	them.		
SdBBT	removes	this	blemish:	Since	the	modulo	square	of	the	wavefunction	represents	
the	corpuscles’	localisation	probability,	conceived	of	as	a	real	property,	the	notion	of	
an	“empty	wavefunction”	loses	its	meaning	–	or	at	 least	 its	sting:	Corpuscles	simply	
have	a	propensity	to	localise	themselves	anywhere.	Whether	this	propensity	actually	
manifests	itself	or	not,	has	no	bearing	on	its	reality.	
Of	 course,	 the	 price	 for	 this	 solution	 is	 the	 postulate	 of	 a	 disposition,	which	 by	 its	
metaphysical	 nature	 is	 empirically	 rather	 elusive.	 However,	 we	 argued	 in	 III.2,	 a	
number	of	advantages	commend	dispositionalism,	compensating	for	this	elusiveness.	
	
• Another	ontological	oddity	has	struck	many	of	dBBT’s	detractors:	While	via	the	GE	the	
wavefunction	 guides	 the	 trajectories	 of	 the	 corpuscles,	 the	 latter	 don’t	 conversely	
influence	the	wavefunction.	The	Action-Reaction-Principle	thus	seems	violated.166	This	
is	seen	as	undesirable:	Rather,	a	substance	should	only	be	a	potential	agens,	i.e.	act,	if	
it	can	equally	be	a	potential	patiens,	i.e.	be	in	turn	acted	upon.	Einstein,	for	instance,	
valued	 this	 Action-Reaction-Principle	 as	 a	 key	 (and,	 vis-à-vis	 Special	 Relativity	 (SR),	
novel)	virtue	of	General	Relativity167,	in	which,	as	Wheeler	famously	put	it,	spacetime	
tells	matter	how	to	move,	whereas	matter	tells	spacetime	how	to	curve.		
With	the	abolition	of	deterministic	trajectories	in	sdBBT,	the	wavefunction	no	longer	
acts	on	the	corpuscles.	Of	course,	they	still	have	the	dispositional	property	to	localise	
themselves,	but	 the	 relation	between	dispositions	and	manifestations	 is	not	one	of	
action,	 usually	 understood	 as	 changes	 in	 substances	 interdepend:	 Objects	 simply	
possess	a	property;	the	meaning	of	a	property	acting	on	the	substance	that	bears	it	to	
																																																						
165	Brown/Wallace	(2005)	and	Brown	(2009)	ratch	up	this	unease	with	empty	wavefunctions	to	the	charge	that	
dBBT	is	“Everett	in	denial”:	In	essence	they	argue	that	dBBT	merely	posits	corpuscles	on	top	of	the	branches	of	
the	multiverse,	as	“mere	epiphenomenal	‘pointers’,	being	relegated	to	picking	out	one	of	the	many	branches,	
defined	by	decoherence,	while	the	real	story	–	dynamically	and	ontologically	–	 is	being	told	by	the	unfolding	
evolution	of	those	branches”,	op.cit.,	pp.8.	This	indexical	role	is	then	criticized	as	an	ad-hoc	ingredient.	Callender	
(n.d.)	critically	examines	this	“redundancy	argument”.		
166	Cf.	Brown/Anand	(1995)	
167	Cf.	Brown/Lehmkuhl	(2013)	
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us	appears	obscure.	By	dint	of	the	dispositional	nature	of	the	wavefunction,	the	validity	
of	the	Action	Reaction	Principle	remains	unscathed.	
	
• At	the	heart	of	dBBT’s	trouble	with	the	Action-Reaction	Principle	lies	the	double	role	
of	the	wavefunction	in	both	guiding	the	corpuscles’	trajectories	and	in	representing	
probabilities	for	their	localisation	–	two	roles	that	are	logically	distinct.	This	double	role	
makes	dBBT	look	contrived.168		
Eliminating	the	GE	trivially	disposes	of	the	double	nature,	tout	court.	IV.5.2:	Justification	of	the	Symmetrisation	Postulate	
Linking	such	metaphysical	aspects	and	what	might	be	seen	as	explanatory,	even	predictive	
power,	Brown	et	al.	have	claimed	that,	whereas	standard	QM	must	posit	it	as	a	contingent	
axiom 169 ,	 via	 the	 topological	 approach,	 dBBT	 can	 naturally	 justify	 the	 Symmetrisation	
Postulate	 for	 identical	 particles. 170 	It	 states	 that	 wavefunctions,	Ψ(𝑸,… ,𝑸𝑵), 	of	 bosonic	
(fermionic)	 N-particle	 systems	 behave	 (anti-)symmetrically	 under	 permutations	 𝜋"¦ 	of	
particles,	 labelled	 i	 and	 j:	𝜋"¦Ψ 𝑸𝟏,… ,𝑸𝑵 = ±Ψ 𝑸𝟏,… ,𝑸𝑵 .	 Such	 an	 astonishing	 claim	
would	contradict	 the	 redundancy	of	 the	GE,	 from	which	sdBBT	draws	 its	appeal.	With	our	
grasp	of	sdBBT’s	conceptual	structure	sharpened,	we’re	now	in	a	position	to	address	the	claim.	
We	submit,	sdBBT	is	equally	able	to	motivate	the	Symmetrisation	Postulate.	
The	 technical	 details	 of	 the	 topological	 approach,	which	 turns	 on	 the	 non-trivial	 topology	
(multiple	connectedness)	of	the	reduced	configuration	space	(more	on	that	below)	shall	not	
detain	us	here;	instead,	we‘ll	focus	on	the	crucial	step,	viz.	the	removal	of	the	“coincidence	
points”	 Δ ≔ 𝑸:= 𝑸𝟏,… ,𝑸𝑵 ∈ ℝ2¹: ∃i ≠ j: 𝐐𝐢 = 𝐐𝐣 	from	 configuration	 space	 ℝ2¹ .	
Brown	 et	 al.	 claim	 dBBT	 naturally	 justifies	 this	 removal.	 Let’s	 recapitulate	 their	 chain	 of	
reasoning:	
(1) The	corpuscles	being	 identical	 (more	precisely:	 indistinguishable),	 their	 index	 labels	
possess	no	intrinsic	meaning.	Hence,	since	the	configuration	Q	of	corpuscle	positions	
completely	 specifies	 the	 actual	 state	 of	 a	 system,	 for	 a	 given	 wavefunction	Ψ ,	 a	
																																																						
168	E.g.	Timpson	(2011),	pp.	14	
169	In	 relativistic	 QFT,	 however,	 the	 Symmetrisation	 Postulate,	 i.e.	 the	 connection	 between	 spin	 and	 (anti-)	
symmetry	can	be	proven	as	a	theorem,	cf.	Streater/Wightman	(1964),	Ch.	4.4	
170	Cf.	Brown	et	al.	(1998).	
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permutation	𝜋 ∈ Σ¹ 	of	 indices	 shouldn’t	 alter	 the	 state	of	 the	 system:	 𝜋𝑸,Ψ 	and	𝑸,Ψ 	are	physically	equivalent.	The	redundancy	of	configuration	space	can	thus	be	
purged	 by	 transition	 to	 the	 reduced	 configuration	 space	𝔇 ≔ ℝ23/Σ¹ ,	 where	
configurations	 that	 differ	 from	 one	 another	 only	 by	 a	 permutation	 are	 identified,	
preserving	the	physical	information.		
(2) The	 GE	 being	 1st-order,	 corpuscles	 coincide	 either	 always	 or	 never:	𝔇\Δ	and	Δ	are	
invariant	under	the	action	of	the	dBBT	dynamics.	
a. This	 implies	 that,	 consistently	with	 the	dBBT	dynamics,	we	may	 remove	 the	
coincidence	points	Δ	from	reduced	configuration	space	𝔇.	
b. This	removal	“[…]	seems	physically	well	motivated,	since	they	correspond	to	
motions	 for	 which	 [the	 involved	 corpuscles]	 coincide	 for	 all	 times	 –	 which	
would	appear	as	the	motion	of	one	particle	of	M-fold	mass	and	charge.”171	
(3) The	 removal	 doesn’t	 affect	 dBBT’s	 observable/statistical	 predictions,	 for	 the	 set	 of	
coincidence	points	is	of	measure	zero,	 d2¹𝐐ã Ψ 9 = 0.	
Let’s	analyse	these	arguments.	What’s	the	role	of	the	GE	in	them?		
• (1)	only	requires	the	position	definiteness	and	dBBT	ontology;	hence,	it	carries	over	to	
sdBBT.	
• (3)	 is	 a	mathematical	 fact,	 independent	of	 the	GE:	 In	 sdBBT,	 too,	 the	 removal	of	Δ	
doesn’t	affect	the	observations.	
• (2),	of	course,	lapses	in	sdBBT.		
Does	that	ruin	the	motivation	for	removing	Δ?		
• The	first	part	of	(2)	is	only	needed	to	ensure	consistency	with	the	GE.	With	no	GE	in	
sdBBT,	we	trivially	needn’t	worry	about	consistency	with	it.	
• Regarding	the	second	part,	note	first	that	(2b)	doesn’t	hinge	on	the	GE	specifically,	only	
on	it	being	1st	order.		
More	to	the	point:	Why	is	it	actually	implausible	to	regard	two	particles	with	the	same	
spatiotemporal	trajectories	as	two?	The	tacit	metaphysical	premise	in	the	background	
is	 a	 spatiotemporal	 principium	 individuationis	 (PI) 172 ,	 according	 to	 which	
																																																						
171	Loc.cit.,	p.7	
172	Schopenhauer	uses	this	term	in	connection	with	Kant,	e.g.	Kant	(1781),	A263.	
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spatiotemporal	 distinctness	 constitutes	 individuality/identity	 and	 thus	 grounds	
numerical	distinctness.	In	other	words,	(2b)	assumes	that	spatiotemporal	distinctness	
is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 individuating	 two	otherwise	 indistinguishable	particles.	
And	since	the	number	of	particles	is	fixed	in	a	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory,	the	removal	
of	Δ	follows.		
However,	 in	 the	 stochastic	 world	 of	 sdBBT,	 corpuscles	 no	 longer	 have	 continuous	
spatiotemporal	paths:	They	localise/delocalise	spontaneously	at	random	points.	One	
thus	faces	two	options:	Either	one	continues	to	adhere	to	the	spatiotemporal	PI	and	
allows	 for	 multiply	 occupied	 spacetime	 points,	 thereby	 indeed	 forgoing	 the	
justification	for	removing	Δ.	Equally	well,	however,	given	that	nowhere	do	Brown	et	
al.	 explicate	 the	 above	 (PI),	 let	 alone	 argue	 for	 it,	 one	 could	 adapt	 an	 alternate	
principium	 individuationis	 (PI*),	 arguably	more	 natural	 to	 a	 discontinuous	world	 of	
corpuscle	 jumps:	 Two	 corpuscles	 are	 identical,	 if	 they	 coincide	 at	 one	 point	 in	
spacetime.	 PI*	 then	 directly	 motivates	 the	 removal	 of	 coincidence	 points,	 thereby	
replacing	(2b).		
In	short,	what	does	the	essential	work	in	the	topological	motivation	for	the	Symmetrisation	
Postulate	for	dBBT	are	a	dBBT-independent,	measure-theoretical	statement,	and	a	Principle	
of	Individuality.	Modifying	the	latter	in	a	plausible	manner,	we	conclude	that	sdBBT	is	no	less	
apt	to	motivate	it.		IV.5.3:	Quantum	tunnelling	
Our	claim	of	the	GE’s	redundancy	is	likewise	disputed	by	asserted	conceptual	advantages	in	
experimental	 contexts	 whose	 treatment	 doesn’t	 fit	 comfortably	 within	 standard	 QM,	 e.g.	
regarding	dwell	and	tunnelling	times,	escape	times	and	escape	positions,	scattering	theory	
and	quantum	chaos.173		
Each	 such	 application	 deserves	 an	 investigation	 in	 its	 own	 right;	 here,	 we’ll	 exemplarily	
examine	the	arguably	clearest	case,	viz.	quantum	tunnelling174	–	a	phenomenon	important,	
e.g.,	 for	describing	α-decay:	Quantum	particles	can	penetrate	a	potential	barrier	classically	
insurmountable,	with	the	particles’	energy	being	below	the	potential	barrier.	The	question	
then	naturally	arises:	How	much	 time	does	 it	 take	a	particle	 to	cross	 the	barrier	 in	 such	a	
																																																						
173	Cf.	Goldstein	(2013),	Sect.	15,	also	for	further	literature	on	these	issues.	
174	Cf.	Holland	(1993),	Ch.	11	and	Passon	(2010),	Ch.	7.5,	whom	we	closely	follow.	
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scenario?	Ordinary	QM	boycotts	the	very	question:	Firstly,	time	is	not	an	observable,	but	a	
parameter;	 secondly,	 standard	 QM	 doesn’t	 assign	 particles	 definite	 trajectories,	 depriving	
statements	about	how	long	it	takes	a	particle	to	traverse	a	certain	distance	of	any	immediate	
meaning.	In	order	to	define	such	time	scales,	one	must	therefore	employ	surrogate	methods	
that	only	use	well-defined	operators175,	by	tracking	wave	packets	via	the	evolution	of	their	
maxima.	The	results	obtained	from	different	methods,	however,	turn	out	to	be	not	always	
mutually	compatible.	
In	 dBBT,	 it	 is	 claimed,	 a	 straightforward,	 unambiguous	 picture	 emerges:	 The	 GE	 pilots	
corpuscles	that	start	from	some	initial	positions	deeply	inside	the	barrier	and	beyond;	other	
corpuscles	with	different	initial	positions	get	reflected.	At	each	moment,	the	corpuscles	have	
both,	a	definite	position	𝑄	and	velocity	𝑄,	for	simplicity	assumed	to	be	time-independent.	Let	
each	α-th	particle	with	 initial	 position	𝑄(ä) 	reach	a	 given	point	Q	 at	 time	𝑡(ä).	 (In	 general,	
solutions	of	the	GE,	𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑡; 𝑄ä ),	won’t	be	invertible	in	closed	form.)	For	the	corpuscle	with	
initial	 position	𝑄(ä) 	it	will	 take	 the	 time	Δ𝑡(𝑄Ã, 𝑄Ä; 𝑄ä )	to	 travel	 from	 sites	𝑄Ã 	to	𝑄Ä ,	 on	
opposite	ends	of	the	potentials	barrier	each.	Since,	according	to	QEH,	the	initial	positions	are	
unknown,	only	their	statistical	distribution,	 𝜓 9,	the	observable,	average	“dwell-time”	for	a	
tunnelling	process,	 Δ𝑡ÃÄ ,	can	be	readily	determined	as:	
Δ𝑡ÃÄ = d𝑄ä 𝜓(𝑄ä ) 9Δ𝑡(𝑄Ã, 𝑄Ä; 𝑄ä )å .	
The	deterministic	trajectories	play	a	crucial	heuristic	role	here,	suggesting	an	intuitive	way	to	
define	 measurable	 quantities.	 But	 might	 this	 advantage	 be	 merely	 illusory?	 Could	 the	
(empirically	elusive)	trajectories	make	certain	choices	of	how	to	define,	say,	dwell-time,	only	
appear	more	natural	than	others?	The	alternative	constructions	of	dwell-time	variables,	e.g.	
via	the	evolution	of	wave	packets,	are	still	equally	legitimate	and	adequate.		
But	let’s	grant	for	the	sake	of	the	argument	that	the	conceptual	advantage	is	real.	Then,	sdBBT	
is	no	worse	off	than	dBBT,	suggesting	an	equally	appealing	instruction	of	how	to	define	dwell-
time,	viz.	as	the	average	time	one	needs	to	wait	until	a	corpuscle	localises	itself	first	at	𝑄Ã	and	
then	at	𝑄Ä.	
																																																						
175	Cf.	Landauer/Martin	(1994)	and	Chiao	(1998)	
	61	
	
In	conclusion,	 for	 tunnelling	 times,	 the	conceptual	advantages	accredited	 to	dBBT	are	of	a	
heuristic	nature;	should	one	indeed	deem	such	heuristic	guidance	an	advantage,	sdBBT’s	more	
thrifty	primitive	ontology	is	no	less	apt	to	provide	it.	IV.5.4:	sdBBT,	dBBT	and	relativistic	QM	
Pride	of	place	in	our	comparative	analysis	of	sdBBT	and	dBBT	shall	be	a	glance	at	the	most	
frequent	 criticism	 of	 dBBT	 –	 namely	 the	 (still	 largely	 unresolved)	 issue	 of	 its	 relativistic	
generalisation.	The	 locus	of	 those	problems	with	a	 relativistic	dBBT,	we’ll	 presently	argue,	
again	lies	in	the	GE.	Dispensing	with	the	latter	thus	makes	sdBBT	an	attractive	alternative	to	
dBBT:	We	 submit	 that	 sdBBT,	 indeed,	 is	 free	 from	 non-locality,	 i.e.	 a	 spooky	 action-at-a-
distance,	but	exhibits	non-separability.	
Let’s	 briefly	 recall	 the	 situation	 in	 ordinary	 QM	 with	 the	 collapse	 postulate	 and	 its	
relativisation.	There,	the	following	quandary	looms176:	Either	the	collapse	is	instantaneous	(as	
standard	formulations	seem	to	suggest)	–	highly	problematic	for	SR,	as	superluminal	signal	
transfer	 arguably	 gives	 rise	 to	 paradoxes,	 involving	 causal	 loops.	 Furthermore,	 the	
instantaneous	propagation	of	an	effect	privileges	a	 reference	 frame	–	 in	 conflict	with	SR’s	
Principle	 of	 Relativity,	 which	 postulates	 the	 equivalence	 of	 all	 reference	 frames 177 ;	
alternatively,	contemporary	QM	needs	to	be	modified	ad-hoc	so	as	to	suitable	account	for	a	
collapse	mechanism.	Either	choice	seems	hard	to	swallow.		
By	 denying	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 collapse,	 non-collapse	 theories,	 such	 as	 dBBT,	 avoid	 this	
dilemma.	 The	 price	 dBBT	 has	 to	 pay,	 though,	 is	 its	 manifest	 action-at-a-distance:	 Each	
corpuscle’s	velocity	field	depends	on	the	configuration	of	all	other,	even	space-like	separated	
corpuscles,	which	in	light	of	SR	one	wouldn’t	expect	to	exert	any	influence	upon	each	other.		
Not	only	should	the	 intimated	conflict	between	an	action-at-a-distance	be	fleshed	out,	but	
also,	one	may	object	that	dBBT,	as	introduced	so	far,	is	a	non-relativistic	theory	–	and	hence	
unsurprisingly	 conflicting	 with	 SR.	 Therefore,	 let’s	 examine	 some	 expressly	 relativistic	
proposals.	
																																																						
176	Cf.	Maudlin	(2011b)	
177	E.g.	for	Popper,	an	action-at-a-distance,	as	a	possible	interpretation	of	an	instantaneous	collapse	“[…]	would	
mean	that	we	have	to	give	up	Einstein’s	interpretation	of	special	relativity	and	return	to	Lorentz’s	interpretation	
and	with	it	to	Newton’s	absolute	space	and	time”,	Popper	(1982),	p.	29.	
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Associated	with	 the	Klein-Gordon	Equation	 for	 the	complex	 scalar	 function	𝜙,	describing	a	
spin	0-particle	of	mass	m	and	charge	q	in	the	external	electromagnetic	potential	𝐴¡,	𝑚9 + 𝜕¡ + 𝑖𝑞𝐴¡ 𝜕¡ + 𝑖𝑞𝐴¡ 𝜙 𝑸, 𝑡 = 0,	
is	the	conserved	4-current	𝑗¡ = =9: 𝜙∗𝜕¡ − 2𝑞𝐴¡ 𝜙,	satisfying	𝜕¡𝑗¡ = 0.		
Based	on	𝑗¡,	one	now	may	be	tempted	to	stipulate	a	GE	for	the	Klein-Gordon	scalar,	analogous	
to	the	non-relativistic	case,	via	Hè;H& = ¦;¦§.	In	the	absence	of	an	external	field,	for	a	plane	wave	
of	positive	energy,	this	appears	reasonable,	with	the	4-current	future-pointing,	𝑗 > 0,	and	
time-like,	𝑗¡𝑗¡ > 0.	 In	 the	 general	 case,	 though,	 such	 a	 proposal	 isn’t	 viable	 for	 two	main	
reasons	178:	Firstly,	𝑗	is	of	indefinite-sign,	not	even	for	free	solutions	of	positive	energy	states,	
and	 hence	 defies	 a	 particle	 or	 probability	 density.	 Secondly,	𝑗¡ 	generically	 isn’t	 time-like.	
Holland	 concisely	 comments:	 “A	 theory	 of	material	 objects	 in	 which	 an	 initially	 time-like,	
future-pointing	trajectory	may	pass	through	the	 light	cone	to	become	space-like,	and	even	
move	backwards	in	time,	is	clearly	unacceptable.”179		
In	conclusion,	the	whole	idea	of	a	dBBT	version	of	the	Klein-Gordon	Theory	can’t	get	off	the	
ground,	 for	 the	 Klein-Gordon	 Theory	 doesn’t	 admit	 of	 a	 satisfactory	 single-particle	
interpretation	 to	 begin	 with.	 (Besides	 of	 some	 formal	 difficulties	 with	 suitable	 position	
operators	and	 localizability	 in	 relativistic	QM,	 in	general,	Holland	 reminds	 the	 reader	 that,	
unless	supplemented	by	further	ad-hoc	constraints,	Lorentz-covariant	wave	equations,	such	
as	 the	 Klein-Gordon	 Equation,	 are	 well-known	 to	 exhibit	 superluminal	 transmission	 and	
backwards-causation	 –	 both	 consequences	 highly	 problematic	 in	 their	 own	 right,	 if	 not	
downright	paradoxical.)	
The	 current	 absence	 of	 a	 consistent	 particle	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Klein-Gordon	 Equation	
seems	to	preclude	a	satisfactory	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory,	with	its	commitment	to	a	particle-
based	primitive	ontology.180	
																																																						
178	Holland	(1993),	Ch.	12.1	
179	Op.cit.,	p.	500	
180	More	satisfactory	 field-based	bosonic	 theories	exist,	 cf.	e.g.	Dürr	et	al.	 (2004);	Nikolic	 (2005).	But	 they	go	
beyond	our	current	scope	–	in	two	regards:	Firstly,	in	that	we	are	focussing	on	deBroglie-Bohmian	approaches,	
narrowly	construed	as	primitive	ontologies	based	on	particles/corpuscles	with	position	as	beable;	secondly,	we	
restrict	 our	 analysis	 to	 the	 domain	 of	 relativistic/non-relativistic	 QM.	 An	 extension	 to	 quantum	 field	 theory	
deserves	an	investigation	in	its	own	right.	
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How	 does	 the	 situation	 look	 for	 fermions?	 Here,	 we’ll	 argue,	 sdBBT	 will	 unbosom	 its	
advantages	 over	 dBBT	 w.r.t.	 a	 relativistic	 extension.	 Exemplarily,	 we’ll	 now	 analyse	 the	
arguably	most	successful	proposal	 for	a	dBBT	of	Dirac-particles,	viz.	so-called	Hypersurface	
Bohm-Dirac	Models.181	
Bohm	himself	proposed	to	derive	the	relativistic	counterpart	of	the	GE	from	the	N-fermion	
Dirac	Equation	(for	ease	of	notation,	ℏ = 𝑐 = 1)	for	each	particle	𝑘 ∈ ℕê3:	
𝑖𝛾U𝜕& + 𝑖𝛾U" 𝜕" + 𝑒𝛾U" 𝐴" 𝑸U, 𝑡 − 𝑒𝛾UΦ 𝑸U, 𝑡 − 𝑚3¦<="<=,9,2 𝜓 𝑸, 𝑡 = 0	
Here,	the	𝛾U¡denotes	the	𝜇-th	Dirac	matrix,	acting	on	the	k-th	particle	(in	the	following,	we’ll	
use	 the	 following	 conventions:	𝜸U ≔ 𝛾U" "<=,9,2 	and	𝛾 =⊗U<=3 𝛾U 	),	m	 and	 e	 denote	 the	
mass	and	the	charge	of	the	Dirac	particles,	respectively,	𝜓:	ℝ23×ℝ → ℂí ⨂3	the	N-particle	
spinor	and	𝐴¡ = Φ,𝐀 	the	electromagnetic	potentials	of	the	external	field.		
The	probability	4-current	for	each	particle	k,	𝑗U¡ = 𝜌U, 𝒋U = 𝜓𝛾𝜓, 𝜓 ⊗¦<=U[= 𝛾¦⨂𝜸U⨂⊗¦<U[=3 𝛾¦𝜓 𝑸,& ,	
with	the	adjoint	spinor	𝜓 = 𝜓£𝛾,	is	conserved,	𝜕¡𝑗¡ = 0.	 In	complete	analogy	to	the	non-
relativistic	GE,	we	obtain	the	relativistic	GE	(rGE)	for	the	k-th	corpuscle	from	the	temporal	and	
spatial	components	of	the	4-current:	
𝑑𝑸U𝑑𝑡 = 𝒋U𝜌U 𝑸,& = 𝜓⊗¦<=U[= 𝛾¦⨂𝜸U⨂⊗¦<U[=3 𝛾¦𝜓𝜓𝛾𝜓 (𝑸,&)	
In	the	single-particle	case,	𝑁 = 1,	this	rGE	reduces	to	(𝜇 = 0,… ,3):	𝑑𝑄¡𝑑𝑡 = 𝜓𝛾¡𝜓𝜓𝛾𝜓 (𝑸,&)	
																																																						
181	Cf.	Dürr	et	al.	(2013)	
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It’s	 Lorentz	 invariant:	 Due	 to	 the	 physical	 insignificance	 of	 re-scaling	 the	 time	
parameterisation,	 one	 obtains,	 for	 some	 parametrisation	 s	 of	 the	 particle’s	 worldline,	 a	
manifestly	covariant	and	geometric	reformulation:	𝑑𝑄¡𝑑𝑠 ∥ 𝜓𝛾¡𝜓.	
The	complicacies	surge	in	the	many-particles	case,	𝑁 > 1.	Then,	the	rGE,	by	using	a	common	
time	 for	 all	 particles,	 stipulates	a	hyperplane	of	 simultaneity	of	 all	N	 corpuscles	on	whose	
positions	the	l.h.s.	of	the	rGE	depends,	thereby	defining	a	distinguished	reference	frame	K.	In	
particular,	the	relativistic	QEH,	with	the	probability	density,	i.e.	the	0-component,	of	the	above	
Dirac	4-current,	no	longer	holds	in	all	frames.	Although	K	turns	out	not	to	be	detectable,	i.e.	
experimentally,	all	reference	frames	remain	indistinguishable182,	the	postulate	of	an	absolute	
reference	 frame	 violates	 SR’s	 Principle	 of	 Relativity,	which	 declares	 the	 equivalence	 of	 all	
reference	frames.	In	short:	While	the	statistical	predictions	coincide	with	those	of	standard	
Dirac	theory,	on	the	level	of	the	individual	particles	SR	is	violated.		
One	 might	 try	 to	 dodge	 the	 absolute	 simultaneity	 by	 moving	 to	 a	 multi-time	
wavefunction	𝜓(𝑸=, 𝑡=; …𝑸3, 𝑡3)	on	 ℝ2×ℝ ⨂3 ,	 which	 assigns	 each	 particle	 a	 time	 of	 its	
own	and	satisfies	the	multi-time	Dirac	Equation:	𝑖𝛾U¡ 𝜕¡,U9 − 𝑖𝑒𝐴¡ − 𝑚 𝜓 = 0.	
And	indeed,	the	rGE,	constructed	via	the	above	scheme	from	the	4-current,	turns	out	to	be	
Lorentz	 invariant	 for	 factorisable	 states,	 i.e.	 multi-time	 wavefunctions	 of	 the	 form	𝜓 𝑸=, 𝑡=; …𝑸3, 𝑡3 = 𝜑U(𝑡U, 𝑸U)3U<= .		
What	about	entangled/non-factorisable	states?	The	resulting	4-current	of	the	k-th	particle,	𝑗U¡ 𝑸=, 𝑡=; …𝑸3, 𝑡3 = 𝜓⊗¦<=U[= 𝛾¦⨂𝛾U¡⨂⊗¦<U[=3 𝛾¦𝜓 𝑸Ê,&Ê;…𝑸ó,&ó 	then	 likewise	 is	 no	
longer	separable.	For	a	viable	GE,	we	thus	need	to	connect	the	velocity	of	the	k-th	particle	
with	the	N-1	tuples	(𝑡¦, 𝑸¦),	with	𝑗 ≠ 𝑘.	One	could	now	consider	a	hyperplane	Σô 	on	which	𝑡= = 𝑡9 = ⋯ = 𝑡3,	the	multi-time	Dirac	Equation	then	reduces	to	the	familiar	one.	Let	𝜂¡	be	
																																																						
182	Cf.	Berndl	et	al.	(1996);	Dürr	et	al.	(1999)	
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an	observer	at	rest	in	this	reference	frame	K	thus	distinguished,	𝜂¡ ⊥ Σô.	Then,	the	4-current	
becomes:	𝑗U¡ 𝑸=, 𝑡=; …𝑸3, 𝑡3 = 𝜓⊗¦<=U[= 𝛾¦ø𝜂ø ⨂𝛾U¡⨂⊗¦<U[=3 𝛾¦ø𝜂ø 𝜓 𝑸Ê,&Ê;…𝑸ó,&ó .	
The	resulting	rGE	for	the	k-th	particle	position	𝑸U	is:	𝑑𝑄U¡𝑑𝑡 = 𝑗U¡𝑗Uø𝜂ø.	
The	probability	density	in	the	denominator	is	now	obviously	a	scalar,	but	furthermore	easily	
verified	to	be	independent	of	the	particle	index.	Consequently,	a	re-parametrisation	yields	the	
manifestly	covariant	rGE:		 𝑑𝑄U¡𝑑𝑠 = 𝑗U¡ 𝐐(ù).	
But	how	to	construct	the	preferred	reference	frame?	Which	vector	field	𝜂¡	to	take?	Lest	the	
thus	attained	Lorentz	covariance	be	hazarded,	𝜂¡	must	be	built	via	a	Lorentz	invariant	law.	A	
popular	proposal	is	to	choose	the	rest	frame	of	the	total	energy-momentum	of	the	universe,	𝑃¡ = 𝑑𝜎ø(𝑥) Ψ 𝑡¡ø Ψû ,	 with	 the	 wavefunction	 of	 the	 universe	Ψ ,	 the	 total	 energy-
momentum	tensor	𝑡¡ø	in	the	Heisenberg	picture	and	𝑆	an	arbitrary	space-like	hypersurface.	
(Due	to	the	conservation	of	energy-momentum	and	Stoke’s	Theorem,	𝑃¡	doesn’t	depend	on	
S.)	The	preferred	vector	field	then	is	𝜂¡ ≔ ýþýþ .	
Have	we	thus	finally	achieved	a	satisfactorily	relativistic	dBBT?	Although	Lorentz	covariance	
has	been	restored,	the	model	still	lacks	what	Bell	calls	“serious	Lorentz	invariance”:	It	needs	
to	 postulate	 extra	 structure	 in	 spacetime	 –	 an	 addition	 SR	 per	 se	 doesn’t	 warrant.	
Furthermore,	 it	deserves	 to	be	pointed	out	 that	 it’s	not	clear	how	to	extend	the	model	 to	
incorporate	interaction	potentials.	
In	conclusion,	the	quest	for	a	rGE	heaves	on	us	the	burden	of	extra	structure	in	spacetime;	SR	
simpliciter	and	dBBT	seem	incompatible.183		
																																																						
183	Cf.	also	Maudlin	(1996),	Sect.	2	
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Where	now	does	sdBBT	stand?	Two	points	are	pertinent:	
Firstly,	as	compared	to	standard	QM,	sdBBT,	as	a	non-collapse	theory,	avoids	the	full-front	
collision	between	instantaneous	collapses	of	the	wavefunction	and	Relativity,	as	well	as	the	
awkwardness	 of	 an	 ad-hoc	modification	 of	 some	 principles	 of	 QM	 so	 as	 to	 incorporate	 a	
collapse.	But	isn’t	the	spontaneous	manifestation	of	a	corpuscle	configuration	tantamount	to	
form	of	instantaneous	collapse?	This	is	mistaken:	The	dispositional	wavefunction	continues	to	
evolve	 unitarily	 according	 to	 the	 Schrödinger	 dynamic,	 even	 after	 a	 manifestation.	 The	
(absence	 of	 a)	 manifestation	 of	 a	 disposition	 has	 no	 bearing	 on	 the	 disposition	 and	 its	
evolution	as	such.		
As	compared	to	dBBT,	with	the	abolition	of	a	GE,	the	need	for	preferred	reference	frames	or	
extra	 structure	 lapses	–	and	 thereby	dBBT’s	obstacle	 for	 “serious	 Lorentz	 covariance”.	But	
what	 about	 an	 action-at-a-distance,	 stemming	 from	 QM’s	 allegedly	 inherent	 non-locality,	
which,	as	Bell	argued,	originates	in	the	fact	“(t)hat	the	[wavefunction]	[…]	propagates	not	in	
ordinary	three-space,	but	in	a	multidimensional	configuration	space[…]”?184	Indeed,	actions-
at-a-distance	 would	 threaten	 the	 compatibility	 with	 SR	 in	 a	 manner	 resembling	 what	 we	
witnessed	 in	 the	 Dirac-Bohm	 case.	 However,	 Bell’s	 diagnosis	 of	 QM’s	 innate	 non-locality,	
which	the	violation	of	his	famous	inequalities	are	supposed	to	attest	to,	is	too	hasty.		
Bell	famously	elucidates	locality	(or	“local	causality”)	for	two	measurement	outcomes	A	and	B	
of	spacelike	separated	measurements,	with	measurement	settings	a	and	b	as	follows:	“[…]	
once	all	the	possible	common	causes	of	the	two	events	are	taken	into	account	(which,	guided	
by	 classical	 relativistic	 intuitions,	 we	 take	 to	 reside	 in	 their	 joint	 past),	 we	 expect	 the	
probability	distributions	 for	 the	measurement	outcomes	 to	be	 independent	and	no	 longer	
display	 any	 correlations.”185 	Formally,	 with	𝜆 	denoting	 all	 relevant	 causal	 factors,	 i.e.	 the	
common	causes	in	the	overlap	of	the	past	cones	of	the	measurement	events,	the	probability	
distribution	 𝕡𝒂/𝒃 ,	 expressing	 the	 correlations	 between	 the	 measurement	 outcomes,	
dependent	only	locally	on	the	measurement	setups	a/b,	factorises:	𝕡𝒂,𝒃 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝜆 = 𝕡𝒂 𝐴 𝜆 𝕡𝒃 𝐵 𝜆 .	
																																																						
184	Bell	(1987),	p.	115	
185	Brown	(2005),	p.184	
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From	this	Bell	derives	his	inequalities,	which	QM	generically	violates	for	entangled	states.		
However,	Brown	remarks	that	“[…]	failure	of	local	causality	in	Bell’s	sense	does	not	entail	the	
presence	of	non-local	causes.	In	arriving	at	the	requirement	of	factorisability	it	is	necessary	to	
assume	 something	 like	 Reichenbach’s	 principle	 of	 the	 common	 cause;	 namely	 that	 if	
correlations	are	not	due	to	a	direct	causal	link	between	two	events,	then	they	must	be	due	to	
common	causes,	such	causes	having	been	identified	when	conditionalization	of	the	probability	
distribution	 results	 in	 statistical	 independence.”186 	The	 violation	 of	 quantum	 correlations	
satisfying	Bell’s	local	causality	thus	could	simply	imply	that	quantum	correlations	aren’t	always	
apt	for	causal	explanations;	violation	of	local	causality	on	its	own	needn’t	imply	non-locality	
in	the	guise	of	an	instantaneous	action-at-a-distance.	
sdBBT	takes	that	route:	It	blocks	the	very	formulation	of	Bell’s	local	causality	by	rejecting	the	
Principle	 of	 Common	 Cause	 (whose	 scope	 of	 validity	 remains	 contented	 on	 independent	
grounds,	also	in	classical	physics187).	Recall	from	our	discussion	of	Humphreys’	Paradox	that	
we	embraced	from	the	outset	sdBBT’s	stochastic,	a-causal	nature.	
This	a-causality	 is	 rooted	 in	 sdBBT’s	 temporal	 solipsism,	 i.e.	 the	absence	of	any	diachronic	
identity	of	corpuscles.	It	defies	both	sdBBT’s	locality	and	non-locality.	Not	persisting	beyond	
an	 infinitesimal	 instant	 of	 time,	 corpuscles	 can	 neither	 themselves	 traverse	 arbitrary	
distances,	 nor	 can	 they	 act	 on	 each	 other:	 An	 influence	 denotes	 a	 correlation	 between	 a	
change	in	the	state	of	one	thing	and	a	change	in	the	state	of	another.	But,	lacking	diachronic	
identity,	no	pair	of	successive	positions	occupied	by	corpuscles	can	be	attributed	to	the	same	
corpuscle;	no	corpuscle	at	a	different,	later	position	can	be	re-identified	with	the	corpuscle	at	
an	earlier	stage.	Conceptually,	no	corpuscle	can	change:	The	possibility	of	mutual	influence	or	
action	thus	is	blocked.	sdBBT	is	neither	an	action-at-a-distance	nor	a	local	theory!	
How	then	to	understand	entangled	states?	We	submit	that	sdBBT	simply	postulates	brute	fact	
statistical	correlations	that	reflect	the	wavefunction’s	non-separability.	
More	in	detail,	following	Einstein’s	view	on	QM188,	entangled	corpuscles	can	be	understood	
“literally”	–	namely	as	failure	of	separability	of	their	propensities:	Separated	subsystems	of	a	
																																																						
186	Op.cit.	p.	185	
187	Cf.	Arntzenius	(2010)	
188	Cf.	Howard	(1985,	1989)	
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joint	 system	 typically	 no	 longer	 possess	 separate	 wavefunctions.	 The	 wavefunction	 thus	
represents	a	holistic,	dispositional	property.	When	performing	a	measurement,	we	register	
correlations	between	manifestations	of	these	non-separable	dispositions.	The	correlations,	by	
themselves	relativistically	 innocuous,	then	are	brute	facts	of	a	fundamental,	non-separable	
reality.	Only	when	trying	to	further	explain	them	in	terms	of	a	common	cause	does	the	pickle	
regarding	compatibility	with	SR	start	–	but	there	is	neither	need	nor	justification	(beyond	the	
merely	 heuristic	 fecundity)	 to	 impose	 the	 a	 priori	 demand	 all	 correlations	 require	
explanation.189	Fine	offers	a	helpful	analogy:	“[Such	a	demand]	is	like	the	ideal	that	was	passed	
on	 in	 the	 dynamical	 tradition	 from	 Aristotle	 to	 Newton,	 that	 motion	 as	 such	 requires	
explanation.”190		
It	deserves	to	be	mentioned	how	sdBBT	escapes	Einstein’s	transcendental	criticism	of	non-
separability. 191 	Distinguishing	 meticulously	 between	 non-separability	 and	 non-locality,	 he	
argued,	 that	were	QM	complete,	we’d	have	 to	 abandon	 separability,	 i.e.	 the	 independent	
existence	of	separated	systems;	and	“(i)f	this	axiom	were	to	be	completely	abolished,	the	idea	
of	the	existence	of	(quasi-)	enclosed	systems,	and	thereby	the	postulation	of	laws	which	can	
be	checked	empirically	in	the	accepted	sense,	would	become	impossible.”192	sdBBT	blocks	this	
worry	in	a	twofold	way:	Firstly,	QM	isn’t	regarded	as	complete:	As	a	minimal	extension	of	QM,	
sdBBT	supplements	it	by	the	primitive	ontology	in	terms	of	corpuscles	and	their	positions	as	
beables.	 Secondly,	 the	 actual	 configurations	 of	 one	 subsystem	exist	 indeed	 independently	
from	 those	of	 a	 remote	 subsystem:	 The	 actual,	 local	 configurations	 completely	 define	 the	
actual	 state	 of	 each	 subsystem;	 nonetheless,	 there	 exist	 correlations	 between	 them	 that	
betoken	the	non-separable	disposition	of	the	joint	system.	
Finally,	 one	 might	 worry	 about	 a	 metaphysical	 incompatibility	 between	 SR	 and	 sdBBT’s	
stochasticity.	Arguably,	SR	is	best	understood	in	terms	of	a	Block	Universe	View193,	with	no	
temporal	part	of	an	object’s	4-dimensional	worldline	being	ontologically	distinguished	as	“the	
present”	and	the	present	only	an	indexically	designated	point	on	the	worldline.	By	contrast,	
																																																						
189	Cf.	Fine	(1989)	for	an	elaboration	of	this	for	QM	
190	Op.cit.,	p.	192	
191	Cf.	Howard	(1985,1989);	also	Brown	(2005),	Appendix	B3	
192	Einstein	(1948),	quoted	in	Brown	(2005),	p.	187	
193	Cf.	e.g.	Petkov	(2009),	esp.	Ch.	5	and	6;	Cf.,	however,	Dickson	(1989),	Ch.	8	for	a	criticism	
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the	strong	intuition	prevails,	articulated	e.g.	by	Popper194,	that	in	an	indeterministic	world	the	
future	is	“open”,	i.e.	un-determined,	while	the	past	is	“fixed”,	unalterable;	consequently,	the	
present	is	the	ontologically	distinguished	moment,	where	pure	potentiality	of	the	open	future	
turns	 into	 the	 congealed	 facticity	 of	 the	 past.	 By	 introducing	 such	 an	 ontologically	
distinguished	hypersurface	that	defines	the	present,	this	(“Growing	Block	Universe”)	view	has	
been	 argued	 to	 collide	 with	 SR.	 Consequently,	 as	 a	 stochastic	 and	 hence	 indeterministic	
theory,	sdBBT	entails	a	Growing	Block	Universe	Theory	of	Time	–	in	conflict	with	SR.	
The	conflict	can	be	resolved	by	challenging	the	claim	that	stochastic	theories	are	committed	
to	the	kind	of	indeterminism	that	implies	an	open	future	in	the	above	sense.	Dispositionalism	
offers	a	 straightforward	alternative	conceptualisation	of	 indeterminism:	The	4-dimensional	
picture	of	actual	reality	in	such	an	indeterministic	world	isn’t	that	of	continuous	trajectories	
of	corpuscles	in	Minkowski	spacetime;	rather,	the	corpuscles	are	distributed	in	spacetime	like	
dust.195	In	other	words:	Whereas	the	disposition	evolves	deterministically,	its	manifestation	
takes	the	form	of	dust	sprinkled	over	spacetime,	their	distribution	typically	approximating	the	
relativistic	 analogues	 to	 the	 Born	 Rule,	 relative	 to	 an	 observer.	 Such	 a	 view	 is	 effortlessly	
compatible	with	a	Block	Universe	View,	and	might	aptly	be	called	a	Dust	Universe	View.	(A	
perhaps	helpful	paraphrase	is	that	in	the	Dust	Universe	View,	the	4-dimensional	spacetime	
isn’t	pervaded	by	continuous	particle	 trajectories;	 rather,	 the	“dust	of	events”	 is	 randomly	
distributed.)	
In	summary,	we	have	seen	that	-within	the	framework	(and	confines)	of	relativistic	QM-	sdBBT	
suggests	 considerable	 advantages	 over	 dBBT;	 a	 comparative	 evaluation	 of	 quantum	 field	
theoretic	extensions	of	both	therefore	seems	promising.196	V.	Summary	and	outlook	
We	started	our	investigation	with	examining	the	conceptual	tension	between	ambitions	for	
an	 inveterately	 objectivist	 “quantum	 theory	 without	 observers”,	 the	 probabilistic	 QEH,	
guaranteeing	 dBBT’s	 empirical	 adequacy,	 and	 its	 determinism,	 as	 introduced	 via	 the	 GE.	
																																																						
194	Cf.	Popper	(1988),	Ch.	III,	sect.	18.	Popper	adduces	this	“argument	from	the	asymmetry	of	the	past	and	the	
future”	to	support	his	indeterminism.	
195	Cf.	also	Petkov	(2009),	Ch.	10,	who	calls	this	view	“4-atomism“.	
196	It	seems	plausible,	however,	that	the	deBroglie-Bohmian	framework,	narrowly	understood	as	a	particle-based	
primitive	ontology	with	position	as	beables,	needs	to	give	way	to,	say,	a	field-based	primitive	ontology	with	e.g.	
fermion	number,	as	Bell’s	model	for	a	Hamiltonian	QFT	suggests,	cf.	Bell	(1984).	
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Further	analysis	identified	the	latter	as	the	source	of	even	more	problems,	related	to	dBBT’s	
formal	 definability,	 uniqueness,	 the	 violation	 of	 the	 Action	 Reaction	 Principle	 and	 the	
contrived-looking	 double	 role	 of	 the	 wavefunction.	 Fortunately,	 the	 GE	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
redundant:	 All	 explanatory	 work	 w.r.t.	 solving	 the	 Measurement	 Problem,	 empirical	
equivalence	with	QM	or	the	natural	justification	of	the	Symmetrisation	Postulate,	is	done	by	
dBBT’s	 particle	 primitive	 ontology	 with	 position	 as	 beables	 and	 contextuality	 of	 all	 other	
dynamical	variables.	This	suggested	to	excise	the	GE,	whilst	keeping	dBBT’s	aforementioned	
ontological	 framework,	 yielding	 a	 realist,	 albeit	 fundamentally	 stochastic/indeterministic	
theory	 –	 sdBBT	 –	 the	 probabilities	 of	 which	 we	 proposed	 to	 construe	 as	 an	N-corpuscle	
universe’s	disposition	to	spontaneously/randomly	actualise	a	certain	configuration.	We	tried	
to	make	the	case	that	sdBBT	counts	as	a	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory,	deserving	to	be	
taken	seriously	as	a	potentially	fundamental	account	of	microscopic	reality.	It	turned	out	to	
be	a	many	worlds	theory	–	however	with	the	arguably	slightly	eccentric	feature	of	“temporal	
solipsism”:	 FAPP-classical	 worlds	 typically	 exist	 actualiter	 only	 for	 an	 instant,	 before	
absconding	again	into	potentiality.	Future	research	regarding	sdBBT,	especially	along	the	lines	
of	its	relativistic	field-theoretical	extension,	is	promising.		
Its	relation,	too,	to	other	theories	sparks	off	a	number	of	exciting	questions:	
• Above	we	presented	sdBBT	as	a	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory	and	argued	for	
its	superiority	vis-à-vis	dBBT.	Another	theory	seems	to	qualify	equally	well	as	minimally	
deBroglie-Bohmian	 –	 namely	 Nelson	 Stochastics,	 which	 aims	 to	 derive	 the	
wavefunction	 and	 its	 Schrödinger	 dynamics	 from	 a	 classical	 Wiener-process	 in	
configuration	 space,	 subject	 to	 certain	 natural	 constraints. 197 	It	 would	 be	 highly	
interesting	to	compare	sdBBT	to	Nelson	Stochastics:	Might	sdBBT	prove	advantageous	
also	vis-à-vis	other	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	Theories?	
• More	generally,	how	does	sdBBT	fare	vis-à-vis	other	primitive	ontology	approaches	to	
QM? 198 	Of	 special	 interest	 is	 a	 comparison	 with	 “Schrödinger’s	 Many	 Worlds	
Interpretation”	 (Allori	 et	 al. 199 ),	 an	 arguably	 minimally	 “continuous-matter-field	
																																																						
197	Cf.	Bacciagaluppi	(2005)	for	a	review,	as	well	as	a	comparison	with	dBBT.	
198	Cf.	Esfeld	(2014)	for	“guidelines	for	an	assessment	of	the	proposals”.	He	argues	for	the	superiority	of	dBBT.	
Given	our	result	of	sdBBT’s	superiority	over	dBBT,	sdBBT’s	superiority	seems	to	follow	straightforwardly,	but	a	
direct	comparison	might	yield	instructive	details.	
199	Cf.	Allori	et	al.	(2014)	
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primitive	 ontology”	 (Allori	 et	 al.).	 It	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 Everettian	 many	 worlds	
counterpart	to	sdBBT,	in	which	temporal	solipsism	is	overcome.	
• Perhaps	even	more	alluring	will	be	the	comparison	with	proposals	from	the	rivalling	
“wavefunction	ontology”	 (Allori)	 camp,	a	 strictly	monist	 approach	which	postulates	
nothing	(e.g.	corpuscles,	 fields,	etc.)	on	top	of	the	wavefunction.	Of	special	 interest	
will,	of	course,	be	the	comparison	with	Everett’s	Many	Worlds	Interpretation.		
Besides	its	many	worlds	character	being	perceived	as	metaphysically	too	sumptuous,	
criticism	of	the	Many	Worlds	Interpretation	has	tended	to	focus	on	the	role	and	status	
of	probabilities	and	the	Problem	of	the	Preferred	Basis,	both	of	which	sdBBT	eschews	
ab	initio.	
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